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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Document formatted into pages; contains xviii, 435 p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 415-435). Abstract available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center; full text release delayed at author's request until 2006 Aug. 19.

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The thesis explores in depth the negotiations to create the United Nations Organization through which Stalin sought to enhance the USSRs power and prestige via traditional, military-oriented means. Although the Kremlin was relatively successful at maximizing Soviet power within the structure of the UNO, its inflexibility on issues such as Poland, Latin American membership, and other issues antagonized its wartime allies, the USA and Britain. This developing fracture seriously undermined cooperation among the victorious great powers both within the new organization and more broadly. As a result, the process of founding the UNO proved to be both a significant cause and reflection of the degeneration of the wartime Grand Alliance into the Cold War. / History

British influence on the diplomacy of WWII, as it relates to postwar planning, is underappreciated. This work explores how the use of astute tactical maneuvering allowed Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to impact the development of the post-war world in a greater degree than is typically portrayed in the narratives of the war. Detailing how the study of business negotiations can provide new insights into diplomatic history, Yalta exposes Britain’s impact on the creation of the post-war order through analyzing the diplomacy of WWII as a negotiation. To depict WWII post-war planning diplomacy as a negotiation means that the Yalta Conference of 1945 must be the focal point of said diplomacy with all the negotiations either flowing to or from the conference. This analysis reveals that Britain harnessed the natural momentum of the negotiation process to create bilateral understandings that protected or advanced their interests in ways that should not have been afforded the weakest party in the Grand Alliance. By pursuing solutions to the major wartime issues first and most stridently through the use of age-old British diplomatic tactics, they were able to enter into understandings with another member of the Grand Alliance prior to the tripartite conferences. Creating bilateral understandings with the Americans on the direction of military operations and the Soviets over the European settlement produced the conditions under which the tripartite negotiations transpired. Options available to the excluded party were thus limited, allowing for outcomes that aligned more favorably to British interests. A synthesis of diplomatic documents, diaries, and memoirs with historical writings as well as research on business and international negotiations brings to life the diplomatic encounters that led to the creation of the post-war order. To provide the reader a basis for analysis of wartime diplomacy, this work is broken down into two parts. Part I focuses on the strategies created for Yalta. Part II (future doctoral dissertation) will use these strategies to evaluate the performances of each party. Combined the two parts expose that British diplomatic maneuverings is an undervalued aspect of wartime diplomacy.