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United States Policy Toward China at YaltaStrahm, Robert E. January 1953 (has links)
No description available.
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United States Policy Toward China at YaltaStrahm, Robert E. January 1953 (has links)
No description available.
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The Far East agreements of the Yalta Conference of February 4-11, 1945, and the Sino-Soviet agreements of August, 1945Davidson, Robert Harold 01 April 1969 (has links)
This paper will present a study of the Far East Agreements of the Yalta Conference, held from February 4-11, 1945, and will trace them through to their conclusion in the agreements signed by the Soviet Union and Nationalist China in August of the same year. These wartime agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, subscribed to by Great Britain and later Nationalist China, reflected then existing distributions of power. The Far East Agreements, on the part of the United States, were concluded in the national self-interest of the United States for reasons thought necessary at the time. The majority of the information in this paper was obtained from United States Government documents and first-hand accounts by men who took part in, or observed at meetings and conferences that dealt with the issues being discussed. Reed College documents library supplied the greater bulk of the material, with additional materials being obtained at Portland State University library and Multnomah County library. All other information was obtained on order through the offices of Portland State University library from various libraries throughout the Pacific Northwest. A background and history of the issues are presented to give the reader the proper perspective before the issues are discussed. Strategic positions and conditions of World War II, both prior to and after the Yalta Conference are presented to give the reader a further knowledge of the conditions surroundings the issues discussed. The actual negotiations involving the Far East Agreements and the Sino-Soviet agreements are discussed in greater detail. Certain of the concessions regarding China agreed upon by the United States at the Yalta Conference were thought necessary at the time. Though it was known that these concessions were made at the expense of China the conclusions drawn in this paper will show that the Far East Agreements were a compromise of the continuing viability of the great powers, pending the final defeat of Japan, and not a compromise of principles on the part of the United States, as believed by many historians and critics. In the late 1940’s, and early 1950’s, after the Chinese Communists assumed the predominant position in China, these agreements came under heavy attack and criticism from many sources, including a Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. This paper will show that much of the criticism and many of the critics were completely unjustified in their beliefs, in that they failed to look at the complete picture and benefited greatly from hindsight. The Far East Agreements were not a radical shift in American China policy. They were not a radical change in traditional American policy. They were thought necessary for both military and political reasons. These agreements were a carefully worked out plan to accomplish three goals: (1) to insure the Soviet participation in the Pacific War at the earliest possible date; (2) to bring about the best possible cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist government of China; and (3) to limit Soviet expansion in China and prevent China from being divided and torn apart after the war. With the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet negotiations in August of 1945, it was thought that these three goals had been accomplished.
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A reinterpretation of the Yalta Conference with particular emphasis on the role of Franklin D. RooseveltIgo, M. Dudley 01 January 1952 (has links)
We know that World War II did not bring the lasting peace everyone hoped and assumed it would bring. The United States, along with other Western powers, now finds itself in a seeming life and death struggle with the Soviet Union and its satellites, with both sides arming for another possible global war. Everyday brings new and deeper problems for the United States and the West in both Asia and Europe. The Yalta Conference was the culminating and most far-reaching of all the conferences of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill. At Yalta the basic decisions were made regarding what these leaders intended to do with the world that would be in their hands as a result of their nations’ defeat of Germany and Japan. Thus, what was decided at Yalta is greatly connected with the state of the world today.
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Uncle Joe: What Americans Thought of Joseph Stalin Before and After World War IIHupp, Kimberly 18 June 2009 (has links)
No description available.
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The creation of the United Nations Organization as a factor in Soviet foreign policy, 1943-46Dolff, David J Unknown Date
No description available.
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The creation of the United Nations Organization as a factor in Soviet foreign policy, 1943-46Dolff, David J 11 1900 (has links)
The thesis explores in depth the negotiations to create the United Nations Organization through which Stalin sought to enhance the USSRs power and prestige via traditional, military-oriented means. Although the Kremlin was relatively successful at maximizing Soviet power within the structure of the UNO, its inflexibility on issues such as Poland, Latin American membership, and other issues antagonized its wartime allies, the USA and Britain. This developing fracture seriously undermined cooperation among the victorious great powers both within the new organization and more broadly. As a result, the process of founding the UNO proved to be both a significant cause and reflection of the degeneration of the wartime Grand Alliance into the Cold War. / History
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Yalta, a tripartite negotation to form the post-war world order: planning for the conference, the big three's strategiesGrossberg, Matthew M. 08 1900 (has links)
British influence on the diplomacy of WWII, as it relates to postwar planning, is underappreciated. This work explores how the use of astute tactical maneuvering allowed Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to impact the development of the post-war world in a greater degree than is typically portrayed in the narratives of the war. Detailing how the study of business negotiations can provide new insights into diplomatic history, Yalta exposes Britain’s impact on the creation of the post-war order through analyzing the diplomacy of WWII as a negotiation. To depict WWII post-war planning diplomacy as a negotiation means that the Yalta Conference of 1945 must be the focal point of said diplomacy with all the negotiations either flowing to or from the conference.
This analysis reveals that Britain harnessed the natural momentum of the negotiation process to create bilateral understandings that protected or advanced their interests in ways that should not have been afforded the weakest party in the Grand Alliance. By pursuing solutions to the major wartime issues first and most stridently through the use of age-old British diplomatic tactics, they were able to enter into understandings with another member of the Grand Alliance prior to the tripartite conferences. Creating bilateral understandings with the Americans on the direction of military operations and the Soviets over the European settlement produced the conditions under which the tripartite negotiations transpired. Options available to the excluded party were thus limited, allowing for outcomes that aligned more favorably to British interests.
A synthesis of diplomatic documents, diaries, and memoirs with historical writings as well as research on business and international negotiations brings to life the diplomatic encounters that led to the creation of the post-war order. To provide the reader a basis for analysis of wartime diplomacy, this work is broken down into two parts. Part I focuses on the strategies created for Yalta. Part II (future doctoral dissertation) will use these strategies to evaluate the performances of each party. Combined the two parts expose that British diplomatic maneuverings is an undervalued aspect of wartime diplomacy.
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