Graduation date: 1971

This thesis explores the interplay between global finance and remote firms and institutions. It highlights the interactions between global institutional investors and Japanese firms on environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) standards, and the process of change in Japanese corporate governance practices. It focuses on analysing the responses of large Japanese firms with a high level of foreign ownership to global finance and global institutional investors' strategies for engagement. Japan provides an excellent research environment for the topic. It is geographically and culturally remote from the West, and has the world's third largest economy with increasing foreign ownership on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Under the influence of global finance, the Japanese economy has been in transition despite the persistence of its traditional institutions. There are many globally recognised Japanese firms, although certain firms have come under scrutiny in several recent corporate governance scandals. Recently, corporate reform has become one of the priority policy agendas, which has led to incremental convergence to global standards. The aims of this thesis are as follows: (i) to analyse the evolution of shareholder activism and corporate governance practices in ownership structure change (Chapter 3); (ii) to examine how global institutional investors privately engage with remote firms (Chapter 4); (iii) to explore the power of global investors in an industry with lower foreign ownership (Chapter 5); (iv) to analyse the perceptions of local firms towards global ESG standards under policy change (Chapter 6). The thesis revealed the following findings. First, global investors provide one of the only opportunities for ESG-related dialogues for local firms, in a country where local institutional investors are not active shareholders. Global finance has the power to transform local corporate governance practices by breaking down path dependence and institutional complementarities, although the status quo does persist. Second, local firms' norms and perceptions based on the existing institutions are culturally derived informal constraints, which slow down the change of corporate governance practices even after instrumental change. Third, the target firms of engagement activities are home-biased and limited to a small number of large global brand firms; hence, non-target firms and industries maintain their ESG standards unless policy reform occurs. Finally, local firms' unfamiliarity with engagement activities limits the power of global finance in a remote market. There is a gap between global institutional investors' motivation for engagement and Japanese firms' readiness to respond; hence, considered strategies and modes of communication are critical for effective engagement with remote firms, especially when language and organisational issues are present.

Japan's foreign relations with the People's Republic of China have been one of the most important and controversial issues since Japan regained her independence in 1952. Geographical proximaty, historical ties that Japan has with China, and China being a major power with nuclear capability made it vitally important for Japan to keep a pipeline open with her, and the policy of separating economics from politics permitted trade relations with her. In this thesis I am chiefly interested in finding out why it was of utmost importance for Japan to adopt this principle of foreign policy toward Communist China. In the first section, the international situation and historical circumstances which eventually led Japan to adopt this policy will be explored. The second section will deal with the international significance and implications of this policy. In section three I should like to analyze how the actual negotiations on "trade" are used by both the Chinese leaders and the pro-Peking leaders in Japan as a means of changing Japan's policy toward China. An important aspect of this policy treated in the last section is the internal political impact in Japan. Finally, I should like to see how Korea will be affected by Japan's new relations with the People's Republic of China. The chief cause of adopting and pursuing the policy of separating economics from politics stemmed from international circumstances in which Japan found herself as a defeated nation after the Second World War. It was the nature of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the timing of the signing, the attitude of Communist China and Japan's particular relation to the United States that made Japan recognize Nationalist China. Since neither Nationalist China nor Communist China would permit diplomatic ties with any country that recognized the other, it was not possible for Japan to recognize both regimes. Therefore, Japan maintained only economic relations with Communist China without any direct political contact. Sino-Japanese trade relations were based on the reality of both Communist China and Japan. From Japan's point of view it was a realistic approach to maximize economic opportunities and minimize political involvement until the right opportunity came for normalization. By adopting and practising the policy of separating economics from politics, Japan looked for larger commercial opportunities in the future and it also served as a pipeline between the two big countries in Asia. From China's viewpoint, it was an "accumulative" approach for the eventual normalization of relations with Japan. Trade was used as an instrument of political pressure and it reflected China's political aims. The volume of trade fluctuated and the techniques China used varied according to the political objectives. China appealed to a "broad political spectrum" in Japan through private agreements and exchange of unofficial private delegations. China threatened Japan with suspension of trade, and manipulated her with "friendly trade" and "memorandum trade". Since the agreement for the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations was signed on September 29, 1972 the controversial issue of "separating economics from politics" has become a story of the past. The admission of Communist China to the United Nations in 1971, Nixon's visit to China in February, 1972, and the eventual change of the policy of the United Nations gave Japan an opportunity to change her policy and recognize the People's Republic of China. With the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, Korea must seek her role by pursuing "independent and positive" action. The talks between North and South for the eventual unification of Korea and the new constitution of South Korea which was adopted in 1972 reflect Korea's attempts to adjust herself to this role. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This dissertation considers the failure of the Japanese government from 1991 through late-1998 to take measures to bring swiftly under control the threat to the nation's finance system posed by nonperforming loans that arose with the collapse of the late-1980s land-price bubble. While some works plausibly argue that this record of delay, and a larger failure of the Japanese state to adjust its general economic policy strategy, can be attributed largely to a progressive fracturing of a 1950s consensus on basic economic policy objectives between relatively internationally competitive firms and firms more dependent on state protection of their business opportunities, this insight has led few scholars to enquire into the role played by advocates of the policy interests of Japan's most competitive large firms in producing the widely lamented policy of delay on nonperforming loans. Counter to the literature's preponderant emphasis on political pressure from protection-dependent firms as impediment to swift state adjustment to nonperforming loans and other economic policy challenges of the late-20th century Japanese state, this dissertation finds that state officials and expert commentators who in debates on nonperforming loans and closely related policy issues strongly advocated dismantling protections on which large numbers of firms depended and in their stead adopting policies more favorable to the firms best able to weather the harsh economic conditions of the 1990s, displayed willingness to tolerate further delay comparable to (and sometimes greater than) that shown by state officials and expert commentators who advocated greater solicitude for the protection-dependent. This finding is based chiefly on a reading of official Ministry of Finance policy statements, transcripts of hearings of relevant Japanese House of Representatives committees, public opinion polls, reporting and commentary published in two national-circulation and two local Japanese newspapers, and a variety of books and longer articles published in the mass-audience Japanese business press. This finding, I argue, suggests a need for more sustained critical analysis of the role of leading business interests in Japan's political processes, which in turn argues for a closer engagement than is now commonly attempted with the work of Karl Marx and Chalmers Johnson, and for following up some preliminary suggestions in the existing literature of an emergent economic policy dimension of Diet party competition. / text

Japan experienced drastic economic, political, and social changes during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Her modernization process has many notable charactertics. In this paper, I discuss an ideology which governed all aspects of the Japanese people's lives between 1868 and 1945 and the people's reaction to it. This ideology , which is now called Tennōsei ideology (the ideology of the Tennō system), was based on the myth that emphasized the divinity of the Tennō (emperor). The Meiji government developed and cultivated Tennō-sei ideology as the theoretical backbone of the government's modernization policy. When one studies the problems of modernization in Japan, Tennōsei ideology and the people's reaction to it should not be overlooked. However, it is quite difficult to know how common people, especially those of the lower social strata, reacted to the changes in their lives which were caused by modernization. During the period between the late Tokugawa era and the late Meiji era, many new religious movements were born. Most founders' of those new religions experienced many difficulties firsthand and expressed critical views of modernization. They attracted people who suffered from the economic, political, social, and religious changes occuring during the rapid modernization process. This paper focuses on examining the religious teachings of Deguchi Nao, the founder of Omoto-kyō, because her writings, called Ofudesaki (Tip of A Writing Brush), contain the sharpest criticism against the Meiji government's policies and the Tennō. I examine religious currents in the late nineteenth century to find out why a large number of new religious movements developed during this period. Also the background of the Tennōsei ideology and how the Meiji government systematically made the ideology penetrate into Japanese people's minds are discussed in Chapter One. In Chapter Two, Deguchi Nao's life experiences as the background of her religious teachings are examined. For the purpose of clarifying Nao's religious ideas, I analyze her early Ofudesaki in chapter three. Through Ofudesaki, the Kami, Ushitora-no-Konjin, warned the people that the present world would be demolished unless they repented their sins quickly. Nao used only simple and unsophisticated expressions when she wrote Ofudesaki, but in it one can find her original mythology and view on salvation. In 1899, a man named Ueda Kisaburō (later changed his name to Deguchi Onisaburō joined . Nao's group. Although Onisaburō is considered by present Omoto-kyō followers as a co-founder of the organization, there were fundamental differences between Nao and him. Onisburō's religious and social background are discussed in chapter four. In chapter five, those ofudesaki written between 1896 and 1899 are analyzed, especially focusing on a series of pilgrimages, called Shussu, led by Nao. I also discuss whether it is appropriate to categorize Nao's religious group as a millenarian movement. Since the Meiji government was maintained by the myth of a 'divine' Tennō, the existence of a new religion which held an independent mythology could be considered a serious threat to the Tennō and his government. In conclusion, I re-examine the struggle between the Meiji government and the new religious movements as an important element of Japan's modernization process. / Arts, Faculty of / Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies, Department of / Graduate

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