Without doubt, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice is one of the most important statements of Anglo-American political philosophy in the twentieth century. Through a revival of the social contract device, Rawls formulates a set of principles of correct political association ("the right") that he argues must be considered as prior to any conception of the good. These principles apply to all persons as free and equal beings in society, but more importantly they assume some things about the nature of persons in that society. On the institutional aspect of his theory, Rawls conceives of the state as a neutral arbiter of the good. This, coupled with a conception of persons as individuals that affirm the values of autonomy and equality, has drawn extensive critical fire from philosophers within and without liberalism. One such group of critics, the communitarians, claim that Rawls's idea of the person is too abstract or "groundless" to account for shared values, and thus fails to appreciate the extent to which we understand ourselves as embedded within our culture. Michael Sandel has thus argued that Rawls's person so conceived is too abstract to be of any theoretical let alone practical use, while Alasdair Macintyre has argued that such a conception of persons is incoherent: liberal "persons" do not know themselves, and so they cannot know what is right or what is good. This thesis analyzes the liberal-communitarian debate by comparing and contrasting some terms used by both sides in the debate. By analyzing the terms, I will present a liberal conception of the person as properly understood in Rawls's theory. ' Rawls has not been idle since the publication of A Theory of Justice. He has defended his theory in a series of articles and lectures that have developed his position in response to these and other criticisms. Specifically, by positing his theory within liberal-democratic culture, by acknowledging individual formative conceptions of the good, and by emphasizing and relying upon a modus vivendi view as the basis for political liberalism and a liberal culture, Rawls has answered the communitarian objections by incorporating and responding to those pertinent criticisms. I will argue that Rawls's recent emphasis on a theory of political liberalism successfully accounts for his idea of persons because it accords with our considered moral principles, it treats persons as free and equal beings worthy of respect, and it incorporates the only coherent construction of the social embeddedness thesis to a greater degree than communitarians acknowledge or appreciate. Rawls's political liberalism thus surpasses this aspect of the communitarian critique.

Egalitarian liberal theories of justice – so this dissertation argues – fail to take into accountthe full implications of the way citizens’ socio-cultural backgrounds work to undermine theequal opportunities these same theories demand. While egalitarians support extensiveredistribution of income and wealth from the privileged to the less privileged, and advocateequal opportunities for all, they do not properly attend either to how our shared societalcultures structure social esteem and related advantages, or to how our individual socioculturalenvironments structure the very act of choice. They thus fail to acknowledge ourunequal opportunities to make choices which bring us esteem and related advantages,particularly the advantages that flow from our having established for ourselves lives thatothers consider good. Alternative approaches to the interplay between justice, culture, and choice are rejected forillegitimately restricting the right to go our own way (communitarianism), or for regulatingpolitically that which cannot legitimately be regulated politically (recognition theory).Against the former position it is argued that we should draw on our culturalunderstandings, not to restrict free choice, but to identify opportunities to be safeguarded.Against the latter it is argued that we should not renegotiate prevailing cultural structurespolitically, but rather acknowledge these same structures and ensure that no one falls too farbehind in the competition for the advantages they generate. Suggesting that one of the more thoroughgoing hierarchies of esteem and disesteem is thatattached to our occupational positions, broadly construed, the dissertation concretizes theclaims defended in relation to this hierarchy in particular. It is argued that the just societyowes it to its citizens to protect them from involuntary occupation of positions that comewith potentially harmful disesteem attached. It is not for society to overrule theindependent choices of citizens, however, but rather to provide enduring opportunities totraining and education for more highly regarded positions, thus both equalizingopportunities to esteem and related advantages, and ensuring that those who continue tooccupy positions at the lower end of the hierarchy in question do so through their owngenuinely free choice.

Recently it has been proposed that humans possess an innate, domain-specific moral faculty, and that this faculty might be fruitfully understood by drawing a close analogy with nativist theories in linguistics. This Linguistic Analogy (LA) hypothesizes that humans share a universal moral grammar. In this paper I argue that this conception is deeply flawed. After profiling a recent and appealing account of universal moral grammar, I suggest that recent empirical findings reveal a significant flaw, which takes the form of a dilemma: either there is something wrong with the moral grammar model because we do not actually possess the innate contents (rules, principles, and concepts) it says we have, or the moral grammar model is simply the wrong model of moral cognition. In light of this dilemma, I conclude we ought to be skeptical that the Linguistic Analogy can adequately serve as a general account of moral cognition.

ABSTRACT DECISION MAKING IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: ONE INSTITUTION’S JOURNEY TO MAINTAIN TITLE IX COMPLIANCE by John Rowland The allocation of resources and participation opportunities in intercollegiate athletics has been a debate among researchers for nearly 40 years. Title IX and traditionally male-dominated budgeting practices continue to be opposing forces that shape the financial and gender makeup of university athletic departments. In fact, the need to be Title IX compliant often dominates discussions when structural changes occur in athletic departments. This case study analyzed the decision making process of distributing resources and participation opportunities at Division I University from 1998 to 2007 based on John Rawls’ arguments about distributive justice. Division I University administrators focused on the substantiality proportionality clause of the three-part test as the only method to comply with Title IX. The Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act and other gender equity reports completed during certification play an important role in the decision making process. The analysis of the decision making process showed that Title IX was used as a political tool to deflect the controversy of program elimination. This analysis also showed that program elimination was not necessary in order to maintain Title IX compliance. Thus, the decision to eliminate sports was a violation of Rawlsian justice.

Liberty as well as equality has been the objective of the trend of liberalism ever since it commenced. More common sense exists with respect to the issue of liberty which guarantess and carries out liberalism¡Fnevertheless¡Mopinions differ on fulfilling the idea of equality, particularly the economic issue. In present times,the consequence of the insistence of willfully diminishing liberalism on the market brings about some social problems, such as the widening gap between the rich and the poor. This makes a part of advocates of liberalism, for example, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin redeem economic justice and allocation, persisting in the fact that nations should take regulatory measures or promote social welfare system to implement the idea of looking after the minor groups thereafter. However, the perspective maintained by them incurs the criticism from the core scholars of liberalism like Friedrich A.Hayek and Rober Nozick that opine the perspective will be a far cry from the core concept of classical liberalism, which regards a nation is interference with the economic allocation policy as an invasion of personal freedom. While John Rawls is theory of justice principle constitutes, causing the dispute within the internal lines of contemporary liberalism, the theory, to be blunt, gives rise to a new trend of thought as regards the balance for which liberalism searches to protect personal freedom and facilitate social economic justice. In addition, liberalism cherishes individual freedom, emphasizes personal uniqueness as well as development, and pursues individual value and the conception of the good to embody respecting of personal thoughts. This genre of concept influences the stance a nation holds on the conception of the good, and thinks that personal value should be respected and not be meddled to embody neutral attitude of a nation. Rawls theory ¡]Theory of Justice¡^takes aim at justice to be the primary morality. Furthermore, priority is placed on ego or righteous independence that value or the conception of the good. He also hangs on to chase after the outlook of obligatory theory of the conception of the good under the frame constructed by justice. Yet, the theory of right priority, Atomism , neutral attitude towards a country, and value subjectivity that insisted by liberalism are all denounced by communitarianism who are of the opinion that the consequences of the Atomism in liberalism will lead to the loss of personal meaning, whereas the neutral attitude towards a country will contribute to problems, such as difficulties in building up social correctness to accomplish public interests. As to the criticism made by communitarianism, liberalism has the opportunity of reconsidering and scrutinizing its theory aside from making counter attacks, which generates a positive meaning for the development of theory of modern liberalism.

Liberal human rights theory has informed Western political policy for decades. An ascending China challenges Western dominance in political theory and philosophy and forces Western theorists to respond. A comprehensive analysis of Western scholarship on human rights and the Confucian tradition makes it clear that there are many structural and systemic issues within this area of study. It also makes it clear that there have been many potentially useful observations and methodologies suggested throughout the literature that have been obscured. One such approach is applied that brings the political theory of John Rawls and Tu Weiming into conversation. As a result, a more nuanced understanding of the Chinese Confucian intellectual tradition in both Western and Chinese terms can be developed, while important questions are raised about human rights theory.

Liberal human rights theory has informed Western political policy for decades. An ascending China challenges Western dominance in political theory and philosophy and forces Western theorists to respond. A comprehensive analysis of Western scholarship on human rights and the Confucian tradition makes it clear that there are many structural and systemic issues within this area of study. It also makes it clear that there have been many potentially useful observations and methodologies suggested throughout the literature that have been obscured. One such approach is applied that brings the political theory of John Rawls and Tu Weiming into conversation. As a result, a more nuanced understanding of the Chinese Confucian intellectual tradition in both Western and Chinese terms can be developed, while important questions are raised about human rights theory.

In his liberal theory of justice, John Rawls stipulates that the principles of justice selected will be generally complied with. This assumption of full compliance is characteristic of what Rawls calls “ideal theory,” i.e., a theory that seeks to formulate and justify ideal principles of justice. David Schmidtz contends that the full compliance assumption undermines the practical relevance of ideal theory. I argue that Schmidtz’s criticisms of full compliance do not succeed. Understanding why his arguments fail requires an examination of both Schmidtz’s and Rawls’s views of the nature of justice and the function of political philosophy. I explain why full compliance can plausibly be assumed in Rawls’s ideal theory given the conception of justice he employs, and articulate the problem Schmidtz’s argument faces if it relies on his view of the role of political philosophy.

Thesis (M.A.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2005. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-68).

The aim of this thesis is to describe and defend ‘The Constraint-Based View’, which is a particular conception of the nature of, and relationship between, ideal and non-ideal theories of justice. Traditionally, ideal theory is characterised by the assumption of ‘full compliance’, while non-ideal theory is characterised by the assumption of ‘partial compliance’. In other words, ideal theories assume that those for whom the theory is meant to apply will be entirely willing and able to comply with the theory’s requirements, while non-ideal theories do not. In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I describe and assess this original conception as well as several alternative accounts of ideal and non-ideal theory, in order to offer a broad survey of the existing literature, and to identify the various ways that these conceptions fail to capture fully the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory. In Chapter 2, I draw a distinction between two different approaches to theorising about justice. ‘Axiological’ or ‘A-Type’ approaches are characterised by the fact that they include almost no assumptions as inputs to the theory, and that they are not intended to provide action-guiding recommendations as part of the outputs of the theory. In contrast, ‘Practical’ or ‘P-Type’ approaches include additional assumptions as part of their inputs and are intended to form part of a process that ultimately produces action-guiding recommendations. In Chapter 3, I describe and defend my preferred conception of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory – the ‘Constraint-Based View’ (CBV). According to the CBV, there is a spectrum of theoretical approaches that can be more or less ideal, depending on the extent to which they include ‘soft constraints’ as part of the inputs to the theory. Soft constraints are facts about the world that can be changed, in contrast to hard constraints, which are facts about the world that cannot. I argue that this way of thinking about the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory is more useful than the alternative conceptions considered in Chapter 1. In Chapter 4, I examine the roles that feasibility considerations should play in ideal and non-ideal theory, from the perspective of the CBV and in Chapter 5, I explain the implications of adopting the CBV for what I call ‘transitional theory’, which is concerned with the transition from the status quo towards a more ideal state of affairs. In Chapter 6, I offer an example of the CBV in action, by considering its implications for the debate over duties of justice towards future generations.