Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1988. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

The end of the Cold War was briefly followed by many indications and hopes that the salience of nuclear weapons in national security strategies was in decline. However, there was soon a growing realisation in policy-making and academic circles that although the Soviet Union had disintegrated, the nuclear threat had not gone away. During this period the concepts of a ‘Second Nuclear Age' and ‘New Terrorism' entered the rhetoric of the academic and policy-making strategic community. Central themes of both of these concepts were that nuclear issues persisted in the post-Cold War world, albeit in a new format, and that reliance on nuclear deterrence as a means of maintaining peace was increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective. The orthodox negative hypotheses regarding (i) the continuing reliability of nuclear deterrence, and (ii) the management and deterrence of the threat of nuclear terrorism, can be challenged on a number of levels. Despite frequent claims to the contrary, nuclear deterrence has never been viewed as infallible and, since the 1949 Soviet atomic test, policymakers and strategic thinkers have consistently refined deterrence strategies to ensure their relevance with regards to evolving threats. Furthermore, closer examination of the various historical tensions from the first nuclear age demonstrates that the challenges of the second nuclear age, at both the state and non-state level, are not necessarily as unique as many analysts assumed. Examination of contemporary nuclear-related issues, not least the implications of horizontal nuclear proliferation, and a comparison against the Cold War historical record indicates that the concepts of the ‘Second Nuclear Age' and ‘New Terrorism' can be found wanting when measured against empirical evidence. Defence of, and over-reliance on these artificial intellectual constructs could result in a number of negative political consequences. Those stressing the uniqueness of the post-Cold War strategic environment also encourage policymakers to view the turbulence of current affairs as posing unique challenges that require entirely new approaches and modes of thinking. In doing so they are likely to iii underestimate the value and relevance of many similar Cold War experiences and lessons; the most important lesson being the enduring importance of nuclear weapons and the concomitant deterrence strategies designed to inhibit their physical use while fully utilising their physical presence.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 276-299).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1982. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 540-550).

Recent research literatures focused on the development and principles of using nuclear weapons in People Republic of China(PRC). For instance, the one-sidely withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the United States, the construction of ballistic missile defense system, the value of capability of hitting power for both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and persistence of outer space weapons development. Most of them studied the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and highlighted the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the principle of using nuclear weapons, and the deterrence strategy, rare did research focus on the integrative nuclear weapons strategy. The study aims to analyze PRC nuclear weapons strategy including nuclear weapons policies, the principles of use, approaches of deterrence, approaches and objects of hitting, methods of commend and control, and policies of controlling nuclear arms. Moreover, the study foresees the future of PRC nuclear weapons strategy based on the analysis of the similarity of the development of nuclear weapons strategy in main countries on the global, the influence of inner and outer factors to nuclear weapons strategy, the situation of PRC¡¦s abiding by international regimes about nuclear weapons, related research literatures with regard to the challenge of PRC nuclear weapons strategy, and the associations between both the development of outer space military and nuclear weapons strategy.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-246).

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

This thesis examines a largely unexplored area of deterrence theory: unconventional deterrence. Unconventional deterrence is defined herein as "persuading the opponent not to attack, via threats of unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla resistance and terrorism." It treats terrorism as a punishment strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to punish the aggressor's population. Guerrilla warfare is a denial strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to protract a war and deny the aggressor his political objectives. This study questions the underlying hypothesis of deterrence theory which says that the balance of the opponents' military capabilities is the basic determinant of successful deterrence. Rather, the hypothesis here is that the deterrer may deter the aggressor from attacking by adopting a strategy that makes the aggressor's military superiority irrelevant. The present thesis focuses primarily on relatively weak states. Unconventional deterrence is explored as a means for a weaker state to deter a considerably stronger opponent. This thesis discusses the requirements for successful deterrence, and the peculiarities of unconventional deterrence. As well, the dynamics of small wars are explored in order to unfold a paradoxical phenomenon: the possibility of an underdog's victory in war. Two case studies: (1) the Vietnam War of 1964-73 and (2) the Afghanistan War of 1979-89 are explored as examples of the weak denying the strong their objectives.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (l. 71-82). Also available via the Internet.