Thesis--University of Washington. / Vita. Another copy has number: Thesis 27330. Bibliography: leaaves [227]-248.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2009. / "May 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-111). Also available online.

viii, 151 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / Current realist explanations of why states decide to develop nuclear weapons cannot account for the behavior of states that lack a clear strategic threat. An alternative explanation is necessary to explain such behavior. I argue that domestic regimes in states with no clear strategic threat may develop nuclear weapons in order to ensure their survival. Such regimes are internationally isolated, under pressure from major powers in the international system and possess some preexisting nuclear capacity. Under these conditions, increasing domestic instability causes regimes to pursue a course of nuclear development. Nuclear weapons allow a regime to change the preferences of the great powers that would otherwise prefer to see the regime overthrown. If the regime possesses nuclear weapons, because of the costs and risks associated with those weapons, the great power will favor maintenance of the status quo and may even prop up a regime it intensely dislikes. / Committee in Charge: Lars Skalnes, Chair; Jane Cramer; Mikhail Myagkov

No description available.

This thesis will investigate the feasibility of developing nationsâ ability to create a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry in the 21st century using China and India as case studies. I propose it is not possible for developing nations in the current context of the globalized arms race to build an advanced arms industry because of the high political and economic costs. Diverse competing interests force politicians to make decisions about distribution and usage of resources that will maintain their legitimacy. The hypothesis does not rule out that some domestic advancements may be made in certain sectors, such as nuclear bombs and missiles, because resources may be spent on narrowly defined goals instead of the development of the whole industry. Nor does it rule out that a developing nation cannot have a modern military with advanced weaponry, just that the weapons will not all be wholly domestic. They will obtain advanced weapons through joint development, purchasing, or licensing. Political and economic cost will explain the failure of a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry to fully develop, as well as illustrate the few successes within certain sectors of the industry.

The North Korean nuclear weapons program poses a challenge to stability in Northeast Asia. The United States' foreign policy with North Korea takes a hard-line position, and cannot solve this problem unilaterally and must rely on support from the other countries in the region. Solving this nuclear issue is only one piece of the stability challenge in this region. North Korea's nuclear program gained international attention when it signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, threatened to withdraw in 1993, withdrew in 2003, and stated it has a nuclear weapons capability in 2005. The Six-Party Talks were initiated with the goal of stopping and dismantling North Korea's entire nuclear weapons program, and has had limited success. Previous negotiations between North Korea and the United States have ended with one party, usually North Korea, failing to uphold its part of the agreement. The Six-Party Talks may be successful, but may take decades. It comes down to the question, is the United States pursuing the best foreign policy toward North Korea? This thesis examines North Korea's nuclear program history, how it perceives itself and others, reviews the current U.S. policy, recommends a flexible policy, and proposes a method of implementation. / US Army (USA) author.

China's reactions to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and their implications for the United States are presented in this thesis. The 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1998 Indian Nuclear test were the prime causes of the enduring Sino-Indian rivalries, and differing views from Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington are explored. The U.S.-India Strategic Partnership is briefly covered with emphasis placed on the desired improvements in U.S.- India Civil Nuclear Cooperation. Several Chinese-specific concepts, Beijing's White Paper on arms control, as well as, Beijing's perceptions of threats from Washington and New Delhi are considered before Beijing's perceptions of and reactions to the India deal are investigated. This thesis concludes by analyzing the implications of Chinese reactions to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and offers recommendations for U.S. policy toward Asia. Although the deal has not been formally concluded as of the writing of this thesis, the intent, implications, and reactions are all relevant to policy considerations. / US Navy (USN) author.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 162-165). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Hafez, Mohammed ; Kadhim, Abbas. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Iran, Nuclear weapons, Deterrence, Homeland defense, Homeland security. Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-90). Also available in print.

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