In anticipation of a future social interaction, socially anxious individuals (SAIs) may imagine themselves appearing stupid or foolish and predict and exaggerate the probability and costs of conveying these undesirable social images both on oneself (e.g., “I will feel stupid”) and on others impressions of oneself (e.g., “Others will think I’m stupid”). However, there is a paucity of research examining the latter bias; moreover, research regarding SAIs estimates of the probability and costs of conveying a positive impression (e.g., “I will feel smart”) has typically been neglected. Thus, the a novel questionnaire was created in order to develop a more comprehensive model of SAIs estimates of probability and costs. We expected that positive and negative, self- and other-related judgments will represent four distinct, latent constructs that will be related to trait social anxiety indirectly through fears of positive and negative evaluation per the evolutionary model of social anxiety. Structural equation modeling was used to test study hypotheses. The final sample included four hounded and seventy-four college students (307 males and 167 females). Results generally supported study hypotheses. After minor theoretically justified modifications, the hypothesized model provided good fit to the data, χ2(94) = 151.78, CFI = .99, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .04. All social appraisals (or judgments) with the exception of other-negative appraisals were indirectly related to social anxiety through fears of positive and negative evaluation. Contrary to expectations, other-positive appraisals were negatively related to fear of negative evaluation and other-negative appraisals were uncorrelated with fear of positive evaluation, providing partial incremental validity of the novel questionnaire used in this study. Results provide preliminary evidence that suggests future research should extend evaluation of SAIs anticipatory social appraisals beyond negative, self-related social impact. Implications, limitations, and future directions of the research are be discussed.

Animal welfare has long been a subject under debate. Since animals are unable to voice concerns about their living standards it is of interest to find other ways to secure their wellbeing. A new measurement has been introduced where animals’ own judgement can act as an indicator for their emotional state and welfare. This study summarizes key elements from previous literature and research in order to explain the connection between welfare and judgement bias. Emotions have been defined as either an observable reaction to a stimulus or a subjective conscious experience of the stimulus. The second has been difficult to assess in animals since they cannot vocalise their own interpretations, hence emotions in animals are assessed based on the first definition. The study of animal welfare is in short the study of animal’s judgement of the world, which in turn indicate how animals feel. Cognitive judgement bias has been defined as whether an animal assess an ambiguous stimulus as negative or positive, a common method used to demonstrate this concept is the go no-go method. Animals learn to discriminate between two stimuli and is then presented with an ambiguous stimulus. The response to the ambiguous stimulus is recorded and determine if the animal is optimistic or pessimistic in its judgement. Research has been rather successful in determining factors which can affect animal welfare, opening up for deeper discussions concerning animal cognition, awareness and their effect on welfare, but further refinements are required to assess the influence of judgement bias.

Cognitive processes include biases, such as cognitive judgment bias. Cognitive judgment bias influences how the surrounding is interpreted, and this can differ between individuals. However, thus far no formal framework exists to understand how cognitive judgment bias works. Here I investigated how environmental factors and personality influence cognitive judgment bias in Gallus gallus chicks. First I investigated how two environmental factors affected the cognitive judgment bias of laying hen chicks. Chicks were exposed to stress and/or environmental enrichment, and tested in a cognitive judgment bias test before and after collective unpredictable stressors were presented. The results showed that chicks living in enriched environments were faster to reach all cues after the collective stressors than chicks living in non-enriched environments. Individual differences are often observed in animals, even when raised under identical conditions; therefore I also investigated if variation in personality influence cognitive judgment bias. Red junglefowl chicks were thereby raised in equal environments and exposed to personality assays in addition to a cognitive judgment bias test. I demonstrated that less nervous chicks were more optimistic towards ambiguous and negative cues than more nervous chicks. Also previous studies have found indications of connections between cognitive bias and environment or personality. I conclude that environmental enrichment can buffer the influence of stress on cognitive judgment bias and that personality has a small influence on interpretations of stimuli. In the future, experiments in this field should focus on exploring more aspects on how cognitive biases occurs to improve our understanding of cognitive processes.

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The moderation function of in-group status position on the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention was tested in a 2 (group-based guilt: low versus high) x 2 (status loss: weak versus strong) factorial between-subjects design, using an online survey software program named Qualtrics. The target population was white South African undergraduate students born after 1988 and registered at the University of South Africa. The results of the first Experiment confirmed the hypothesis, that the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention becomes less significant the more participants perceive a loss of status for their in-group. However, the hypothesis could not be confirmed in Experiment 2. The results are presented and discussed in detail / Psychology / M.A. (Psychology)

The moderation function of in-group status position on the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention was tested in a 2 (group-based guilt: low versus high) x 2 (status loss: weak versus strong) factorial between-subjects design, using an online survey software program named Qualtrics. The target population was white South African undergraduate students born after 1988 and registered at the University of South Africa. The results of the first Experiment confirmed the hypothesis, that the relationship between group-based guilt and reparation intention becomes less significant the more participants perceive a loss of status for their in-group. However, the hypothesis could not be confirmed in Experiment 2. The results are presented and discussed in detail / Psychology / M.A. (Psychology)

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