This thesis is the result of research on the nature of Japan's security policy as pursued by the Ikeda Cabinet during I960 and 1964. The main discussion consists of three parts: internal political impacts on security policy making; external political impacts on security policy of Japan; and Japan's security policy proper. Three political parties are studied as significant determinants of internal political impacts on the decision making structure of the Japanese political system. The rationale is that these political parties provide channels that connect the decision making core and the outer area of the Japanese political system. Therefore, the study of these political parties is a rewarding attempt at observing political inputs that the decision making core of the Japanese political system receives. International exchange of the Japanese political system is investigated in the second part of the discussion. This subject is viewed both as inputs and outputs of the Japanese political system in relation to its international environment. The nature of the external impacts such as military, economic, geographic, ideological or cultural impacts is not specified in the following discussion, but is viewed as a Gestalt, or total being which comprises all the elements stated above. The third section deals with what is usually described as defence policy. A more military aspect of Japan's security policy is studied in this section. In conclusion, a broad generalisation is derived from the survey cited in the main discussion. The conclusion is characterised as the principle of balance in the Ikeda Cabinet's security policy. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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According to parliamentary theory, an executive that is made and unmade by the Lower House of the legislature alone is responsible to that House. But an executive whose existence is not solely dependent on the legislature is not responsible to the legislature. In such systems, usually the main branches of government have specific functions, possess limited rights of veto over one another, and have independent existences. They are known as separation-of-powers systems. The purpose of the thesis is to discover whether the prewar Japanese polity approximated more closely to a parliamentary system or a separation-of-powers system. Its method is to identify all the political institutions which made and unmade the executive in 1890-1940. When institutions are not easily identifiable, for example, when a cabinet resigned because of public rioting, the influences responsible for Cabinet changes are translated into politico-institutional forces. Because there was always a struggle over the selection of Prime Ministers and then over Cabinet seats, the selection of Prime Ministers is examined separately from the formation of cabinets. A classification of the reasons for Cabinet composition and its rise and fall is used to determine whether institutional relationships are better understood in terms of parliamentary or separation-of-powers theory. The results of the investigation reveal that: i) Each of the prewar political institutions had a separate identifiable function and tried to have the executive pursue the policies it desired in matters related to its function. ii) Each institution possessed a limited veto power over each of the others and used this power to ensure that the Cabinet included representatives from it. The Cabinet regularly consisted of representatives from most institutions: the two Houses of the Diet, the Army, the Wavy, and the Civil Service. iii) Each institution had an existence independent of each of the others, and only the Cabinet never had an independent power base. Usually at least three institutions had to support a new Prime Minister before he could assume office, and usually two had to conspire to force his resignation. Because only rarely could any single institution on its own raise or pull down an entire ministry, the existence of the Cabinet was separate from each individual institution and the Cabinet was not responsible to any. Separation-of-powers theory alone emphasises the lack of the executive's total dependence on the legislature, or on any other institution for that matter. The need for at least three institutions to raise and two to pull down a ministry indicates that the Cabinet never had a completely independent existence. Not having its own separate power base, it was the joint creation of other institutions. Though its existence was separate from each individual institution, its rise and fall was not independent of combinations of other institutions. The prewar Japanese polity, however, bore only a slight similarity to a parliamentary system, in which the executive is entirely dependent on the Lower House of the legislature. Because only very rarely could the Lower House of the legislature on its own pull down an entire ministry, only occasionally were parliamentary type forces present, and the polity functioned regularly as a separation-of-powers system. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This dissertation examines the determinants of the effect of partisanship on support for a parliamentary government. In doing so, I address a set of related questions, using Japan as an example. I begin with a descriptive question: Is the effect of partisanship on the job approval of the administration changing over time? To answer this question, using 1960-2001 time series data, I demonstrate the changing impact of the job approval rate of the cabinets over this period. Then I turn to explanation for the change and ask: Why does the effect change over time? I hypothesize that supporters of newly established parties in the government are less likely to be influenced by their partisanship when evaluating the cabinet' performance. Partisanship, defined here as a predisposition to support a particular political party, grows with the cumulative effect of political experience and learning. There is, however, less opportunity for newly established and political parties to have such loyal supporters. My second hypothesis holds that supporters of ruling parties to which the prime minister does not belong are less likely to make partisan judgments in appraising the cabinet's performance. Party identification extends to the government in which the party participates, the partisan effect on the appraisal of the government's performance emerges. The party affiliation of the prime minister influences to what extent people associate the government with the party. / text

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This study is a treatment of the conflicts between politics and militarism in Japan from the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889 to December 7, 1941, in four major divisions: (1) organization of the government; (2) the Elder Statesmen in power, 1889-1918; (3) the party politicians in power, 1918-1932; and (4) the militarists in power, 1932-1941.

This dissertation investigates the position that interest groups occupy in the decisionmaking process of the government of Japan from case studies in the area of health policy. Three important points are demonstrated. First, the medical associations have created strong interdependent linkages to the party in power and have obtained their policy preferences from within the party's decision-making organs. Second, the policy design process in Japan's leading political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, has left little room for the prime minister's initiatives in health care policy. The party has deconcentrated the policy approval process in various councils over which the prime minister has little or no influence. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation prevailing in most parliamentary systems. Third, the thesis demonstrates how the prime minister can, through the design of supra-partisan national councils for reforms, temporarily bypass the normal policymaking channels of the party and enhance its ability to carry out policy adaptation. Two such national councils are investigated: the Nakasone Provisional Council on Administrative Reform (1981-84) and the Hashimoto Administrative Reform Council (1997-98). The temporary national councils are investigated as institutions complementary to the normal policymaking channels of the ministerial and party committees. In the field of health care, the national councils have introduced policy options which had been rejected for years by the medical body and the party in power. The Hashimoto national council, in particular, introduced marketoriented policies that significantly altered Japan's health care system. Three policy areas are investigated: the introduction of principles of information disclosure through the provision of medical files, the creation of transparent price determination mechanisms, and the attempt at reforming the medical fee schedule. These policy changes are seen as a first step toward the introduction of market principles in Japan's service economy.

This dissertation investigates the position that interest groups occupy in the decisionmaking process of the government of Japan from case studies in the area of health policy. Three important points are demonstrated. First, the medical associations have created strong interdependent linkages to the party in power and have obtained their policy preferences from within the party's decision-making organs. Second, the policy design process in Japan's leading political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, has left little room for the prime minister's initiatives in health care policy. The party has deconcentrated the policy approval process in various councils over which the prime minister has little or no influence. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation prevailing in most parliamentary systems. Third, the thesis demonstrates how the prime minister can, through the design of supra-partisan national councils for reforms, temporarily bypass the normal policymaking channels of the party and enhance its ability to carry out policy adaptation. Two such national councils are investigated: the Nakasone Provisional Council on Administrative Reform (1981-84) and the Hashimoto Administrative Reform Council (1997-98). The temporary national councils are investigated as institutions complementary to the normal policymaking channels of the ministerial and party committees. In the field of health care, the national councils have introduced policy options which had been rejected for years by the medical body and the party in power. The Hashimoto national council, in particular, introduced marketoriented policies that significantly altered Japan's health care system. Three policy areas are investigated: the introduction of principles of information disclosure through the provision of medical files, the creation of transparent price determination mechanisms, and the attempt at reforming the medical fee schedule. These policy changes are seen as a first step toward the introduction of market principles in Japan's service economy. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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