Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed Jan. 31, 2006). "June 2005." Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-83). Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): James A. Russell. Includes bibliographical references (p.79-83). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Daniel J. Moran. Includes bibliographical references (p. 95-101). Also available online.

No description available.

No description available.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2009. / "May 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 103-109). Also available online.

Dissertation (Ph.D. in Security Studies)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010. / Dissertation supervisor: Knopf, Jeffrey. "March 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 28, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Reassurance Strategy, Deterrence Strategy, Contingent Generalizations, "Structured, Focused Comparison," Level of Analysis, Tit-for-Tat, GRIT, Leader's Perceptions, Domestic Politics, Alliance Politics, Balance of Power, Interdependence, Identity, Motivating Factors, South Korea, North Korea, Sunshine Policy, Six-Party Talks, Gorbachev, Reagan, the End of the Cold War. Includes bibliographical references (p. 474-516). Also available in print.

In the past twenty years boot camps have been evaluated for effectiveness on reducing recidivism, crowding, and costs to the Departments of Corrections. Program and offender characteristics have been studied. This analysis intends to determine how well studied boot camps are, why there is so much disagreement in the findings, and what impact, if any, boot camp programming has had in corrections.

學界常以嚇阻理論觀點詮釋解放軍的外在戰略作為，但經由本研究透過嚇阻理論分析檢證的結果，發現事實上中共有其一貫的「威懾戰略」思維模式，並且為解放軍核心戰略「積極防禦」的依據，此戰略思維內涵承襲中國傳統戰略文化與原則，其實際意義和中共學界定義的威懾戰略不同。「威懾戰略」思維也是解放軍在建構與運用戰略武力時的根本依循原則，而非根據嚇阻理論產生的嚇阻戰略，因此以嚇阻戰略的標準來檢驗與分析解放軍戰略作為，將不能得到正確解答。 解放軍從早期建構核戰略武力開始，即是出自於現實戰略利益考量，並不只是如中共官方所稱，要打破大國核壟斷與追求徹底消滅核武器等理想性、道德化說詞；解放軍隱晦的「不首先使用」核武原則，更是「威懾戰略」思考下，避免引起強國攻擊，以換取戰略武力發展空間的一項策略。隨著國際戰略局勢以及中共安全認知轉變，在美國發展彈道飛彈防禦體系以及調整核武戰略的情況下，解放軍將會持續建構包含非核戰略武力在內的戰略打擊力量，但在核戰略武力建構方面將會有所節制，置重點於技術提升和多元發展，以確保解放軍能在不改變既有原則的基礎上，更加彈性靈活運用各式戰略武力，一方面維持威嚇的效果，另一方面也能在必要時配合「威懾戰略」動用武力，達成中共所賦予解放軍的任務。 關鍵詞：中共軍事、嚇阻理論、嚇阻戰略、威懾戰略、戰略武力、不首先使用 / Researchers often apply the concept of Deterrence Theory to explain the outward strategic actions of People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, through comprehensive analyses and examinations of Deterrence Theory, the research result indicated that PLA has created its own strategic logic of “Threat and Deterrent Strategy” which became the foundation of PLA’s core military strategy--Active Defense. In addition, this kind of strategic thinking which can be considered as the heritage of traditional Chinese military culture and principle is significantly different from the concept and measures of Deterrence Theory commonly agreed by scholars. “Threat and Deterrent Strategy” also became the foundation of PLA’s main military strategy “Active Defense”. “Threat and Deterrence Strategy” is PLA’s principle of building and operating its strategic weapon. Applying the concept of Deterrence Theory to explain PLA’s military actions may be inappropriate and result in misunderstanding because the concept and application of “Threat and Deterrence Strategy” are different from Deterrence Theory. Even though China official claimed that the goal of obtaining nuclear power is based on an ideal and proper purpose such as to break the exclusive development of nuclear weapon by certain countries and abolish nuclear weapon eventually, the reason why PLA developed nuclear weapon is because of the military advantages and strategic interests from obtaining nuclear power. PLA announced its “no-first-use” principle of using nuclear weapon without notifying the proviso is a typical example of playing “Threat and Deterrence Strategy” so that China can develop its strategic weapon without creating opposition from other countries. Along the strategic interactions among countries, the changing attitude toward national security in China, the development of Ballistic Missile Defense System in U.S, and the adjustment of using nuclear weapon and its strategy, PLA will keep improving its strategic weapon, including nuclear and non-nuclear. However, PLA will not speed up its development of nuclear weapon. Instead, PLA will emphasize more on improving the capacity and variety of its strategic weapon so that PLA can utilize all kinds of strategic weapon flexibly and ingeniously. On the one hand, improving military strength can ensure the effectiveness of deterrence; on the other hand, cooperating “Threat and Deterrence Strategy” and military actions can help PLA to complete the mission from China. Keywords: China Military, Deterrence Theory, Deterrence Strategic, Threat and Deterrence Strategy, Strategic Weapon, No first use