The nuclear age provided U.S. soldiers and statesmen with unprecedented challenges. the U.S. military had to incorporate a weapon into strategic calculations without knowing whether the use of the weapon would be approved. Broad considerations of policy led President Dwight Eisenhower to formulate a policy that relied on nuclear weapons while fully realizing their destructive potential. Despite the belief that possession of nuclear weapons provided strategic superiority, the U.S. realized that such weapons were of little value. This realization did not stop planners from attempting to find ways to use nuclear weapons in Korea and Indochina.

Though many international relations theorists have speculated that the spread of nuclear weapons may diminish the frequency - if not the severity - of military conflict among states, there are five reasons to expect that increased proliferation will increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be employed for coercive or destructive purposes. These dangers are independent of one another; that is, they are not interconnected as causes and effects. First, as nuclear weapons spread, the notion that these weapons are useful for purposes other than deterrence will spread concomitantly. Those who argue that the spread of nuclear weapons will diminish conflict wrongly assume that the leaders of new nuclear states will consider nuclear weapons useful only for deterrence. Second, actors within states may support policies that undermine deterrence stability. Specifically, such actors could support the deployment of weaponry and other technologies that could - in certain strategic contexts - provide incentives for pre-emptive attacks by one side or the other. Third, one side of an inter-state rivalry may acquire nuclear weapons long in advance of its vulnerable adversary. Often, the leaders of states that enjoy such advantages contemplate attacking their rival before it can acquire nuclear weapons, too. Fourth, though new nuclear states will be assumed to be as careful with their weapons as the older nuclear states, proliferation may nevertheless cause the probability of such accidents to grow at an accelerating rate. As the number of nuclear states increases, the distances between these states decrease, and some of them may assume dangerous launch-on-warning force postures to compensate for their perceived vulnerability to sudden attack. Launch-on-warning increases the danger that accidents could escalate into nuclear violence. Fifth, surreptitious attempts may be made by third parties to instigate nuclear war between other states. The likelihood that the provocateur of such an incident would remain undiscovered increases as the number of nuclear states grows - as does the temptation to instigate such an event.

Access to nuclear technology and growing concern over the spread of nuclear weapons triggered an international debate in the 1960s that led to the creation of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Ratified in 1970, NPT was designed to prevent the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons and limit destructive uses of nuclear energy. At the same time, it also normalized the arsenals of existing nuclear states and encouraged exchanges of nuclear information, technology, and materials for peaceful purposes. Nonproliferation policy relies on a theory of the development process that identifies a nuclear frontier to locate evidence of nuclear capabilities. Absent from the proliferation model, however, are cases of covert nuclear weapons programs. For almost 50 years, it has been generally accepted that Israel is a nuclear weapon state, yet Israeli officials have never confirmed nor denied the possession of nuclear weapons. Israel has not signed NPT and has not appeared to conduct a nuclear test, in effect absolving the nuclear program's main reactor from international inspections. Uncertainty surrounding the Israeli program stems from a tradition of deliberate secrecy and deception that constitutes a national policy of opacity. This study argues that opacity has armed Israel with the privilege of nuclear immunity, exempting its secret nuclear activity from the standards and regulations imposed on all other nuclear weapon states. To circumvent the barriers built by opacity, a mixture of declassified material, nuclear history and security literature, and postcolonial studies refines the history of Israel's nuclear program. By examining the American-Israeli nuclear relationship, the sources of opacity, and the framework of nonproliferation that sustains an international nuclear regime, Israel's role in the nuclear world becomes visible.

Yes / This report supports the second in a series of briefings on Trident to be published during 2007 and 2008 as part of the Bradford Disarmamenet Research Centre's programme on Nuclear-Armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability.

Yes / This briefing paper is the first in a series to published through 2007 and 2008 as part of the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre¿s programme on ¿Nuclear-armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability¿. The programme has been generously funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. / Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust

Yes / This briefing paper is the third in a series to be published during 2007 and 2008 as part of the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre¿s programme on Nuclear-Armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability. / Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust

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