The subject of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is widely known and has the public attention. Still it is not processed enough by the historians. The end of the 1980's, as a period of withrdraw of the Soviet soldiers, draws more attention. Even the person of Jimmy Carter does not draw that much attention as the personality of his successor Ronald Reagan. The author will concentrate on the steps that were taken consequently after the Soviet incursion by the leading policy makers of the USA headed by president Carter. The author will analyse the indirect American involvement in the conflict and its influence on the relations of the superpowers and the condiotions in the administrative of the president of the USA. The author will also make an effort to show the continuity with the previous foreign policy of USA, Afghanistan and Soviet Union.

This D.Phil constitutes an investigation led by studio practice and supported by archival and desk-based research into knowledge production through the building of complex cosmologies; specifically those created de novo in visual art practice and 'outsider science' oeuvres. It considers how these cosmologies relate to mainstream science, definitions of outsider art, and other complex cultural systems such as alchemy. Through a more detailed analysis of the work of the British artist John Latham and American outsider cosmologist James Carter, the thesis undertakes this investigation through discussions on the development of these systems and a consideration of the epistemologies these cosmologies reveal. The studio practice elements drive this investigation forward by interrogating themes including the relationship between culture and complex systems, alchemical epistemology, and the struggle to relate to unintuitive science.

In this paper I apply the Rational Actor model to the 1993-1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis. I begin with two hypotheses: 1) North Korea attempted nuclear armament because of its perception of threat from South Korea and the United States; 2) North Korea attempted nuclear armament because it wanted to use its nuclear program as leverage to obtain economic assistance from the United States. I conduct a diplomatic historical analysis based on the Rational Actor model to determine which was North Korea's primary objective, and conclude that the primary objective of North Korea was obtaining economic concessions, but that threat perception did seem to play a role in the decision to start the nuclear program. In this process, I show that the Rational Actor model was insufficient in the analysis and that it must be complemented by cultural factors, "thickening" the rationality. / Master of Arts