Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Illinois, 1916. / Vita. Chapter I reprinted from the Journal of philosophy, psychology, and scientific methods. vol. XV, no. 12, June 6, 1918.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1936. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / The problem for this thesis is primarily to determine if an ethical theory can be constructed for William James and, incidentally, to determine what relationship it bears to the rest of his philosophy. If the ethical theory is to be constructed, it must give some account for the place of reason in ethical decisions as well as some account of basic ethical principles. It is essential to deal with the problem of the place of reason in James's ethical theory before presenting the basic principles of his ethical theory because the solution of it makes the argument for the basic principles meaningful. James arrives at the conclusion that reason is limited. In criticizing the contrary position, which he calls intellectualism, James says that there are two epistemological maxims: know truth and avoid error. The latter, if strictly obeyed, might tend to turn one away from the truth needlessly, when it is within his grasp. James's final criticism of intellectualism is that it relies for its own foundation upon something more than reason. Intellectualism can only be asserted on the grounds of faith or volitional nature. Scepticism is criticized in the same manner by James. Scepticism is merely one act of the volitional nature laying down the law over all other acts of the volitional nature and saying that they are improper. Finally, James must exercise his own volitional nature in going beyond reason [TRUNCATED]

The problem considered in this thesis is whether or not there is an ethics of belief. The notion that it could be right or wrong to believe something is examined. William James, in The Will To Believe, advocated the right to believe, in certain cases, whatever most tempts one's will. William Kingdon Clifford had earlier argued in The Ethics Of Belief that it is always wrong to believe anything for which the evidence is insufficient. I have argued that belief is not an action that can be executed or refrained from at will but is the acceptance of something as being true. As such, it is not possible for us to believe what most appeals to us unless we deem it true. If 'belief’ is used in any other sense than 'deem true', the true-false distinction is vitiated. Since belief is not an action and is therefore not voluntary, the ethics of belief cannot apply to what is believed. The right or wrong of belief applies to the attitude we adopt to a certain proposition or to the manner in which we acquire our beliefs. The distinction is made between belief-cultivation and inquiry. A detailed analysis of The Will To Believe is then undertaken. The claim that religion is a hypothesis which we can verify is questioned. It seems that before one can 'test' the hypothesis, one must believe it already — thus there is really no test at all. The contrasts between science and religion are presented -- explanation being the main concern of the former and consolation that of the latter. The following six claims are called into question: 1) the decision regarding the truth or falsity of religion is forced and momentous, 2) no test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon, 3) there is a striking similarity between the potential religious believer and the scientific investigator, 4) the universe must have a purpose, 5) in religion, faith creates its own verification, 6) to believe in religion requires hope and courage while to doubt or disbelieve indicates fear and cowardice. It is concluded that even if religious belief influences or changes our actions and reactions, this is proof not of the truth of religion but of its utility, which may be helpful or harmful to the individual and to society. My thesis, in short, is that insofar as we attempt to proportion belief to our desires and not to the evidence, we risk losing the true-false distinction altogether. We thus risk loss of communication with others. And effective communication, I submit, is essential to the acquisition and transmission of knowledge — the raison d'etre of philosophy. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Inaug.-Diss.--Erlangen. / Bibliography: p. [89]-91.

Thèse d'université--Lettres--Paris, 1950. / Bibliogr. f. I-VI. - Ex. dactylographié.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

Zugl.: Tübingen, Univ., Habil.-Schr., 2009

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / The purpose of this thesis is to compare and contrast the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James in two respects: (1) their ideas of reality and (2) their doctrines of the continuity of consciousness and its metaphysical implications. Chapter II traces their different theories of reality to basic differences in their metaphysical orientations. Peirce, as a metaphysical realist, maintains that general terms refer to ideas and laws which are realities apart from the particulars which manifest them and the minds which apprehend them. The real correspondents of general terms are within two realms of being: the realm of first-ness, which is possibility and feeling; and the realm of thirdness, which is law, meaning, and thought, all of which are synonymous. Both differ from the world of existence, or secondness, in which possibility is actualized, and in which ideas, including laws, are physically and mentally operative. [TRUNCATED]

William James came of age at a time of great social and intellectual change in the United States. During this period, new professional identities proliferated, and a new culture of professionalization developed with important ramifications for conceptions of individual and social identity. Professionalization was also closely related to key intellectual developments of the time, such as the application of scientific methods to social and human questions and the consolidation of intellectual work within the university. This thesis chronicles James's struggle to find a place within this society that both satisfied his personal desire for individual growth and freedom and established him within the context of professional academia, arguing that James's difficulties in finding a professional identity were inseparable from his development of a unique intellectual voice. The thesis then explores how James expressed his personal identity and insights in his work as professional academic and psychologist. / Graduation date: 2003