Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Jeffrey Knopf, Peter Lavoy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 111-117). Also available online.

Thesis (doctoral)--Göteborgs universitet, 2007. / Thesis t.p. and abstract laid in. Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-263).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2000. / "December 2000." Thesis advisor(s): James J. Wirtz. AD-A386 702. Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-93).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Colorado, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 208-222).

No description available.

xi, 578 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / Rational deterrence theory posits that deterrence is more likely to be successful when a state credibly communicates to its adversary that it has both the capability and intent to retaliate against threats. Yet, second-generation nuclear states, which often exist in severe security environments, have largely adopted postures of nuclear ambiguity where they do not acknowledge their nuclear weapons capabilities or the circumstances under which they would use them. To date, research has been insufficiently comparative. While some existing research offers explanations for the ambiguous nuclear postures of individual countries, it does not permit us to draw inferences across cases and assess relative explanatory power. Through comparison, both within and across cases, this project develops a more general explanation of why nuclear states choose ambiguity over a visible deterrence posture. To this end, this project analyzes the nuclear postures of three countries: Israel, India, and Pakistan. Using process tracing and the congruence procedure methodology, I assess the relative validity of existing explanations for each case and then compare these findings across the three cases. This research suggests that regional security environments, characterized by disparities in power, create strong incentives for states to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities for deterrence as well as to retain an ambiguous posture. In particular, an ambiguous posture enables regional states to avoid the costs and dangers of competitive nuclear development vis-à-vis their adversaries. The three cases also suggest that patron state pressures for non-proliferation, which combine threats and incentives, are another important constraint on the nuclear posture of second-generation nuclear states. Other variables--such as the international non-proliferation regime, domestic political interests, and the personal moral reservations of some state leaders--play some role to varying degrees in individual cases. However, these effects are limited both within the broad history of individual cases as well as in cross-case comparison of the three states. Understanding these constraints is helpful for evaluating the efficacy of policy tools designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as well as how to manage crises and conflicts between regional nuclear-armed states. / Committee in charge: Lars Skalnes, Chairperson, Political Science; Jane Kellett Cramer, Member, Political Science; Ronald Mitchell, Member, Political Science; Shaul Cohen, Outside Member, Geography

abstract: In September 1945, after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States possessed only one nuclear weapon. Thirteen years later, in September 1958, the nation possessed a significant stockpile of nuclear weapons, including the very powerful hydrogen bomb. The United States was able to build its stockpile of nuclear weapons because the Los Alamos Laboratory, once a secret wartime facility, was able to convert the forces of nature – fission and fusion – into weapons of war. The United States also was successful because of the sacrifice made by a tiny Pacific Ocean nation, The Marshall Islands, and the people of Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Atolls. Between 1946 and 1958, the United States tested sixty-six nuclear weapons in the Marshall Islands. Nuclear testing contaminated these three atolls and, in one instance, injured the people of Rongelap. As a result of this testing many of these people cannot return to their ancestral homes. This dissertation examines the many conditions that led to the creation of the Los Alamos Laboratory, its testing of nuclear weapons in the Marshall Islands, and the long term, perhaps, permanent, displacement of the people of Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation History 2015

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, resulting from the dangers associated with the use of these weapons well visible during 1945, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and a nuclear arms race as seen during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During NPT Review Conferences, held every five years, the strength and integrity of this treaty is tested. Evident in NPT review conferences is the disagreement between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states over the role and importance placed on nuclear weapons and the slow pace of nuclear disarmament. The NPT has been in force for over 40 years; however the threat of nuclear weapons still exists. It then becomes necessary to understand what role the NPT plays in the international system, which differs depending on the theoretical lens used to interpret the NPT. A realist perspective of the NPT reveals that this treaty is an instrument used by dominant states to safeguard and legitimise their hold over nuclear weapons, while denying other states access to these weapons, instead protecting their allies through extended nuclear deterrence. A liberal perspective of the NPT highlights the moral influence of this treaty as an instrument for the benefit of the greater good, to shield humanity from the dangers of a nuclear explosion by delegitimizing nuclear weapons, key to shaping the perceptions of the decision makers of states regarding state security and nuclear weapons particularly. A constructivist interpretation of the NPT argues that this treaty is a social construction by states to impose a measure of order in their relations. At particular times in history, the NPT moves between a realist and liberal interpretation based on critical events that inform its direction. Social agents (decision makers of the state) through their thinking and ideas construct and give meaning to “reality” which is constantly negotiated. With that in mind, no interpretation of the NPT is fixed and for that reason, a constructivist conclusion seems ultimately applicable, namely that the NPT is what states make of it.

Masters of Commerce / Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is one of the most dangerous materials in the world, because it is a key ingredient in making a nuclear bomb. If a terrorist organisation can get HEU, it would be close to making a nuclear bomb. After South Africa disarmed its nuclear weapons, it kept HEU that was extracted from the nuclear bombs. The US tried to persuade South Africa to blend down its HEU into low enriched uranium (LEU) or give it up for safekeeping. However, South Africa refused to give it up. After a breach at Pelindaba, a national key point facility where South Africa stores its HEU, the US intensified its efforts to pressure South Africa to give its HEU up. It even promised incentives to South Africa should they agree to give it up, but South Africa refused. The US used the nuclear terrorism narrative to justify its initiative to eliminate vulnerable materials in the world. However, South Africa is yet to be swayed. This is odd since South Africa's refusal can negatively affect its credentials as a nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament champion and its image as a norm entrepreneur. The objective of the study was to understand the role played by HEU in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. It was to explore HEU as a factor in the state's nuclear diplomacy and to understand the power of having HEU in nuclear negotiations, as well as what SA intends to do with its HEU. The study is framed theoretically by drawing on foreign policy theory, namely middle-power theory, and revisionism. It juxtaposed middle power, reformist, and revisionist positions with status quo foreign policy to analyse the role of HEU in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. As a middle power with a moral high ground, South Africa hoped that it can affect change in the nuclear regime. However, when this did not occur its foreign policy shifted to a revisionist character that is discontent with the status quo in the nuclear regime. SA is dissatisfied with the current nuclear order and wants it revised towards liberal values such as equality and nondiscrimination. It views the current nuclear order as nuclear apartheid.