Abstract Since being developed in 1956, no matter it¡¦s category, function or quantity, Chinese ballistic missiles have kept renewing and increasing. For example, the development of its strategic missiles has undergone the 1st through the 3rd generation with models from Dongfeng-1 to currently developing Dongfeng-41 Ballistic Missile, and its warhead has been gradually developed from carrier of single nuclear head to combination of both traditional and nuclear warheads and to multiple warheads now. Under such multiple developments, Chinese nuclear strategy according to their official speech has still adopted ¡§minimum deterrence¡¨ claimed by the 1960¡¦s and 1970¡¦s until now, and which has already led to external speculations. They think that Chinese has devoted to modernization of ballistic missiles lately, actively developed more land-based strategic missiles and sea-based nuclear submarines, techniques of multiple warheads and space-based weapons, and reinforced the practicality of tactical nuclear missiles etc. that such development has already exceeded the ¡§minimum deterrence¡¨ strategy, which even develops towards the ¡§limited deterrence¡¨ strategy. Therefore, whether China¡¦s deterrence strategy is changing is one of the assumptions in this study. If China¡¦s deterrence strategy is no longer equipped with the minimum deterrence, then whether the most important features of the minimum deterrence by ¡§no use of nuclear weapons at first¡¨ and China¡¦s¡§three nos principle on nuclear weapons¡¨will be changed accordingly is the second assumption in this study. Chinese ballistic missiles apart from being used as deterrence can also be used to practice coercive and annihilative strategies. Especially in the issue of Taiwan, when Chinese deterrence strategy fails in terms of Taiwan, it may use coercive or annihilative strategies to achieve their political and military objectives. As the ability of Taiwan¡¦s anti-ballistic missile is obviously insufficient; so if Taiwan suffers the attack from Chinese missiles, the result will be unimaginable. Therefore, how to prevent the attack from its missiles is what I would like to discuss in this paper. For the probable battle by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the future, in order to quickly facilitate the victory, whether Chinese will use micro-kiloton nuclear warhead to destroy the important and stable military targets in Taiwan to help smooth the warfare and further crash the myth that Chinese will not use nuclear weapons against Taiwan is the 3rd assumption in this paper. Finally how to increase our defense against ballistic missiles and whether we should participate in the TMD (Theatre Missile Defense) provided by America, I will provide several suggestions for references of the related units, hoping to make certain contributions towards Taiwanese prevention against the threat from Chinese ballistic missile.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): James Russell, Peter R. Lavoy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-79). Also available online.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences / Department of Government and Public Administration

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal in covering security commitments with its foreign allies, particularly Japan. The U.S. has promised to defend allies all over the world with nuclear forces, and consequently has been forced into a delicate and precarious position. President Barack Obama wants to reach nuclear zero, which would make the world safe from nuclear destruction in the future; yet he also wants to provide security for allied nations in the present, using the
very weapons he has marked for destruction. And he is facing an aging Cold War-era nuclear arsenal that needs serious repairs and upgrades in order to remain a credible and capable deterrent. This paper argues that while the U.S nuclear posture up to this point has been satisfactory enough to prevent panic and ensure protection of Japan, the evolving nuclear posture from this point onward will strengthen the credibility of existing security commitments, deter potential attackers, and give Japan the confidence to become a more coordinated partner in the relationship. Components of the paper include the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy and deterrence, the three historical occurrences of tensions between the U.S. and Japan over nuclear issues, and the current concerns and actions in the alliance today.

This thesis is a study of what is said to be at issue in the nuclear weapons debate and constitutes the beginning of an attempt to understand its nature and significance . The technique adopted has been to offer an initial presentation of rival rationales in order to introduce the main concepts and show something of the force of these developed, positions (Vol I pp 7-30) . The two rationales are then related point by point , to give the analytical framework used in the subsequent interviews (pp 31-9) . Each pair of points is expanded and commented upon , and detailed references are given to the books and articles from which the analysis was drawn (pp 40-214) . The next section relates all of this briefly to the main party platforms in Britain , as of June 1987 (pp Zt 1- zt ) Volume II is made up of complete sets of responses to the framework of questions generated in the earlier chapters . The advantages of this method are i that in each case the rationale is laid out verbatim 9 so that premises are explicitly stated and the dependence of subsequent upon prior arguments is clearly seen . This in itself is very rarely done which is why so many proposed policies are so often , and so widely misunderstood . that , because all those consulted have responded to the same set of questions , their alternative sets of answers can be compared with one another point by point . This is the crucial and unique advantage of the approach adopted here . It ensures that what is at issue can be precisely pinpointed. The results as recorded here are in themselves striking and illuminating More important still they open the door to detailed future investigation of a kind which can be done in no other way.

Thesis (M.S.)--Joint Miitary Intelligence College, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-72).

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / "National Defense Univ Norfolk VA"--DTIC cover. Vita. "5 April 2007." Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-77). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. / Cover title. "December 2007." AD-A475 875. Includes bibliographical references. Electronic version available on the Public STINET.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2006. / Thesis Advisor(s): Anshu Chatterjee. "December 2006." AD-A462 722. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (doctoral)--Göteborgs universitet, 2007. / Thesis t.p. and abstract laid in. Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-263).