LD2668 .T4 1947 G8 / Master of Science

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We know that World War II did not bring the lasting peace everyone hoped and assumed it would bring. The United States, along with other Western powers, now finds itself in a seeming life and death struggle with the Soviet Union and its satellites, with both sides arming for another possible global war. Everyday brings new and deeper problems for the United States and the West in both Asia and Europe. The Yalta Conference was the culminating and most far-reaching of all the conferences of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill. At Yalta the basic decisions were made regarding what these leaders intended to do with the world that would be in their hands as a result of their nations’ defeat of Germany and Japan. Thus, what was decided at Yalta is greatly connected with the state of the world today.

This study offers a mythical examination of the addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt during his first two terms of presidency. The direction of the study is to determine the use of the hero persona in Roosevelt's goal of gaining an unprecedented third-term presidential reelection.The study overviews the historic American public attitude toward the concept of a president being elected for a third consecutive term. Close attention is given to the fears of Americans during the late thirties generated from both the Great Depression and the current war in Europe and Asia. Drawing upon comments from various authorities and particularly those of Roosevelt's 1940 election opponent Wendal Willkie, the study establishes that many Americans were afraid that a third-term election would give Roosevelt too much power, and that many compared this power to/ dictatorships like those in Italy and Nazi Germany.-.Examination of numerous addresses by Roosevelt before the 1940 election reveals that FDR established a dramatistic rhetorical framework in which he cast a variety of players including the American people, Congress, the financial leaders of the Nation, foreign countries and dictatorships. These were cast as villains, victims and heroes.Two of the victims were democracy and the American Dream, both being threatened from without and from within America. The study looks at ways Roosevelt cast himself in this drama as the hero and defender of these two myths. / Department of Speech Communication

“National security” is one of the most powerful terms in the American vocabulary. It commands wide deference and almost unlimited resources, and what counts as a national security matter determines many of the government’s priorities and responsibilities. It is surprising, therefore, that we know so little about how national security came to be defined in the way Americans have understood it for the last 75 years. The problem is one of perspective. Almost everything written about the history of national security approaches the topic with a present-day understanding of the term’s meaning in mind and uses the term instrumentally to explain something else—most often some aspect of American foreign policy. Most of these works assume that national security refers principally to physical security, that national security policymaking is a foreign policy matter, and that it has always been thus. This dissertation historicizes the term national security. Rather than tracing the present-day conception of national security backwards in time, as has been the norm, it looks forward from the past. This shift in perspective reveals a history of national security that challenges the prevailing assumption that national security has always been a matter of physical security and foreign policy. When Franklin Roosevelt first put national security at the center of American political discourse in the 1930s, he equated it with individual economic security and considered domestic policy the primary domain for national security policymaking. Roosevelt also articulated a broad vision for the government’s national security responsibilities in the final years of his presidency that included economic, social, and physical security to be delivered through a mix of domestic and foreign policy. These findings raise a big question about American political development: why did the United States end up with separate “national security” and “welfare” states rather than the comprehensive national security state Roosevelt envisioned? To answer that question, this dissertation focuses on the interactions between political language, public opinion, and the institutional development of the American state. Combining traditional historical research methods with text mining, network analysis, and data visualization, this dissertation charts the movement of policy areas into and out of the national security frame. Franklin Roosevelt succeeded in placing domestic policy into the national security frame in the mid-1930s, thereby justifying the expansion of the government’s domestic responsibilities. But this success catalyzed the nascent conservative movement, which launched a public persuasion campaign to limit the further expansion of the government’s domestic responsibilities by removing domestic policy from the national security frame. Roosevelt’s subsequent success putting foreign policy into the national security frame at the end of the 1930s created a powerful foreign policy establishment that claimed the mantle of national security exclusively for its work. The exclusion of domestic policy from the purview of national security policymaking was therefore largely an ironic result of Roosevelt’s two successes using the language of security to expand the government’s responsibilities.

The objective of this study is to identify newspapers who supported or opposed portions of the New Deal from 1932 to 1938. Nine newspapers from various geographic areas were consulted. Chapter II discusses the 1932 campaign, in which all newspapers supported Roosevelt. Chapter III discusses the First New Deal, in which widespread support was evidenced. Chapter IV discusses the Second New Deal, in which criticism appeared. Chapter V discusses the 1936 campaign, in which only one newspaper opposed Roosevelt. Chapter VI discusses three post-1936 issues. The study determined that Texas newspapers became more critical during the 1930s. The central hypothesis, that urban newspapers were more critical of urban measures and rural newspapers of rural measures, was rejected.

Prompted by international ramifications of Jewish migration from Nazi Germany, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called a world conference on refugees in March 1938. The conference, held at Evian, France, in July, established the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees. The committee, led by American diplomats, sought relaxation of Germany's discriminatory practices against Jews and tried, without success, to resettle German Jews abroad. World War II ended the committee's efforts to achieve systematic immigration from Germany. The American, British, and German diplomatic papers contain the most thorough chronicle of American involvement in the refugee crisis. Memoirs and presidential public papers provide insight into Roosevelt's motivations for calling the conference. Although efforts to rescue German Jews failed, the refugee crisis introduced Americans to intervention in Europe.

Ce que nous nommons ici le réseau Carter fut un service secret de renseignements financé à l'aide des fonds d'urgence présidentiels, fonds octroyés en vertu du Military Appropriation Act, qui mena de nombreuses opérations sans aucun statut officiel pour le compte personnel du président Roosevelt de 1941 à 1945. À la tête de ce réseau figurait un dénommé John Franklin Carter, un éditorialiste libéral travaillant aussi à titre de romancier et rédacteur de discours. Jusqu'à ce jour, il n'existe aucun ouvrage de synthèse consacré au réseau Carter alors que certaines de ses assignations les plus importantes ont fait l'objet d'études spécifiques. À l'aide des monographies existantes sur le sujet et de sources, dont l'essentiel est constitué de mémorandums de Carter à l'intention du Président, notre recherche propose un bilan et une évaluation des principales assignations de l'agence Carter, ainsi qu'un examen de l'évolution organisationnelle de ladite agence. L'observation des divers champs d'activités du réseau nous amènera aussi à traiter d'assignations peu ou non étudiées. En procédant ainsi, nous montrerons que le réseau Carter fut utile à Roosevelt puisqu'il constituait un canal d'informations supplémentaires permettant à ce dernier de bénéficier d'un service capable de contourner son propre système de renseignement, d'épier et d'évaluer les services de renseignement concurrents ou toute autre personne ou organisation suspecte aux yeux du Président, de fournir des analyses politiques et du renseignement tant étranger que domestique, et finalement d'être une organisation capable de mener secrètement des projets spéciaux. Selon nous, grâce aux services du réseau Carter, Roosevelt bénéficiait d'un outil qui, sans être le plus important parmi ceux à sa disposition, était unique en son genre et comportait des fonctionnalités multiples. En somme, nous soutenons que malgré des lacunes évidentes, le réseau Carter contribua tout de même à l'effort de guerre et aida à l'instauration d'un système de renseignement plus efficace. De fait, nous soutiendrons que le réseau Carter fut utile, sans toutefois être important. Cela étant, une meilleure connaissance du réseau Carter permettra de mieux connaître la pensée du président Roosevelt et d'enrichir la connaissance au sujet de l'évolution du renseignement américain à un moment où celui-ci était en pleine métamorphose. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : John Franklin Carter, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Agences américaines du renseignement, États-Unis, Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

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