Since its inception in 1995, more than 200 disputes have been raised under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). In spite of the obvious numerical success of the DS system of the WTO, in practice several shortcomings call for institutional and/or procedural change. This analysis deals with the economic aspects of the DS system. First, it turns out that the WTO DS system seems to be "biased". The larger and richer trading nations (USA, EU) are the main users of this system, either because of the larger involvement in world trade, or because the LDCs simply lack the legal resources. Second, in taking advantage of recent theoretical explanations of the WTO system in general (trade talks) and the DS system in particular (aberrations from WTO compliance can lead to trade wars) one can theoretically derive the relative robust result concerning the present practice of the WTO DS system: retaliation with tariffs is ineffective, distorts allocation and is difficult to control. This is also demonstrated in an CGE model analysis for the most popular disputes between the EU and the USA: the Hormones, the Bananas and the FSC cases. The major conclusion of our economic evaluation is that the DS system of retaliation should be changed towards a transfer-like retaliation system. (author's abstract) / Series: EI Working Papers / Europainstitut

The eastward enlargement of the European Union will be the fifth enlargement since establishing the European Community in 1957. This paper gives an overview of the most recent undertakings to estimate the costs and benefits of EU enlargement in the framework of model analysis. This field of research is relatively young. Therefore only a few model simulations have been made so far. They can be classified into world models covering several world regions, and in single country models. In both cases, one finds computable general equilibrium - CGE - models as well as macro models. The major findings of world models are that the CE-ECs will be the winners whereas the EU incumbents can expect only small gains from enlargement. Taking into account the costs of enlargement the big question, is how the int e-gration gains are distributed among EU incumbents. As a rule, those countries will benefit the most which have already strong trade relations with the CEECs. In the case of the single country models, Austria is one of those countries with the longest tradition in making model simulations in the case of enlargement. A comparison of CGE model approaches with macro model simulations for Austria shows that the benefits of EU enlargement may be lower than those of the opening-up of Eastern Europe since 1989. (author's abstract) / Series: EI Working Papers / Europainstitut

Aggregate demand is influenced by the functional income distribution of an economy and that of its trading partners. This relationship between income distribution and output is analyzed in a short-run two-country Neo-Kaleckian model. The effects of devaluation and redistribution are discussed in detail. Trade and redistribution within one country interact and output increases or decreases with changes in either depending on the specific distributional and exchange rate movements. The Marshall-Lerner condition is shown to be equivalent to the assumption of expansionary devaluation. If devaluation increases output, national redistribution policy toward wage earners is also more likely to be expansionary. (author's abstract)

The paper applies a non-parametric propensity score matching approach to evaluate the effects of two types of farm programs (agri-environment (AE) programs and the less favoured area (LFA) scheme) on input use and farm output of individual farms in Germany. The analysis reveals a positive and significant treatment effect of the LFA scheme for farm sales and the area under cultivation. Participants in AE schemes are found to significantly increase the area under cultivation (in particular grassland), resulting in a decrease of livestock densities. Furthermore, participation in AE programs significantly reduced the purchase of farm chemicals (fertilizer, pesticide). We also find substantial differences in the treatment effect between individual farms (heterogeneous treatment effects). Farms which can generate the largest benefit from the program are most likely to participate. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Many recent experimental studies have shown that some subjects destroy other subjects' incomes without receiving any material benefit, and that they even incur costs to do so. In this paper, we study the boundary conditions of this phenomenon, which is referred to as anti-social behavior. We introduce a four-player destruction game, in which we vary the framing and the presence of another activity, running in parallel to the destruction game. We observe a substantial amount of destruction in the baseline condition without the parallel activity, and with a framing in the spirit of previous destruction experiments. Our results indicate that a parallel activity as well as a framing emphasizing joint ownership of the item that can be destroyed reduces destruction almost to zero. We therefore argue that the emergence of anti-social behavior is highly contingent on the contextual environment. / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

This paper argues that the cumulative causation processes between wealth and power risk leading to an escalation of wealth inequality. We confirm with new survey data for the Eurozone Piketty's conclusions that wealth is highly concentrated and that this inequality is perpetuated through dynastic wealth. This leads to an ever-concentrating ability to shape economic and political institutions. While neoclassical economics has a blind spot where power is concerned, we discuss how heterodox approaches have attempted to conceptualize this structural power which influences the framework of economic activity. Finally, we discuss three concrete channels through which the unequal distribution of private assets may affect power relations and economic activity.

Cooperating in the Prisoner's Dilemma is irrational and some supporting mechanism is needed to stabilize cooperation. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is one such mechanism. Assessing an individual's reputation requires first-order information, i.e. knowledge about its previous behavior, as it is utilized under image scoring. But there seems to be an agreement that in order to successfully stabilize cooperation, higher-order information is necessary, i.e. knowledge of others' previous reputations. We show here that such a conclusion might have been premature. Tolerant scoring, a first-order assessment rule with built-in tolerance against single defections, can lead a society to stable cooperation. (author's abstract)

Series: Creative Industries in Vienna: Development, Dynamics and Potentials

Interest of STI policies to influence the innovation behaviour of firms has been increased considerably. This gives rise to the notion of behavioural additionality, broadening traditional evaluation concepts of input and output additionality. Though there is empirical work measuring behavioural additionalities, we know little about what role distinct firm characteristics play for their occurrence. The objective is to estimate how distinct firm characteristics influence the realisation of behavioural additionalities. We use survey data on 155 firms, considering the behavioural additionalities stimulated by the Austrian R&D funding scheme in the field of intelligent transport systems in 2006. We focus on three different forms of behavioural additionality project additionality, scale additionality and cooperation additionality and employ binary regression models to address this question. Results indicate that R&D related firm characteristics significantly affect the realisation of behavioural additionality. Firms with a high level of R&D resources are less likely to substantiate behavioural additionalities, while small, young and technologically specialised firms more likely realise behavioural additionalities. From a policy perspective, this indicates that direct R&D promotion of firms with high R&D resources may be misallocated, while attention of public support should be shifted to smaller, technologically specialised firms with lower R&D experience.

Using a unique dataset comprising information for (up to) 153 firms in the machine building sector in Belarus, we investigate the determinants of firm growth for an economy where state ownership of enterprises is widespread. We use panel data models based on generalizations of Gibrat's law, total factor productivity estimates and matching methods to assess the differences in firm growth between private and state-contolled firms. Our results indicate that labor hoarding and soft budget constraints play a particularly important role in explaining differences in performance between these two groups of firms.