Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Conventional wisdom holds that constitutions shape behavior, structures, and institutions. Looking at provisions in the constitutions of 19 Latin American countries, I show the level of judicial independence exercised by a country’s courts and judges is a function of constitutional provisions.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 136-147).

The special role courts play in a democracy requires designers of constitutions to consider the delicate trade-offs between democratic accountability and judicial independence. This dissertation analyzes the decisional consequences of state supreme court institutional structures. States utilize several types of election and elite reconfirmation, and each method carries a systematically different risk of incumbent defeat. My theory predicts that as reappointment uncertainty increases, judicial independence decreases. I define judicial independence as decisions made by judges using only considerations that are internal to the rule of law. I measure judicial independence by quantifying the external influence of partisan, elite, popular, and economic pressures applied to judges. I conclude by considering the normative implications of the empirical findings. Because judicial independence is a problem of optimization, not maximization, constitutional designers hope to strike a balance between some form of judicial accountability, popular constitutionalism, and judicial independence. / text

The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the supreme law of the Republic and in enjoying this status it is prescribing the composition of the three different arms of government as well as each branch’s status within the new constitutional dispensation. Prior to this era of constitutional supremacy South Africa was subject to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, an era where the courts could only challenge legislation on procedural grounds, but had no general power to declare legislation unconstitutional. The Constitution further provides for a separation of powers between these arms of government, and it has vested the judicial authority in the courts and conferred strong judicial review powers upon the Constitutional Court. The head of executive has recently argued that “the powers conferred on the courts cannot be regarded as superior to the powers resulting from a mandate given by the people in a popular vote”. The preceding quote is one of many statements and claims that forms part of a national debate on the nature and scope of the Constitutional Court’s powers in South Africa. The Constitutional Court has in recent years handed down judgments that were not favourable to the legislative6 and executive arms of the South African government. / Magister Legum - LLM

A non-corrupt judiciary is a fundamental condition for the endorsement of rule of law and the ability to guarantee basic human rights in society. The judiciary must therefore be an independent and fair body that fights corruption, not the other way around. This essay systematizes different binding and non-binding international, and to some extent regional, norms and standards regarding corruption in the judiciary and judicial independence, and presents potential factors and effects of judicial corruption, through an inventory of documents recognized by organizations such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Further, the essay presents different anti-corruption strategies and the dilemma of implementing such strategies with regard to judicial independence. The advantages and disadvantages of different anti-corruption strategies are reviewed through the study of some successful and unsuccessful examples. There are several definitions of corruption, this essay emanates from the definition of ‘abuse of office for personal or private gain’, a definition that is wide but yet well recognized. The factors of judicial corruption are many and often overlapping, but they vary from state to state and must hence be analyzed individually to find the factual reasons for what generates corruption. The effects are detrimental and break down the very core of rule of law and corrupt judges neglect fundamental principles such as equality, impartiality, propriety and integrity. With regard to the different factors and effects, the norms and standards, and the anti-corruption strategies, a discussion follows about how to rid the judiciary from corruption with preservation of the respect of judicial independence. The discussion also raises the predicament that malpractice of various fundamental principles e.g. judicial independence can occur and further distort unhealthy judiciaries. The main conclusion regarding anti-corruption strategies is that they must be carefully weighed against the principle of independence.

The relationship between judicial independence and the levels of ethnic conflicts in developing countries has remained a significant research area due to increased cases of the conflicts with lack of judicial independence in the countries. Judicial independence is seen as an essential element of democracy in that an independent judiciary can act as an arbiter between different groups and institutions. The main aim of this study was to examine the relationship between judicial independence and ethnic conflicts empirically. Greater judicial independence should be associated with less ethnic conflict, because an independent court can serve as an arbiter for disputants, and thus lessen the likelihood of conflict. The study involved 128 developing countries over a 30-year period from 1981 to 2010 using secondary data sources and employing statistical methods to test the relationship between judicial independence and the levels of ethnic conflicts. Findings indicate that judicial independence has a statistically significant negative association with the levels of ethnic conflict. Therefore, this study recommends that the governments of developing countries should promote judicial independence as part of solutions for ethnic conflicts .

The beginning of the 1990s saw many African countries embarking on the process of drafting new constitutions as they abandoned independence constitutions. Most of the independence constitutions were perceived as constitutions without constitutionalism and they were generally blamed for failure of democracy and the rule of law in Africa. The study analyses the state of democracy and constitutionalism and the impact that colonialism had on the African continent. Apart from the spurt of new constitutions adopted, democracy is growing very slowly in most African states with widespread human rights violations and disregard for the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers, still holding the centre stage. Judicial independence is an important component of democracy in the modern state. The study therefore scrutinizes how the principle of judicial independence can be promoted and protected to enhance democracy. One important mechanism which plays a crucial role in safeguarding judicial independence is the way judicial officers are appointed. The study selects four countries – Swaziland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa and analyses how judicial officers are appointed in these countries in an effort to find an effective and optimal approach.The premise of the study is centred on the role of constitutionalism and the process of appointing judges as a means of promoting and safeguarding democracy in these selected countries. / Public, Constitutional, & International Law / LLM

The beginning of the 1990s saw many African countries embarking on the process of drafting new constitutions as they abandoned independence constitutions. Most of the independence constitutions were perceived as constitutions without constitutionalism and they were generally blamed for failure of democracy and the rule of law in Africa. The study analyses the state of democracy and constitutionalism and the impact that colonialism had on the African continent. Apart from the spurt of new constitutions adopted, democracy is growing very slowly in most African states with widespread human rights violations and disregard for the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers, still holding the centre stage. Judicial independence is an important component of democracy in the modern state. The study therefore scrutinizes how the principle of judicial independence can be promoted and protected to enhance democracy. One important mechanism which plays a crucial role in safeguarding judicial independence is the way judicial officers are appointed. The study selects four countries – Swaziland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa and analyses how judicial officers are appointed in these countries in an effort to find an effective and optimal approach.The premise of the study is centred on the role of constitutionalism and the process of appointing judges as a means of promoting and safeguarding democracy in these selected countries. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLM

published_or_final_version / abstract / Law / Master / Master of Philosophy