The postwar Soviet Union remained militarized and failed to reform itself because of its ideological concerns against the West and its new satellite states, all at the cost of the Soviet people. This analysis will compare the Soviet government’s external focus and the Soviet people’s domestic problems in the aftermath of the Second World War. The country’s ideological, military, and imperial concerns abroad emphasized militarization over domestic revitalization. The Soviet people widely expected significant action from their government to remedy economic and political issues. The Soviet government nevertheless committed itself in focusing on outside concerns regardless of the harsh reality of everyday postwar society.

Doctor of Philosophy / History / Michael Krysko / David R. Stone / This dissertation examines the shifting patterns of naval reform and the implementation of foreign technology in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union from Alexander III’s ascension to the Imperial throne in 1881 up to the outset of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. During this period, neither the Russian Imperial Fleet nor the Red Navy had a coherent, overall strategic plan. Instead, the expansion and modernization of the fleet was left largely to the whims of the ruler or his chosen representative. The Russian Imperial period, prior to the Russo-Japanese War, was characterized by the overbearing influence of General Admiral Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who haphazardly directed acquisition efforts and systematically opposed efforts to deal with the potential threat that Japan posed. The Russo-Japanese War and subsequent downfall of the Grand Duke forced Emperor Nicholas II to assert his own opinions, which vacillated between a coastal defense navy and a powerful battleship-centered navy superior to the one at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean. In the Soviet era, the dominant trend was benign neglect, as the Red Navy enjoyed relative autonomy for most of the 1920s, even as the Kronstadt Rebellion of 1921 ended the Red Navy’s independence from the Red Army. M. V. Frunze, the People’s Commissar of the Army of Navy for eighteen months in 1925 and 1926, shifted the navy from the vaguely Mahanian theoretical traditions of the past to a modern, proletarian vision of a navy devoted to joint actions with the army and a fleet composed mainly of submarines and light surface vessels. As in the Imperial period, these were general guidelines rather than an all-encompassing policy. The pattern of benign neglect was shattered only in 1935, when Stalin unilaterally imposed his own designs for a mighty offensive fleet on the Soviet military, a plan that was only interrupted by the outbreak of World War II.

No description available.

This essay is mainly about the Church of the Goths and about the Russian Orthodox Church, and their conflict. The essay will be focusing about important persons in these two churches. This essay will be tracing back the roots of the Church of the Goths, since it is a church, that is unknown by most people in this world. My research will be making a distinction of the differences between the Church of the Goths and the Russian Orthodox Church. This essay will also be discussing the heritage of the Gothic people and the theories of the Goths.The methods in the essay, is academic sources, information from the Church of the Goths and from the Russian Orthodox Church. The results shows how the information was found, and now it is published for the first time about the Church of the Goths. This means the Church of the Goths has a stronger ground than first expected. The methods were comparing what the different sources says, and if it was possible to connect the Church of the Goths to the Metropolitanate of Gothia, and so on.