Nuclear weapons remain salient to international security and stability given their continued existence within the strategic context of interstate relations, as well as their continued proliferation to state actors and potentially to non-state actors. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia have dramatically reduced their nuclear arsenals; however, the U.S and Russia today still have the large majority of the world's nuclear inventory, with thousands of nuclear weapons each and plans to maintain these large stockpiles. The central question of this study is-how does one reconcile the size and continued existence of the U.S. nuclear arsenal with U.S. nonproliferation policy and the U.S. commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament? This study's primary argument is that a nuclear-armed state can craft a weapons policy involving nuclear posture and force structure that balances the requirements of nuclear deterrence with nuclear nonproliferation objectives and eventual nuclear disarmament, and that the U.S. has imperfectly pursued such a balanced nuclear weapons policy since the end of the Cold War. This study's primary policy recommendations are that the U.S. nuclear arsenal can be reduced further and the U.S. can modify its nuclear posture to limit the role of nuclear weapons; such nuclear weapons policy changes that limit the mission and size of U.S. nuclear forces would demonstrate genuine commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and progress towards nuclear disarmament, while also maintaining a strategic deterrence capability for the foreseeable future. The pursuit of a balanced nuclear weapons policy will allow the U.S. to function as a genuine actor to positively influence the international nuclear environment towards a potentially nuclear-free world. Ultimately, global nuclear disarmament will likely require major developments within the international system, including the solving of the world's major security issues.

No description available.

After the Cold War ended, the process of nuclear disarmament began to stagnate and in recent years there are signs of backsliding. Efforts to revive the disarmament regime over decades culminated with the drafting and ratification of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017 and 2021 respectively, much to the dismay of nuclear weapons states. The U.S., Britain, and France have declared their dismissal of the treaty while subscribing to the disarmament regime as established by the Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970.  The Western nuclear powers typically channel their opposition through NATO, and this thesis will first look at NATO’s legal arguments and as the strategy of nuclear deterrence which is fundamental to their defensive strategy. I will then investigate NATO discourse as it pertains to nuclear weapon strategy as a constituent of its subjectivity and intentionality. In other words, what it is like to “be” NATO, and in so doing understand why it acts in opposition to a goal it already pursues.  This is relevant to IR in that it explores an alterative manner in which to understand social structures while adhering to research designs typically ascribes to the “lower” unit of analysis of individuals.

Yes / This briefing paper is the second in a series to be published during 2007 and 2008 as part of the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre¿s programme on Nuclear-Armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability.

This thesis is primarily an application of the Christian tradition of Just War to the problems arising from the basing of US nuclear weapons in South Korea and the development of nuclear weapons by the regime in the North. The Christian theology of Just War has developed over the last two thousand years, adapting as first Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, through the break down of any enforceable norms in Europe‘s 'Dark Ages‘, to the emergence of the concept of the modern nation state at the end of the Thirty Years Wars in 1648. Throughout these shifts, two issues have remained constant, although their relative weight has changed. First that a war can only be described as 'just' if it is being waged for legitimate reasons, jus ad bellum, and that is waged in a proportionate manner that seeks to separate combatants from non-combatants, jus in bello. Both these ideas were severely weakened in the period of warfare that followed on from the American and French Revolutions at the end of the Eighteenth Century. The new ideology of nationalism brought with it the idea of the nation at arms, the armed citizenry, and with this, a further blurring of the always weak distinction between soldiers and the wider population. By 1945, both the secular and Christian tradition lay in ruins, damaged by the total warfare in the twentieth century when anything and anyone who could contribute to the wider war effort became a target. Also, although not the most destructive weapon, this saw the advent of the nuclear bomb. In response, Christian thinkers sought to redefine the concepts of Just War for a nuclear age, with the potential for the use of weapons that could destroy all of humanity. Some saw this as the lesser evil, when faced with the victory of a totalitarian political system, and others argued that proportionality could be maintained if the size of weapons, or their targeting, was such as to minimise wider damage. On the other hand, many theologians argued that by definition they could never be discriminate or proportionate and that their use (or even the implied threat of their use) would always fail the precepts of Jus in Bello. In the modern Korean context, this debate is not abstract, but has real bearing on the practical steps being taken by all the main parties. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the North (the DPRK) has meant that the desire for Korean re-unification has become entwined with how best to resolve the nuclear issue. At the moment, in the South amongst the Protestant communities (split between the CCK and the NCCK), this debate has become fixed on issues of practical politics. In effect, is it better to negotiate with the North over the nuclear weapons issue and hope that resolving this will then lead to reunification or is it better to aim to overthrow the DPRK (economically, politically or even militarily) and, this, by definition, would resolve the question of their possession of nuclear weapons. At the moment both the NCCK and the CCK have based their policies towards North Korea (the DPRK) on the basis of secular politics not the teachings of the Christian gospel. The NCCK is tending to overlook human rights abuses in the DPRK, and the threat of that regime‘s nuclear arsenal, in their emphasis on the need to overcome the political division of Korea. In turn, the CCK ignores much Christian teaching with its emphasis on seeking the collapse (perhaps by military means) of the DPRK as a precursor to unification. In this, both bodies seem to have forgotten that they are fundamentally Christian confessional bodies, and as such their public statements should be based on the Gospels, not on the practicalities of day to day politics. Neither approach is particularly grounded on either in the Christian message of the gospels or the Just War tradition. Thus this thesis does not just seek to explore and explain the current situation in Korea using the concepts of Just War, it also seeks to provide a basis on which the Protestant community can resolve their current impasse. This means the thesis is grounded on the Christian concept of political theology, in particular in so far as this approach 'offers alternatives to better comprehend the different postures and approaches towards a solution‘. In the case of the situation in Korea, this means there is no military solution to the problem of unification. Nor can a solution be found in ignoring the human rights abuses in the DPRK. The answer lies in stressing three aspects that remain fundamental to any Christian identity in Korea – of a unified Korean koinoina, that any resort to force must meet the conditions of the Christian Just War tradition, and that, as faith groups, any response must stem from the Gospels.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Are U.S. nuclear weapons still needed in Europe now that the threat that brought them there is gone? This thesis examines whether basing theater nuclear weapons in Europe is useful, irrelevant or counterproductive for maintaining European security. U.S. and NATO policymakers adhere to political and military utility arguments, while others argue TNWs in Europe are irrelevant-their utility has been supplanted by political, cultural and economic interdependence, modern conventional capabilities and the existential deterrent of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation and arms control advocates argue TNWs are counterproductive because they enhance, rather than deter proliferation, undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and impede cooperation in the NATO-Russia security relationship. This thesis demonstrates how economic and political ties, including widespread participation in nuclear planning, the increasing importance of the nuclear taboo, prospects for conventional deterrence and the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella render TNWs in Europe irrelevant. Emphasizing their utility provides incentive for others to join the "nuclear club," degrades the nonproliferation regime, and creates a roadblock for NATO-Russian arms control and counterproliferation efforts. This thesis recommends withdrawing U.S. theater nuclear weapons from Europe, relying instead on a strategy of conventional deterrence and reassurance while maintaining general nuclear deterrence via strategic forces. / Major, United States Air Force

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / Despite decades of energetic international control efforts, nuclear weapons technology continues to spread worldwide. To understand how these complex weapons programs can be developed, we assume the role of a nation seeking to build a first fission weapon, and the ability to continue to build more. We introduce a large-scale project management model that includes alternate development paths to achieve certain key technical milestones. We show how such a project can be optimally accelerated by expe-diting critical tasks. Next, we present a new analysis tool to detect vulnerabilities in such a development program: we seek optimal actions to impede, set back and/or otherwise frustrate completion of a first weapon, even if the proliferator knows what we are doing to delay things. This two-sided project evaluation tool is implemented with a combination of off-the-shelf project management software, optimization software and custom code. An illustrative case study of a first fission weapon program shows how this new analysis tool can be used. Our methods also apply to chemical, biological and/or radiological dispersion weapons, as well as to more conventional strategic industrial and commercial activities. / Lieutenant, Supply Corps, United States Navy

The A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network constitutes the most severe loss of control over nuclear technology ever. For the first time in history all of the keys to a nuclear weapon*the supplier networks, the material, the enrichment technology, and the warhead designs--were outside of state oversight and control. This thesis demonstrates that Khan's nuclear enterprise evolved out of a portion of the Pakistani procurement network of the 1970s and 1980s. It presents new information on how the Pakistani state organized, managed, and oversaw its nuclear weapons laboratories. This thesis provides extensive documentation of command and control challenges faced by Pakistan and argues that Khan was largely a rogue actor outside of state oversight. The A. Q. Khan affair refutes more optimistic theories about the effects of nuclear proliferation. This case study indicates that states have a difficult time balancing an abstract notion of safety against pressing needs for organizational speed and flexibility. This thesis enumerates enabling institutional factors in Pakistan, which allowed Khan's enterprise to continue and flourish, and which might also be generalizable to other states of proliferation concern.

This thesis analyzes Libya's historic 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. In the 2 years following the decision, several theories have emerged to explain why the Libyan regime renounced these dangerous weapons. The author uses current literature and relevant sources to analyze the three most probable external causal factors: sanctions and diplomacy, intelligence, and coercive diplomacy. He finds that sanctions, diplomacy, and intelligence were significant in altering the Libyan cost-benefit analysis in favor of the West. These findings have political and theoretical implications. Lessons learned from the Libyan case will not be effective against Iran and North Korea due to differences between these countries' proliferation motivation levels and the Libyan case. However, the influence strategies that were effective against Libya are likely to be applicable in other situations. The author finds that more research is still needed to identify the conditions when different strategies are most likely to be effective.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the issue of political violence expressed via mass destruction has raised security concerns to an unprecedented degree not seen since the end of the Cold War. As a principal adversary, the Soviet Union has been replaced by terror networks applying asymmetric warfare to achieve politically charged or ideologically driven objectives. A scenario whereby non-state actors would acquire a nuclear capability not only threatens the security of the United States, but would destabilize the Westphalian notion of the primacy of nation-states within the international system. Despite U.S. expenditures of over $86 million to help nearly 30 countries worldwide in preventing the smuggling of weapons-useable radiological materials, over 20 known cases of such activity were reported between 1992 and 2001. Previous research has concentrated on a singularly defined threat: The Rogue State. Today's challenges are characterized by more defused, decentralized networks, to include transnational actors with the potential to proliferate and supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade radiological material. This thesis examines the applicability of traditional Cold War strategies such as deterrence, pre-emption, prevention, and coercive diplomacy in the present context, to deny extremist groups and associated networks the means to buy, steal, or make nuclear and radiological weapons. This thesis proposes a multi-dimensional approach in support of mixed-strategies for winning the race against nuclear terror. The author contends that terrorist groups cannot acquire nuclear or radiological technology without the witting or unwitting support of state actors.