The early September day in 1951 that brought the Pacific War to an official end, with the signing of a treaty of peace, concluded as representatives of Japan and the United States signed the Bilateral Security Treaty. The security treaty symbolized new realities of international relations, just as the peace treaty had buried the old. By cementing into place a strategic alliance between the former Pacific antagonists, the treaty represented the great and lasting achievement of postwar American diplomacy in Asia. Nevertheless, the treaty was both the outcome and the perpetuation of a stereotyped and lopsided relationship, now fixed firmly into place, as a Japan diminished by defeat acceded to the necessity of a security embrace with its former conqueror, and the United States enlisted a most valued, albeit a most reluctant ally for the ongoing struggle to meet and defeat the Soviet threat. At the end of the Pacific War such an outcome had been beyond the pale. The security treaty was the product of years of crisis adaptation. Hopes that the U.S. could make China the great power of Asia were dashed by revolution. As cherished verities of U.S. diplomacy fell by the wayside, new truisms, based upon strategic interests inherited from victory in the Pacific and the cold war policy of containment, staunchly rose to assume their place. As a result, U.S. attitudes towards Japan underwent a tortuous reassessment. The initial occupation policies of disarmament and reform were replaced by the urgent need to enlist Japan as a vital cold war asset. However, this reorientation was not easily accomplished. Competing interests within the U.S. Government clashed over the means necessary to insure Japan's security and stability, while also guaranteeing the creation of a reliable ally -- a debate that became ever more heated as the cold war intensified. The Japanese, at great disadvantage, skillfully attempted to negotiate a role for themselves in the postwar world, eager for an alliance, yet fearful of domination. The goal of this thesis is to chart and document the evolution of this policy transformation, in all its twists and odd turns. To accomplish this task I turned to an older tradition of political science, one widely practiced at the dawn of the discipline. To be sure, judicious use was made of many of the theories and methodological approaches prevalent currently. Yet while useful at times, these methods often failed to adequately explain those indeterminate moments of idiosyncratic chance and contingency of events upon which so much, to my mind, the final outcome depended. I turned therefore to a more historical approach. My primary sources became the diplomatic record as revealed in the Foreign Relations of the United States and the memoirs of those who participated in the fashioning of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. By the time the security treaty was concluded, the agreement reached was not one of shared joint purpose, but one which defined and gave sanction to diverging national aims that could not, nonetheless, be realized in isolation. The continued U.S. military presence in Japan had been the goal of a policy process ultimately defined in military terms, as the final bastion of cold war containment on the rim of Asia. The Japanese understood the need for security in a volatile world, but not the necessity of providing it for themselves, as the postwar political system slowly organized around emerging economic priorities. It was an odd arrangement, but one which met respective needs and desires. Yet its lack of reciprocity and mutual commitment has ensured through the years the continuation of an ambiguous and uncertain alliance.

Research on Japanese current foreign policy suffers from neglect of the influence of domestic factors on Japan's decisions and behaviour in world politics. The question of the nature of Japanese foreign policy needs to go beyond the exogenous cause of state behaviour in international affairs. The object of inquiry of this thesis is the influence of social factors on the orientation of Japan's foreign policy. The central concern is: "how" and "why" Japan behaves as it does in world affairs. This examination addresses the question of the interaction of endogenous and exogenous factors on the foreign economic policy of Japan, and postulates that Japanese national identity, national interests, and role conceptions, are the essence of Japan's defensive attitudes in world affairs on the one hand, and that Japanese behavioural patterns in international relations are in conformity with the ends of Japan's foreign policy: economic security and growth under the Japan-US alliance. Japanese response to US pressure and trade adjustment to the changing framework of the world economy from the 1980s up to the present give a relevant outlook to the defensive character of Japan's foreign policy. For Japanese policy-makers, the stability of Japan's economic performance in the world economy, its pacifist attitude in world affairs, its trade relations with the United States, and its protectorate status as a result of the Japan-US Security Treaty, are beyond question.

This thesis examines the implications that the Nixon “shocks” may have on Japan’s foreign policy. The data used consisted of books, articles, periodicals, government publications and newspapers. Examined were such important factors as: the attitudes of the political parties in Japan on foreign policy questions, the rapid rise of the Japanese economy and the implications this has had on Japan's relations with other countries, and the question of Japan's possible remilitarization, both in conventional and nuclear terms. In addition, Japan's relations with the other three Great Powers in Asia, (China, the Soviet Union and the United States), are also studied. From about 1945 until the close of the 1960's, Japan's foreign policy had been based on a close relationship with the United States. From about the end of 1970 to the end of 1971, Japan was stung by a series of “shocks” in the course of American foreign policy. These included tile sudden and last minute announcement of Nixon's visit to China, severe economic measures, the imposition of' textile quotas, and the failure of Japan's co-sponsoring of the United Nations motion allowing Taiwan to keep its membership. The period of 1969 to 1972 is critical to the future alignment of Japan’s foreign policy. One conclusion from this re-alignment is that it is now clear that Japan will no longer serve as the American junior partner in Asia. Japan now shows a new independent attitude in its relations with other countries, quite apart from American desire. Also in 1972 following the Nixon “shocks,” both China and the Soviet Union competed against the other to draw Japan away from its American alliance. It is the shift in Japan's foreign policy that this thesis is concerned with.

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Call number: LD2668 .T4 1985 M37 / Master of Arts

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This thesis examines the Japanese military conquests leading up to their attack on Pearl Harbor, including aggression towards Korea, China, and the Pacific islands.

During the Korean War, US-Japan relations changed dramatically from the occupation status into one of a security partnership in Asia. When North Korea invaded South Korea, Washington perceived Japan as the ultimate target. Washington immediately intervened in the Korean peninsula to protect the South on behalf of Japanese security. Japanese security was the most important objective of American policy regarding the Korean War, a reality to which historians have not given legitimate attention. While fighting in Korea, Washington decided to conclude an early peace treaty with Japan to initiate Japanese rearmament. The issue of Japanese rearmament was a focal point in the Japanese peace negotiation. Washington pressed Japan to rearm rapidly, but Tokyo stubbornly opposed. Under pressure from Washington, the Japanese government established the National Police Reserve and had to expand its military forces during the war. When the Korean War ceased in July 1953, Japanese armed forces numbered about 180,000 men. The Korean War also brought a fundamental change to Japanese economic and diplomatic relations in Asia. With a trade embargo on China following the unexpected Chinese intervention in Korea, Washington wanted to forbid Sino-Japanese trade completely. In addition, Washington pressed Tokyo to recognize the Nationalist regime in Taiwan as the representative government of the whole Chinese people. Japan unsuccessfully resisted both policies. Japan wanted to maintain Sino-Japanese trade and recognize the Chinese Communists. The Korean War brought an economic boom to Japan. As a logistical and service supporter for United States war efforts in Korea, Japan received a substantial amount of military procurement orders from Washington, which supplied dollars, technology, and markets for Japan. The Korean War was an economic opportunity for Japan while it was a military opportunity for the United States. The Korean War was the beginning of a new era of American-Japanese military and economic interdependence. This study is based on both American and Japanese sources--primary and secondary.

Includes bibliographical references (leaves [56]-[62]) Focusses on issues concerning the U.S. military presence on the island. Elaborates on Okinawa's suffering due to the military bases which have hindered Okinawa's economic development, created serious pollution and encouraged crime