Wetgewing wat onbestaanbaar is met die bepalings van Wet 200 van 1993 as die hoogste reg is nietig tensy geoorloof volgens die maatstawwe van art 33 (1) 1 en die Konstitusionele Hof en die provinsiale en plaaslike afdelings van die Hooggeregshof is bevoeg om dit ongeldig te verklaar. Die beoordeling van die geldigheid van wetgewing waardeur inbreuk gemaak word op 'n Fundamentele Reg of Vryheid in Hoofstuk 3 verleen 1 vereis in eerste instansie die vertolking van die betrokke bepaling van die Hoofstuk. In die lig van die besondere karakter van 'n grondwet en die gebrek aan omlyning van die verleende regte en vryhede 1 moet die vertolking nie volgens geykte metodes geskied nie I maar wel doelgerig aan die hand van die waardes onderliggend tot die Handves as geheel. Waardes wat nie herleibaar is tot die grondwet self nie en die persoonlike filosofiee van die regters behoort die howe egter nie te beinvloed nie. / Legislation inconsistent with the provisions of Act 200 of 1993 as the supreme law is of no force and effect and the Constitutional Court and the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court may declare it invalid, unless it complies with the criteria of a permissible limitation under sec 33(1). Before the validity of legislation impinging upon a Fundamental Right or Freedom conferred in Chapter 3 can be considered, the relevant provision of the Chapter must first be interpreted. In view of the special nature of a constitution and the generality of the conferred rights and freedoms, the ordinary methods of interpretation should not be applied. Chapter 3 must be interpreted purposively taking into account the values underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole. Values not founded in the Constitution and the personal philosophies of the judges ought not to influence the courts. / Private Law / LL.M.

Wetgewing wat onbestaanbaar is met die bepalings van Wet 200 van 1993 as die hoogste reg is nietig tensy geoorloof volgens die maatstawwe van art 33 (1) 1 en die Konstitusionele Hof en die provinsiale en plaaslike afdelings van die Hooggeregshof is bevoeg om dit ongeldig te verklaar. Die beoordeling van die geldigheid van wetgewing waardeur inbreuk gemaak word op 'n Fundamentele Reg of Vryheid in Hoofstuk 3 verleen 1 vereis in eerste instansie die vertolking van die betrokke bepaling van die Hoofstuk. In die lig van die besondere karakter van 'n grondwet en die gebrek aan omlyning van die verleende regte en vryhede 1 moet die vertolking nie volgens geykte metodes geskied nie I maar wel doelgerig aan die hand van die waardes onderliggend tot die Handves as geheel. Waardes wat nie herleibaar is tot die grondwet self nie en die persoonlike filosofiee van die regters behoort die howe egter nie te beinvloed nie. / Legislation inconsistent with the provisions of Act 200 of 1993 as the supreme law is of no force and effect and the Constitutional Court and the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court may declare it invalid, unless it complies with the criteria of a permissible limitation under sec 33(1). Before the validity of legislation impinging upon a Fundamental Right or Freedom conferred in Chapter 3 can be considered, the relevant provision of the Chapter must first be interpreted. In view of the special nature of a constitution and the generality of the conferred rights and freedoms, the ordinary methods of interpretation should not be applied. Chapter 3 must be interpreted purposively taking into account the values underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole. Values not founded in the Constitution and the personal philosophies of the judges ought not to influence the courts. / Private Law / LL.M.

Text in Afrikaans / Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Die beginsel van die onafhanklikheid van die regbank word verskans in die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika van 1996. 'n Onafhanklike regbank is noodsaaklik ten einde te voldoen aan die primere funksie van die regbank, naamlik die bewerkstelliging van geregtigheid. Openbare vertroue in die onafhanklikheid van die regbank verhoog die legitimiteit van hierdie instelling, wat noodsaaklik is vir nakoming en eerbiediging van die howe se beslissings deur die gemeenskap. In die verlede het kritici beweer dat die regbank 'n legitimiteitskrisis beleef op grond daarvan dat polilieke oorwegings 'n rol gespeel het by die aanstelling van regsprekende amptenare, dat die regbank nie verteenwoordigend genoeg is van die bevolking wat betref ras en geslag nie en dat die howe in die verlede in sommige gevalle te owerheidsgesind was en soms diskriminerende wetgewing sonder veel skroom of teenspraak aanvaar en toegepas het. Kritici het daarop gewys dat die opbloei in die volkshowe as alternatief tot die formele howe, as voorbeeld dien van die algehele miskenning van en wantroue in die reg bank. 'n Kritiese evaluering van hierdie aangeleenthede is gedoen aan die hand van 'n regsvergelykende ondersoek. Daar is tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die Regterlike Dienskommissie en die Landdrostekommissie 'n belangrike hervorming teweeg gebring het op die gebied van aanstelling van regterlike amptenare. Verder is bevind dat die juriestelsel nie 'n realistiese oplossing bied om die regbank meer verteenwoordigend van die gemeenskap te maak nie, maar dat die assessorestelsel blyk 'n meer praktiese en geskikte alternatief te wees. Dit het verder geblyk dat daar van regterlike beamptes verwag word om, in die lig van die Grondwet van 1996 en 'n stelsel van grondwetlike oppermagtigheid, 'n aktivistiese waarde-ge6rienteerde of waarde-aktiverende benadering by wets- en grondwetuitleg te volg. Daar is verder bevind dat die informele howe behoue moet bly, maar aangepas behoort te word by veranderende omstandighede, in die lig van die Grondwet en die handves van fundamentele regte. Ten slotte is voorstelle gemaak as moontlike oplossing vir bepaalde probleme wat geidentifiseer is. / The principle of the independence of the judiciary is entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. An independent judiciary is essential in order to fulfill the primary function of a judiciary, namely the realisation of justice. Public confidence in the independence of the judiciary increases the legitimacy of this institution, which is essential for respect for and compliance with the decisions of the court by the community. In the past critics maintained that the judiciary is experiencing a legitimacy crisis, due to the fact that political considerations have played a role in the appointment of judicial officials, that the judiciary is not representative of the community in respect of race and sex and that the courts have been too executive-minded in the past and have at times accepted and applied discriminatory legislation without much hesitation or contradiction. Critics alleged that the proliferation of people's courts as an alternative to the formal courts, was an indication of the general denial of and loss of confidence in the judiciary. A critical evaluation of these aspects was undertaken by way of a comparative study. It lead to the conclusion that the Judicial Service Commission and the Magistrates Commission brought about an important reform regarding the appointment of judicial officials. It was found that the jury system does not constitute a realistic solution to make the judiciary more representative of the community, but that the assessor system seems to be a more practical alternative. It became apparant that in view of the Constitution of 1996 and our system of constitutional supremacy, it is expected of judicial officals to follow an activistic value-orientated or value-activated approach during legislative and constitutional interpretation. It is furthermore concluded that the informal courts should be retained, but that they should be adapted to the changing circumstances in view of the Constitution and the bill of rights. Finally, suggestions are made in order to address certain problems which have been identified. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.D.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

Text in Afrikaans / Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Die beginsel van die onafhanklikheid van die regbank word verskans in die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika van 1996. 'n Onafhanklike regbank is noodsaaklik ten einde te voldoen aan die primere funksie van die regbank, naamlik die bewerkstelliging van geregtigheid. Openbare vertroue in die onafhanklikheid van die regbank verhoog die legitimiteit van hierdie instelling, wat noodsaaklik is vir nakoming en eerbiediging van die howe se beslissings deur die gemeenskap. In die verlede het kritici beweer dat die regbank 'n legitimiteitskrisis beleef op grond daarvan dat polilieke oorwegings 'n rol gespeel het by die aanstelling van regsprekende amptenare, dat die regbank nie verteenwoordigend genoeg is van die bevolking wat betref ras en geslag nie en dat die howe in die verlede in sommige gevalle te owerheidsgesind was en soms diskriminerende wetgewing sonder veel skroom of teenspraak aanvaar en toegepas het. Kritici het daarop gewys dat die opbloei in die volkshowe as alternatief tot die formele howe, as voorbeeld dien van die algehele miskenning van en wantroue in die reg bank. 'n Kritiese evaluering van hierdie aangeleenthede is gedoen aan die hand van 'n regsvergelykende ondersoek. Daar is tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die Regterlike Dienskommissie en die Landdrostekommissie 'n belangrike hervorming teweeg gebring het op die gebied van aanstelling van regterlike amptenare. Verder is bevind dat die juriestelsel nie 'n realistiese oplossing bied om die regbank meer verteenwoordigend van die gemeenskap te maak nie, maar dat die assessorestelsel blyk 'n meer praktiese en geskikte alternatief te wees. Dit het verder geblyk dat daar van regterlike beamptes verwag word om, in die lig van die Grondwet van 1996 en 'n stelsel van grondwetlike oppermagtigheid, 'n aktivistiese waarde-ge6rienteerde of waarde-aktiverende benadering by wets- en grondwetuitleg te volg. Daar is verder bevind dat die informele howe behoue moet bly, maar aangepas behoort te word by veranderende omstandighede, in die lig van die Grondwet en die handves van fundamentele regte. Ten slotte is voorstelle gemaak as moontlike oplossing vir bepaalde probleme wat geidentifiseer is. / The principle of the independence of the judiciary is entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. An independent judiciary is essential in order to fulfill the primary function of a judiciary, namely the realisation of justice. Public confidence in the independence of the judiciary increases the legitimacy of this institution, which is essential for respect for and compliance with the decisions of the court by the community. In the past critics maintained that the judiciary is experiencing a legitimacy crisis, due to the fact that political considerations have played a role in the appointment of judicial officials, that the judiciary is not representative of the community in respect of race and sex and that the courts have been too executive-minded in the past and have at times accepted and applied discriminatory legislation without much hesitation or contradiction. Critics alleged that the proliferation of people's courts as an alternative to the formal courts, was an indication of the general denial of and loss of confidence in the judiciary. A critical evaluation of these aspects was undertaken by way of a comparative study. It lead to the conclusion that the Judicial Service Commission and the Magistrates Commission brought about an important reform regarding the appointment of judicial officials. It was found that the jury system does not constitute a realistic solution to make the judiciary more representative of the community, but that the assessor system seems to be a more practical alternative. It became apparant that in view of the Constitution of 1996 and our system of constitutional supremacy, it is expected of judicial officals to follow an activistic value-orientated or value-activated approach during legislative and constitutional interpretation. It is furthermore concluded that the informal courts should be retained, but that they should be adapted to the changing circumstances in view of the Constitution and the bill of rights. Finally, suggestions are made in order to address certain problems which have been identified. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.D.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact and influence of South Africa's Constitutional Court in the first two years of our democracy. To achieve this objective, some of the definitive and controversial cases already decided by the Court have been selected and analysed in an attempt to glean some jurisprudential perspectives of the Court. It focuses on the work of the Court over the past two years. It deals with the evolution of South Africa into a democracy, and analyzes the South African legal system prior to the beginning of the process of transformation. It briefly surveys the evolution of our constitutional system, dating back from the pre-1910 colonial period and provides a broad outline of the legal system in the post-April 1994 period of transformation. It analyzes the Court from the point of view of, inter alia, its composition, jurisdiction and powers. The Court is also contrasted with courts in other jurisdictions which exercise full judicial review. The Court's emerging jurisprudence is examined. A review is made, inter alia, of the Court's understanding of, and approach to, the questions of the values underpinning the post-apartheid society and its constitutional system, and constitutional interpretation. The right against self-incrimination and South African company law and the two relevant Constitutional Court cases are discussed. The collection of evidence by the State and the constitutionality of provisions relating to search and seizure and the taking of fingerprints are looked into. The Court's approach to statutory presumptions and criminal prosecutions; some aspects of our appeals procedures; an accused's right to be assisted by a lawyer at state expense; the question of a fair trial and access to information; capital punishment; corporal punishment; committal to prison for debt; and the certification of constitutions is analyzed. Two of the cases in which the provinces clashed with the national government on the distribution of posers between provinces and the national government are discussed. The conclusion is that the Court has, overall, hitherto acquitted itself well in the handling of particularly the controversial quasi-political questions that arose in the cases it has decided. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / L.L. D. (Law)

The legislative supremacy of Parliament has dominated the constitutional law of South Africa for a very long time. In the pre-constitutional era, the judiciary had no power to question the deeds of Parliament. Despite the need for the judiciary to be independent from the two other governmental branches to execute its function effectively, it was surely dependent on them. However, the creation of the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) as a separate governmental department by the Constitutional Seventeenth Amendment Act, read together with Superior Court Act, mandated by the requirements of a supreme Constitution (and not Parliament), changed things so that the judiciary is no longer dependent on government for its day-to-day administration. This thesis examines the independence of the OCJ and its role in promoting judicial transformation in the new South Africa. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. M. (Human Rights Law)

The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact and influence of South Africa's Constitutional Court in the first two years of our democracy. To achieve this objective, some of the definitive and controversial cases already decided by the Court have been selected and analysed in an attempt to glean some jurisprudential perspectives of the Court. It focuses on the work of the Court over the past two years. It deals with the evolution of South Africa into a democracy, and analyzes the South African legal system prior to the beginning of the process of transformation. It briefly surveys the evolution of our constitutional system, dating back from the pre-1910 colonial period and provides a broad outline of the legal system in the post-April 1994 period of transformation. It analyzes the Court from the point of view of, inter alia, its composition, jurisdiction and powers. The Court is also contrasted with courts in other jurisdictions which exercise full judicial review. The Court's emerging jurisprudence is examined. A review is made, inter alia, of the Court's understanding of, and approach to, the questions of the values underpinning the post-apartheid society and its constitutional system, and constitutional interpretation. The right against self-incrimination and South African company law and the two relevant Constitutional Court cases are discussed. The collection of evidence by the State and the constitutionality of provisions relating to search and seizure and the taking of fingerprints are looked into. The Court's approach to statutory presumptions and criminal prosecutions; some aspects of our appeals procedures; an accused's right to be assisted by a lawyer at state expense; the question of a fair trial and access to information; capital punishment; corporal punishment; committal to prison for debt; and the certification of constitutions is analyzed. Two of the cases in which the provinces clashed with the national government on the distribution of posers between provinces and the national government are discussed. The conclusion is that the Court has, overall, hitherto acquitted itself well in the handling of particularly the controversial quasi-political questions that arose in the cases it has decided. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / L.L. D. (Law)

The concept of judicial law-making impacts on the extent, meaning and scope relationship between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is an integral function of the courts while its shape, meaning and nature seem to lack sufficient formulation and articulation, which results in an inherent problem regarding its legitimacy. This study examines the legitimacy and the working of the South African constitutional judicial law-making concepts. Its effect on the constitutional relationships between all three branches of government is scrutinized. In order to fully probe this concept, its impact and application on the separation of powers, judicial review, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences becomes inevitable. The introductory part of this study looks at origins and historical development of the separation of powers doctrine and its application under the 1996 South African Constitution. The latter part focuses on the nature and the scope of judicial review, judicial law-making, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences with a view establishing the impact of these concepts in our judicial law-making. The development of these concepts by South African courts, and what seems to be the lack of formulation and articulation of South African constitutional judicial law-making which raises questions regarding its legitimacy is probed. This research recommends that it is of the utmost importance that South Africa develops its own unique and comprehensive doctrine of separation of powers. The Constitution further requires reforms in order to clarify the extent to which the courts can go when formulating laws and public policy in the interests of justice, and whether the interests-of-justice test is capable of delivering a well-informed outcome in developing this jurisdiction’s laws. South African jurisprudence also needs to be developed in empowering the legislature to make laws which are constitutionally compliant without making the courts the sole expositor of the Constitution. Lastly, the extent to which the legislature can enact certain laws must be redefined, which on face value might seems to be encroaching into the courts’ independence and authority. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. D. (Criminal and Procedural Law)