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Judicial independence in South Africa : a constitutional perspective.Siyo, Lunga Khanya. January 2012 (has links)
This dissertation seeks to explore the judiciary as an independent and separate arm of government. In doing so, this dissertation attempts to provide a holistic analysis of the constitutional and legislative framework that has been established to protect both individual and institutional independence of the judiciary in South Africa. The question that will be asked is whether such mechanisms are consistent with the section 165 of the Constitution. Central to this analysis is whether the system of court administration that was inherited from apartheid is appropriate for the purposes that courts now have to perform under South Africa‟s constitutional democracy.
Chapter one lays the foundation by providing an introduction to the topic under discussion. In doing so, this chapter also provides the research question, literature review, and an explanation of the research methodology. Lastly, this chapter attempts to trace the historical foundation of the principle of judicial independence. It is concluded that judicial independence is linked with the development of the rule of law and seeks to counter unfettered power.
In an attempt to provide a conceptual definition for judicial independence, chapter two draws from international law instruments. This definition focuses on the distinction between independence and impartiality; individual and institutional independence. It is then concluded that judicial independence is vital for good governance, administration, accountability and the protection of the public from the arbitrary and abusive exercise of power by the state.
Chapter three focuses on the independence of judges in South Africa, in other words, individual independence. This chapter contains an analysis of legislative mechanisms adopted in South Africa to protect the judges from improper influence in their adjudicatory tasks. Further, this chapter also analyses jurisprudence relating to impartiality and bias. It is concluded that the constitutional and legislative framework adopted in South Africa sufficiently insulates judges from improper influence. As far as impartiality is concerned, it is concluded that in terms of South African jurisprudence, the presumption is that judges are impartial. The burden of proof falls on the party alleging bias. Chapter four focuses on court administration. This chapter gives an overview of the structure of courts and the current system of court administration in South Africa. Further, this section discusses how the doctrine of separation of powers relates to court administration. This section also discusses reforms to the current system of court administration that have been proposed by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. It is concluded that the current system of court administration is inconsistent with the Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers as it permits the executive to encroach upon the independent functioning of the courts.
Chapter five seeks to discuss some of the challenges that threaten judicial independence in South Africa. This chapter begins by providing a cursory overview of some of the main incidents which have threatened the independence of South Africa‟s judiciary. The main focus of this chapter is the alleged attempt by the Cape Judge President Hlophe to improperly influence judges of the Constitutional court in their adjudicatory tasks. Moreover, this chapter discusses the manner in which the complaint against Judge Hlophe was dealt with by the Judicial Service Commission. It is concluded that in dismissing the complaint against Judge Hlophe without a thorough examination, the Judicial Service Commission abdicated its constitutional duty. It is also concluded that the unresolved complaint against Judge Hlophe casts a shadow of doubt over the impartiality and independent functioning of the judiciary in South Africa.
The main conclusion in chapter six is that the protection of independence in South Africa suffers from contradictory elements which leave the judiciary under executive control, which constitutes an insidious erosion of the doctrine of separation of powers. Therefore the status of the judiciary as an equal arm of government in South Africa is weak. Thus, while South Africa's judiciary is impartial and contains strong elements of individual independence, it is not independent. The essence of the recommendations relate to the functioning of the Judicial Service Commission, the application of section 175 (2) of the Constitution, the tenure of judges, the administration of courts, the complaint against Judge Hlophe and the Superior Courts Bill. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2012.
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The impact and the effect, of the management and control of judges by the executive on the independence of the judiciary.Womack, Anna Johanna Catharina. January 2009 (has links)
The independence of the judiciary is not only crucial for the legal community, but for all South Africans, including the business community. It is important for local and foreign investment to have confidence that the judiciary will protect and enforce their interests. It is submitted that if the independence of the judiciary is undermined in South Africa, not only will the judiciary be affected but so will the broader business community. The aim of this study is to determine what effect legislative and executive interference in managing the judiciary, through its human resource processes (such as selection, training and
discipline of judges) as well as through its finances and court administration, has had on the independence of the judiciary. In recent years there has been an increased interest in the activities of the judiciary and an increase in the criticism of its members. This has resulted in the
executive proposing amendments to legislation which, in turn has resulted in the ongoing debate in legal circles about the impact of these measures on the independence of the judiciary. The concern is that the proposed measures will enable the executive to further encroach upon the
judiciary and undermine its independence. Consequently, members of the judiciary, academics, members of the bar council and the side bar have objected strongly to the proposed legislative changes. The purpose of this case study is to explore the extent to which the executive has already interfered with, and proposes to further interfere with judicial personnel and the functioning of the judiciary. A further purpose is to establish what effects the aforesaid political interference has had on the independence, the efficient and effective functioning of the judiciary. It is hoped
to determine whether the proposed legislative and executive measures will remedy the perceived judicial inefficiencies through holding members more accountable or whether they will compound the problems that already exist. In pursuit of this broad aim the research takes a grounded, theory-generating approach. The foundation of the research design is a combination of the use of the literature surveyed in Chapter Two together with the responses to the survey questionnaires and the answers to the interview questions from judges of the various superior courts of South Africa. The South African judiciary presently comprises of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and 13 divisions and local divisions of the High Court situated in Bisho (Ciskei); Bloemfontein (Orange Free State); Cape Town (Cape of Good Hope Division); Durban (Durban and Coast Local Division); Grahamstown (Eastern Cape); Johannesburg (Witwatersrand Local Division): Kimberley (Northern Cape); Mmabatho (Bophuthatswana); Pietermartizburg (KwaZulu-Natal); Port Elizabeth (South Eastern Cape Local Division); Pretoria (Transvaal); and Thohoyandou (Venda). A dual approach using two types of research instruments, namely the survey questionnaire and the interview questionnaire, was used. In 1999 only two of the ten Constitutional Court judges were women (Sally Baden, Shireen Hassim and Sheila Meintjes, 1999). At that time there were only two female judges in the Labour Court and one in the Land Claims Court. Also, of the total of 186 judges, at the time, 156 were white males, 20 were black males, 7 were white women and 3 were black women. However, the racial and gender composition of the judiciary has changed dramatically since then (Seedat, 2005, page 5) and (Lewis, 2008, page 1). No random sample was taken, due to the small population size of the judiciary and it was feared that it would further reduce the response rate. Both research instruments (the survey questionnaire and the interview schedule of questions) were sent to the entire population of judges, which at the time that the study was conducted, consisted of 213 judges in total. The main source of data was obtained from the research questionnaire developed by the researcher. This was posted to each of the respondents, together with a self-addressed envelope.
The aforesaid data was obtained from the semi-structured face to face (alternatively telephonic) interviews conducted with the respondents, who were willing to participate and agreed to be interviewed. Amongst the judges surveyed and interviewed some were current judges, some were retired judges and some were acting judges, of the various superior courts (the interview questionnaire was also developed by the researcher), all of whom were spread across the whole of South Africa. Due to distance and time constraints, a number of the judges agreed to be interviewed telephonically instead of face to face, which saved the researcher a great deal of expense, with regards to travelling and accommodation. The constant comparative method of qualitative analysis was used. Data reduction was carried out in three stages, each representing a progressively higher level of theoretical abstraction. The findings of the research are expressed as an integrated theory and a series of propositions,
generalized within the boundaries of the study, relating legislative and executive interference with the judiciary and what the impact and effect these have had on the independence of the judiciary. The conclusions may be summarized in four statements. Firstly, there is political interference with the personnel of the judiciary, through the Judicial Service Commission being involved in the
judicial selection and disciplinary processes. This has negatively impacted on the efficient functioning of the judiciary. Secondly, the judiciary has transformed and no further political inference is necessary to bring about transformation of its structures or its functioning. Thirdly,
there is executive interference, by the Department of Justice, with the judiciary's finances and court administration, which has negatively impacted on the efficient functioning of the judiciary. Fourthly, the proposed judicial bills are an unnecessary intrusion and, if enacted, will increase the executive's power over the functioning of the judiciary, further undermining its independence and
possibly eventually leading to its complacency. This will have adverse consequences for all South Africans, including the business community, as local and foreign investor confidence in the South African judiciary's ability to protect and enforce their rights. In light of the aforesaid, the recommendation is that all forms of political interference with the judiciary should be removed and that the legislature and the executive should support the judiciary and protects it from judicial criticism. The legislature and the executive should take steps where necessary to remedy the abovementioned, for example to correct the imbalances in the composition of the Judicial Service
Commission and allow the judiciary to control its own internal processes thereby ensuring that it functions efficiently and independently. / Thesis (MBA)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2009.
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The fate of Heath's special investigation unit : an evaluation in terms of the separation of powers doctrineShackleford, Caroline Sara 03 1900 (has links)
Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / Some digitised pages may appear illegible due to the condition of the original hard copy / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis is a response to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in South
African Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, in which certain provisions of the
Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act were subjected to
constitutional review. The outcome of the case was the striking down of certain
provisions of the Act as unconstitutional, and the removal of Judge Willem Heath
from his position as head of the Unit. The provisions were said to infringe upon the
principle of separation of powers, an implicit term of the Constitution of South
Africa. This principle affects the extent of the judicial power because of its
influence on determining the acceptability of extra-judicial functions. The doctrine
of separation of powers is therefore considered in its historical and theoretical
context, with particular reference to the way in which it tends to limit or define the
role of judges. Following this analysis, the status of institutions supporting
constitutional democracy is examined, and the legislation governing Special
Investigating Units is compared with that which regulates the office of the Public
Protector. As a result, some alternative legislative means of achieving the ends of
the Units, namely the combating of state corruption and maladministration, are
suggested. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis volg op die uitspraak van die Grondwetlike Hof in South African
Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, waarin sekere bepalings van die Wet op Spesiale
Ondersoekeenhede en Spesiale Tribunale aan grondwetlike hersiening onderwerp
is. Die uitkoms van die saak was dat sekere ongrondwetlike bepalings van die Wet
ongeldig verklaar is, en dat Regter Willem Heath van sy posisie as hoof van die
Eenheid onthef is. Dit is bevind dat die bepalings die beginsel van skeiding van
magte, 'n implisiete term van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet, geskend het. As
gevolg van sy invloed op die bepaling van aanvaarbaarheid van buite-juridiese
funksies, beïnvloed dié beginsel die omvang van die juridiese mag. Die skeiding
van magte leerstuk word dus in sy historiese en teoretiese konteks oorweeg, met
spesifieke verwysing na die manier waarop dit neig om die rol van regters te beperk
of te omskryf. Na hierdie analise word die status ondersoek van instellings wat
grondwetlike demokrasie ondersteun, en die wetgewing wat die Spesiale
Ondersoekeenhede beheer, vergelyk met dié wat die Openbare Beskermer reguleer.
Op grond hiervan word sekere alternatiewe wetgewende metodes voorgestelom die
doeleindes van die Eenhede, naamlik die bekamping van staatskorrupsie en
wanadministrasie, te bereik.
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A critical evaluation of the independence of the Office of the Chief Justice and its role in promoting judicial transformation in South AfricaPhatshwane, Rebaone Jeremia 07 1900 (has links)
The legislative supremacy of Parliament has dominated the constitutional law of South Africa for a very long time. In the pre-constitutional era, the judiciary had no power to question the deeds of Parliament. Despite the need for the judiciary to be independent from the two other governmental branches to execute its function effectively, it was surely dependent on them. However, the creation of the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) as a separate governmental department by the Constitutional Seventeenth Amendment Act, read together with Superior Court Act, mandated by the requirements of a supreme Constitution (and not Parliament), changed things so that the judiciary is no longer dependent on government for its day-to-day administration. This thesis examines the independence of the OCJ and its role in promoting judicial transformation in the new South Africa. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. M. (Human Rights Law)
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The legitimacy of judicial law-making and the application of judicial discretion in South Africa : a legal comparative studyMhlanga, Pete Vusi 02 1900 (has links)
The concept of judicial law-making impacts on the extent, meaning and scope relationship between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is an integral function of the courts while its shape, meaning and nature seem to lack sufficient formulation and articulation, which results in an inherent problem regarding its legitimacy. This study examines the legitimacy and the working of the South African constitutional judicial law-making concepts. Its effect on the constitutional relationships between all three branches of government is scrutinized. In order to fully probe this concept, its impact and application on the separation of powers, judicial review, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences becomes inevitable.
The introductory part of this study looks at origins and historical development of the separation of powers doctrine and its application under the 1996 South African Constitution. The latter part focuses on the nature and the scope of judicial review, judicial law-making, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences with a view establishing the impact of these concepts in our judicial law-making. The development of these concepts by South African courts, and what seems to be the lack of formulation and articulation of South African constitutional judicial law-making which raises questions regarding its legitimacy is probed.
This research recommends that it is of the utmost importance that South Africa develops its own unique and comprehensive doctrine of separation of powers. The Constitution further requires reforms in order to clarify the extent to which the courts can go when formulating laws and public policy in the interests of justice, and whether the interests-of-justice test is capable of delivering a well-informed outcome in developing this jurisdiction’s laws. South African jurisprudence also needs to be developed in empowering the legislature to make laws which are constitutionally compliant without making the courts the sole expositor of the Constitution. Lastly, the extent to which the legislature can enact certain laws must be redefined, which on face value might seems to be encroaching into the courts’ independence and authority. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. D. (Criminal and Procedural Law)
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