What is a nuclear umbrella alliance and how does it differ from other defensive alliances in international politics? Scholars and practitioners frequently refer to this type of pact, but no study has defined it or identified how a nuclear security guarantee, as an umbrella alliance is better-termed, is unique. This dissertation presents and tests a theory of nuclear security guarantee formation and management. In Chapter 1, I establish two factors that make nuclear security guarantees novel: their ambiguous treaty content and unilateral provision of military aid. I present my Theory of Absolute Alliances, positing that these alliance attributes can be explained by the fact that security guarantees aim to establish deterrence by punishment in addition to deterrence by denial. Security guarantees' vague content and one-sided provision of capabilities, however, means that they are also riddled with vexing information problems that patron and client must manage at all stages of their alliance relations. I derive three hypotheses on security guarantee formation, entrapment, and abandonment that are tested in this project. In Chapters 2 and 3 I present a hypothesis on nuclear security guarantee formation, positing that while the presence of shared adversaries among prospective allies may explain the formation of many defense pacts, nuclear security guarantees have more exacting conditions for formation. For security guarantees to form, prospective allies should have exclusive adversaries--that is, one or more shared adversaries and no unshared adversaries--between them. I test this proposition statistically and using case studies of the US decision to deny Israel a formal security guarantee and the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance, a non-security guarantee. In Chapter 4 I hypothesize that security guarantees' ambiguous and unilateral nature may create a heightened risk of crisis entrapment for patrons. These features serve the purposes of general deterrence, but once an ally is involved in a crisis, they also mean that the patron is inclined to intervene to clarify its commitment to a weaker ally that cannot credibly defend itself. I test this hypothesis using summary statistics and qualitative case studies of the US-Taiwan and Sino-Soviet alliances in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. I also examine US non-intervention in the Beagle Channel Crisis, a non-security guarantee case. In Chapters 5, I present a hypothesis on client state abandonment fears. Security guarantee clients are prone to particularly acute abandonment fears, and I posit that because of the a priori information deficits in these pacts, abandonment fears can be addressed through the unilateral provision of information on patron strategies and policies. I examine case studies of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and the Extended Deterrence Dialogues in the US-Japan alliance, and consultation in the US-Thailand alliance, a non-security guarantee. I find significant support for my three hypotheses and conclude this study with directions for future research and policy implications.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2008. / "May 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 87-96). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 224-268).

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / Throughout twenty-five years of strained relations, U.S. policy efforts have delayed but not thwarted Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program, largely because Washington has failed to influence Iran's motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons. There are three main motivations behind Iran's nuclear program. First, at the systemic level, external threats drive Iran's perceived need for a nuclear deterrent. Second, at the individual level, well placed governmental elites propel the nuclear security myth to spur nationalistic support for nuclear weapons. Third, at the state level, institutional bureaucracies, created to build Iran's nuclear infrastructure, now compete against other organizations for their own self interests, which are closely associated with the continued development of nuclear weapons. The thesis recommends three policy tracks, addressing causal factors at each level. First, the United States should try to create a new Gulf Security organization, including Iran and the new Iraqi government, to build a collective security environment without nuclear weapons. Second, Washington should build a multilateral coalition to contain Iranian proliferation activities while offering economic incentives for Iranian disarmament. Third, the United States should work to discredit Iran's nuclear security myth by fostering a public debate within Iran on the costs of nuclear weapons, using U.S.-run media. / Major, United States Air Force

In the face of Tehran's vitriolic rhetoric and outright refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, why do Russia, China and India refuse to support the United States and the EU-3 in their efforts to curtail Iran's pursuit of a complete and indigenous nuclear fuel cycle? Russia's motivations stem from its desire to establish itself as a counter to American hegemony and also to maximize its significant financial relationship with Iran. China's booming economy is dependant on its vast manufacturing infrastructure, which is increasingly dependant on Middle Eastern oil for its energy needs. Thus, China is unlikely to take a hard stand on Iran. India's energy demands are growing almost as quickly as those of China and Iran is a vital source of natural gas and oil for India. Also, Iran can be seen as a test case in India's desire to maintain an independent foreign policy. Containing Iran to the detriment of relations with these countries is not a path the United States should follow. U. S. foreign policy should support a verifiably peaceful nuclear program in Iran, with defined and unambiguous penalties should it come to light that the technology is diverted towards a military application. / US Navy (USN) author.

Recent case studies suggest that states highly motivated to obtain nuclear weapons will eventually succeed. If Iran manages to go nuclear, as Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have done, what will the Arabian Gulf region look like after Tehran acquires these weapons? This thesis investigates the likely responses of Israel, the Arab Gulf States, and Pakistan to an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. A detailed examination of regional statements and media analysis shows that the region will likely not be further unbalanced. Instead, these states will pursue rational responses to diminish any Iranian threats. This thesis argues that Israel will develop a mutually deterring relationship with Tehran. The Arab Gulf States will not yield to the temptation to develop domestic nuclear programs-instead they will continue to outsource state security needs. Pakistan, focused on India and lacking serious issues with Iran, will create an understanding to avoid conflict. Iranian nuclear weapon acquisition will be universally unwelcome, but the United States can mitigate the negative impact by extending security guarantees to states requiring protection against a potentially more aggressive nuclear Iran.

The concept of Strategic Culture was developed during the Cold War years as a tool to analyse the nuclear policies of the Soviet Union and the United States, in an effort to assess the likelihood of their utilising their nuclear capabilities. Strategic Culture provides a useful lens through which we may understand the context, outlook and behaviour of states, shedding light on the way they perceive the international community and their role within it. As the Cold War came to an end, the focus of Strategic Culture literature shifted from the nuclear bipolarity that characterised U.S.-Soviet relations, to focus on other states and issue areas that dominated the international agenda within the New World Order. This thesis seeks to return to the original tenets of Strategic Culture, bringing attention back to the initial remits of this area of study, that is, the nuclear strategic cultures of the U.S.A. and Russia. Further to identifying the strategic cultures of the United States and Russia, this research questions whether these have been impacted by the change in international order brought on by the end of the Cold War. This work will also question whether nuclear weapons contorted their respective strategic cultures, or whether their strategic cultures were insulated from the impact of nuclear weapons. It will also assess whether the differences in strategic cultures have brought about differences in nuclear policy.

Recent research literatures focused on the development and principles of using nuclear weapons in People Republic of China(PRC). For instance, the one-sidely withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the United States, the construction of ballistic missile defense system, the value of capability of hitting power for both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and persistence of outer space weapons development. Most of them studied the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and highlighted the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the principle of using nuclear weapons, and the deterrence strategy, rare did research focus on the integrative nuclear weapons strategy. The study aims to analyze PRC nuclear weapons strategy including nuclear weapons policies, the principles of use, approaches of deterrence, approaches and objects of hitting, methods of commend and control, and policies of controlling nuclear arms. Moreover, the study foresees the future of PRC nuclear weapons strategy based on the analysis of the similarity of the development of nuclear weapons strategy in main countries on the global, the influence of inner and outer factors to nuclear weapons strategy, the situation of PRC¡¦s abiding by international regimes about nuclear weapons, related research literatures with regard to the challenge of PRC nuclear weapons strategy, and the associations between both the development of outer space military and nuclear weapons strategy.

The thesis is a sociological study of the Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp. It addresses the question of how it is possible for women to act collectively to promote social change: primarily, to resist and transform relations of male domination and female subordination, and, secondarily, to resist the forces of militarism. It highlights the importance for feminist sociology of theoretical and substantive attention to women's agency. The thesis offers an analysis of the origins of Greenham, thereby developing a critique of the gender-ignorance of previous theoretical work on social movements and arguing the importance of attention to macro-, ineso- and micro-level processes in the studying of the creation of collective politA.cal action. The particular character and ethos of Greenham as a form of feminist politics is explored, both in terms of the internal workings of the movement and in its actions confronting the outside world. The responses of the forces which were challenged by Greenham are analyzed, in order to assess its impact. Finally, the transformations in consciousness and identity experienced by women who had been involved with Greenham are discussed, contributing both theoretically and substantively to feminist understandings of women's consciousness and identity.

Thesis (M.S. - Hydrology and Water Resources)--University of Arizona, 1983. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-73).