This study focuses on the role of the South African judiciary under an entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights. The lack of an established human rights culture in South Africa results in uncertainty regarding the permissible extent to which judges are empowered, under the Bill of Rights, to employ judicial activism and creativity in order to protect the fundamental rights of citizens. Judicial activism is used in the sense that judges can and should, whenever expressly or impliedly sanctioned to do so by the Bill of Rights, ensure that the fundamental rights of the individual are protected to the extent of granting actual constitutional relief, where this is justified, instead of merely declaring the existence of a right. The essential aim of this study is to outline the parameters of, and the legal basis upon which judicial activism can be justified and accepted into a South African human rights culture. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

This study focuses on the role of the South African judiciary under an entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights. The lack of an established human rights culture in South Africa results in uncertainty regarding the permissible extent to which judges are empowered, under the Bill of Rights, to employ judicial activism and creativity in order to protect the fundamental rights of citizens. Judicial activism is used in the sense that judges can and should, whenever expressly or impliedly sanctioned to do so by the Bill of Rights, ensure that the fundamental rights of the individual are protected to the extent of granting actual constitutional relief, where this is justified, instead of merely declaring the existence of a right. The essential aim of this study is to outline the parameters of, and the legal basis upon which judicial activism can be justified and accepted into a South African human rights culture. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

Ph.D. (Politics) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

The African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (the Africa Charter), which is one of the constituents of the African human rights system, was adopted by the Assembly of Head of States and Governments of the OAU in 1981 and entered into force five years later in 1986. The African Charter covers a wider range of rights when compared to the other regional human rights instruments, such as the European and the Inter-American Human Rights Systems. As many writers indicated, the Africa Charter is designed to reflect the history, values, traditions, and development of Africa by joining collective rights and individual duties. The African Commission on Humans and Peoples‟ Rights (the Commission) is responsible for the enforcement of the African Charter. Currently, the African Charter has been ratified by 53 countries. South Africa has signed, ratified and deposited the Charter on 09 July 1996. / Prepared under the supervision of Dr. Letitia van der Poll, Faculty of Law of the University of the Western Cape, South Africa / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa))--University of Pretoria, 2011. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / nf2012 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

There exists a lacuna in our legal system, the role of the judiciary in the lawmaking process is not well defined. 'Historically, the judiciary has always claimed that its duty was merely to interpret and apply the law and that it was not within its province to legislate.' Custom and practice on the other hand has revealed that. to some extent, this is not entirely true. Because through precedents and pronouncements of statutes unconstitutional and therefore, null and void, the former in that sense makes laws and is practically involved in the law-making process. • Judicial discretion is another means at the disposal of the judiciary by which the latter legislates." Therefore, the notion that the province of the judiciary is only confined to the interpretation and application of the law is overwhelmingly misleading. The role of the judiciary in the law making process has to be clearly defined and not just to be inferred so that there is left no middle ground or grey area between its involvement and non-involvement. Once this is done, the problem of uncertainty and inconsistency in so far as the judicial process is concerned will be remedied. Since it is indeed the judiciary that decides the cases before them, from these cases it is respectfully submitted that the interpretative process they adopt in arriving at their decision itself amounts to law-making. It is trite law that when courts interpret the law. they also make the law in that process. This reasoning has long been accepted in our legal order and in foreign jurisdictions. The former President of the United States of America, Roosevelt. precisely pointed out in his message to the Congress of the United States on the 8th December 1908, thus: The Chief lawmakers in our country may be. and often are, the judges. because they are the final seat of authority. Every time they interpret contract. property, vested rights, due process of the law. liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy; and as such interpretation is fundamental. they give direction to all lawmaking. The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions depend upon their economic and social philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth century we shall owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic and social philosophy and not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself the product of primitive economic conditions. 1 Even though the above quote was said in the last century, it is still applicable today because judges still do the job of interpreting and applying the law. In doing so they are involved in the law-making process. It has become manifest, as this study will reveal, that Ihe judiciary is involved in the law-making process even though this has proven somewhat irksome to 1 PresidenlTheodore Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, 8th December 1908, 43rd Congressional Record ,Part 1, p.21 . accept and appreciate, bearing in mind the overriding democratic principles such as seoaration of DOwers and the independence of the judiciary .. Therefore this study endeavours to interrogate the manner by which the South African judiciary has been involved in the law-making process both during the previous apartheid regime and in the present democratic dispensation. Futhermore, this study also attempts to answer the question as to how the judiciary will continue to legislate in the present judicial transformation process without upsetting the imperatives of the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. / Thesis (LLM)--North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2006.

There exists a lacuna in our legal system, the role of the judiciary in the law-making process is not well defined. 'Historically, the judiciary has always claimed that its duty was merely to interpret and apply the law and that it was not within its province to legislate.' Custom and practice on the other hand has revealed that to some extent, this is not entirely true. Because through precedents and pronouncements of statutes unconstitutional and therefore, null and void, the former in that sense makes laws and is practically involved in the law-making process. "Judicial discretion is another means at the disposal of the judiciary by which the latter legislates." Therefore, the notion that the province of the judiciary is only confined to the interpretation and application of the law is overwhelmingly misleading. The role of the judiciary in the law making process has to be clearly defined and not just to be inferred so that there is left no middle ground or grey area between its involvement and non-involvement. Once this is done, the problem of uncertainty and inconsistency in so far as the judicial process is concerned will be remedied. Since it is indeed the judiciary that decides the cases before them, from these cases it is respectfully submitted that the interpretative process they adopt in arriving at their decision itself amounts to law-making. It is trite law that when courts interpret the law, they also make the law in that process. This reasoning has long been accepted in our legal order and in foreign jurisdictions. The former President of the United States of America, Roosevelt, precisely pointed out in his message to the Congress of the United States on the 8th December 1908, thus: The Chief lawmakers in our country may be, and often are, the judges, because they are the final seat of authority. Every time they interpret contract, property, vested rights, due process of the law, liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy; and as such interpretation is fundamental, they give direction to all law-making. The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions depend upon their economic and social philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth century we shall owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic and social philosophy and not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself the product of primitive economic conditions. Even though the above quote was said in the last century, it is still applicable today because judges still do the job of interpreting and applying the law. In doing so they are involved in the law-making process. It has become manifest, as this study will reveal, that the judiciary is involved in the law-making process even though this has proven somewhat irksome to "President Theodore Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, 8th December 1908, 43rd Congressional Record ,Part 1, p.21" accept and appreciate, bearing in mind the overriding democratic principles such as separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary .. Therefore this study endeavours to interrogate the manner by which the South African judiciary has been involved in the law-making process both during the previous apartheid regime and in the present democratic dispensation. Furthermore, this study also attempts to answer the question as to how the judiciary will continue to legislate in the present judicial transformation process without upsetting the imperatives of the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. / (LLM) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2006

Thesis (LLD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this dissertation is to conceptualise the principle of "environmental justice". In doing so it attempts to determine its meaning, assess its possible use for the protection of environmental rights in the light of the South African Bill of Rights, and draw, in a comparative manner, on examples from two other jurisdictions, namely the United States of America (USA) and India. In the first part of the study "environmental justice" is defined and thereafter the ways in which the idea of "environmental justice" has found expression in the USA and Indian jurisprudence as well as in legislative and administrative practices in these two countries are analysed comparatively. In reviewing the US experience the study concludes that the courts have shown a conspicuous measure of self-restraint in the conceptualisation of environmental justice. Due to its non-activist and formalistic approach, the judiciary has failed to address systemic environmental inequities, and to carve out remedies whereby environmental injustice could have been dealt with in an effective and meaningful way. The more activist approach of the Indian judiciary, on the other hand, has led to more effective protection of the environment and of people adversely affected by environmental degradation. The judiciary has imposed positive obligations on the state to carry out its social duties as laid down in the Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution. Although India does not have a constitutionally entrenched environmental right, the courts have interpreted the right to life proactively so as to include quality of life. The study concludes by examining possible applications of the principle of environmental justice for the protection of environmental rights in South Africa, assessing the law as it stands and exploring new avenues in the light of the Bill of Rights. In this respect the following guidelines are proposed by this study: o Environmental problems in South Africa must be placed within their specific historical and political context. Consequently environmental injustice must be understood as a form of inequity that impacts on people disproportionately on the basis of race and socio-economic status. The concept "environment" can therefore not be narrowly understood, whether it is being dealt with in the Constitution, legislation or common law. It must be recognised that the concept goes beyond ecosystems and that it includes a multiplicity of relationships, in many of which humans are the focal point. o Environmental justice claims in South Africa may best be framed as constitutional claims. Regard should be had not only to the environmental right in section 24 of the Constitution, but also to other rights that support the notion of environmental justice, such as the rights to life, equality and dignity. o Judicial activism is a key to the promotion of environmental justice. The judiciary plays an important role in ensuring that the state and other actors fulfil their obligation to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. Transformation requires a judiciary that is prepared to reconsider the traditional boundaries of the doctrine of separation of powers and to lay down directives for other branches of government, in particular the executive. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om die beginsel "omgewingsgeregtigheid" te konsepsualiseer. Die studie poog dus om die betekenis van hierdie beginsel, sowel as die moontlike gebruik daarvan in die beskerming van omgewingsregte vas te stel in die lig van die Suid Afrikaanse Handves van Regte. Verder poog die studie om deur middel van regsvergelyking insigte te bekom uit voorbeelde in twee jurisdiksies, die Verenigde State van Amerika en Indië. "Omgewingsgeregtigheid" word in die eerste deel van die proefskrif gedefinieer. In die tweede deel word die wyse waarop omgewingsgeregtigheid uitdrukking vind in Amerikaanse en Indiese reg, sowel as in statutêre en administratiewe praktyk vergelykend geanaliseer. In die beoordeling van die Amerikaanse ervaring word tot die slotsom gekom dat die howe 'n ooglopende mate van selfbeheersing toon in die konsepsualisering van omgewingsgeregtigheid. As gevolg van die regsbank se nie-aktivistiese en formalistiese benadering, het dit in gebreke gebly om sistemiese omgewingsongelykhede aan te spreek, en om remedies te ontwikkel wat omgewingsgeregtigheid op 'n effektiewe en betekenisvolle wyse aanspreek. Die aktivistiese benadering van die Indiese regsbank aan die ander kant, lei tot meer effektiewe beskerming van die omgewing en diegene wat nadelig geaffekteer word deur omgewingsbeskadiging. Die regsbank plaas positiewe verpligtinge op die staat sodat die staat sy sosiale pligte kan nakom soos bepaal in die Direktiewe Beginselsin die Indiese Grondwet. Alhoewel Indië nie oor 'n grondwetlik verskanste omgewingsreg beskik nie, het die howe die reg op lewe pro-aktief geinterpreteer sodat dit ook die reg op lewenskwaliteit insluit. Die studie ondersoek verder die moontlike toepassings van die beginsel van omgewingsgeregtigheid vir die beskerming van omgewingsregte in Suid Afrika. Dit beoordeel die huidige reg en ondersoek nuwe rigtings in die lig van die Handves van Regte. In hierdie opsig word die volgende riglyne neergelê in hierdie studie: o Omgewingsprobleme in Suid Afrika moet binne 'n spesifieke historiese en politieke raamwerk geplaas word. Gevolglik moet omgewingsongeregtigheid verstaan word as 'n vorm van onbillikheid wat mense op grond van ras en sosioekonomiese status benadeel. D Die konsep "omgewing" behoort dus nie beperkend geinterpreteer te word nie, hetsy dit gebruik word in die grondwet, wetgewing of die gemene reg. Erkenning moet gegeeword daaraan dat die begrip wyer is as ekosisteme en dat dit 'n veelvoud van verhoudings insluit, baie waarvan mense die middelpunt vorm. D Eise rakende omgewingsgeregtigheid in Suid Afrika moet beskou word as grondwetlike eise. Nie net kom die omgewingsreg vervat in artike124 van die Grondwet ter sprake nie, maar ook aan ander regte soos die reg op lewe, gelykheid en menswaardigheid wat omgewingsgeregtigheid ondersteun. D Regterlike aktivisme is die sleutel tot die bevordering van omgewingsgregtigheid. Die regsbank speel 'n belangrike rol deurdat dit moet verseker dat die staat en ander rolspelers hul plig nakom om die regte in die Handves van Regte te respekteer, te beskerm en te bevorder. Transformasie vereis dus 'n regsbank wat bereid is om die tradisionele grense van die beginsel van magskeiding te heroorweeg en om riglyne neer te lê vir ander takke van die regering, spesifiek die uitvoerende gesag.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / Some digitised pages may appear illegible due to the condition of the original hard copy / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis is a response to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in South African Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, in which certain provisions of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act were subjected to constitutional review. The outcome of the case was the striking down of certain provisions of the Act as unconstitutional, and the removal of Judge Willem Heath from his position as head of the Unit. The provisions were said to infringe upon the principle of separation of powers, an implicit term of the Constitution of South Africa. This principle affects the extent of the judicial power because of its influence on determining the acceptability of extra-judicial functions. The doctrine of separation of powers is therefore considered in its historical and theoretical context, with particular reference to the way in which it tends to limit or define the role of judges. Following this analysis, the status of institutions supporting constitutional democracy is examined, and the legislation governing Special Investigating Units is compared with that which regulates the office of the Public Protector. As a result, some alternative legislative means of achieving the ends of the Units, namely the combating of state corruption and maladministration, are suggested. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis volg op die uitspraak van die Grondwetlike Hof in South African Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, waarin sekere bepalings van die Wet op Spesiale Ondersoekeenhede en Spesiale Tribunale aan grondwetlike hersiening onderwerp is. Die uitkoms van die saak was dat sekere ongrondwetlike bepalings van die Wet ongeldig verklaar is, en dat Regter Willem Heath van sy posisie as hoof van die Eenheid onthef is. Dit is bevind dat die bepalings die beginsel van skeiding van magte, 'n implisiete term van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet, geskend het. As gevolg van sy invloed op die bepaling van aanvaarbaarheid van buite-juridiese funksies, beïnvloed dié beginsel die omvang van die juridiese mag. Die skeiding van magte leerstuk word dus in sy historiese en teoretiese konteks oorweeg, met spesifieke verwysing na die manier waarop dit neig om die rol van regters te beperk of te omskryf. Na hierdie analise word die status ondersoek van instellings wat grondwetlike demokrasie ondersteun, en die wetgewing wat die Spesiale Ondersoekeenhede beheer, vergelyk met dié wat die Openbare Beskermer reguleer. Op grond hiervan word sekere alternatiewe wetgewende metodes voorgestelom die doeleindes van die Eenhede, naamlik die bekamping van staatskorrupsie en wanadministrasie, te bereik.

Text in Afrikaans / Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Die beginsel van die onafhanklikheid van die regbank word verskans in die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika van 1996. 'n Onafhanklike regbank is noodsaaklik ten einde te voldoen aan die primere funksie van die regbank, naamlik die bewerkstelliging van geregtigheid. Openbare vertroue in die onafhanklikheid van die regbank verhoog die legitimiteit van hierdie instelling, wat noodsaaklik is vir nakoming en eerbiediging van die howe se beslissings deur die gemeenskap. In die verlede het kritici beweer dat die regbank 'n legitimiteitskrisis beleef op grond daarvan dat polilieke oorwegings 'n rol gespeel het by die aanstelling van regsprekende amptenare, dat die regbank nie verteenwoordigend genoeg is van die bevolking wat betref ras en geslag nie en dat die howe in die verlede in sommige gevalle te owerheidsgesind was en soms diskriminerende wetgewing sonder veel skroom of teenspraak aanvaar en toegepas het. Kritici het daarop gewys dat die opbloei in die volkshowe as alternatief tot die formele howe, as voorbeeld dien van die algehele miskenning van en wantroue in die reg bank. 'n Kritiese evaluering van hierdie aangeleenthede is gedoen aan die hand van 'n regsvergelykende ondersoek. Daar is tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die Regterlike Dienskommissie en die Landdrostekommissie 'n belangrike hervorming teweeg gebring het op die gebied van aanstelling van regterlike amptenare. Verder is bevind dat die juriestelsel nie 'n realistiese oplossing bied om die regbank meer verteenwoordigend van die gemeenskap te maak nie, maar dat die assessorestelsel blyk 'n meer praktiese en geskikte alternatief te wees. Dit het verder geblyk dat daar van regterlike beamptes verwag word om, in die lig van die Grondwet van 1996 en 'n stelsel van grondwetlike oppermagtigheid, 'n aktivistiese waarde-ge6rienteerde of waarde-aktiverende benadering by wets- en grondwetuitleg te volg. Daar is verder bevind dat die informele howe behoue moet bly, maar aangepas behoort te word by veranderende omstandighede, in die lig van die Grondwet en die handves van fundamentele regte. Ten slotte is voorstelle gemaak as moontlike oplossing vir bepaalde probleme wat geidentifiseer is. / The principle of the independence of the judiciary is entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. An independent judiciary is essential in order to fulfill the primary function of a judiciary, namely the realisation of justice. Public confidence in the independence of the judiciary increases the legitimacy of this institution, which is essential for respect for and compliance with the decisions of the court by the community. In the past critics maintained that the judiciary is experiencing a legitimacy crisis, due to the fact that political considerations have played a role in the appointment of judicial officials, that the judiciary is not representative of the community in respect of race and sex and that the courts have been too executive-minded in the past and have at times accepted and applied discriminatory legislation without much hesitation or contradiction. Critics alleged that the proliferation of people's courts as an alternative to the formal courts, was an indication of the general denial of and loss of confidence in the judiciary. A critical evaluation of these aspects was undertaken by way of a comparative study. It lead to the conclusion that the Judicial Service Commission and the Magistrates Commission brought about an important reform regarding the appointment of judicial officials. It was found that the jury system does not constitute a realistic solution to make the judiciary more representative of the community, but that the assessor system seems to be a more practical alternative. It became apparant that in view of the Constitution of 1996 and our system of constitutional supremacy, it is expected of judicial officals to follow an activistic value-orientated or value-activated approach during legislative and constitutional interpretation. It is furthermore concluded that the informal courts should be retained, but that they should be adapted to the changing circumstances in view of the Constitution and the bill of rights. Finally, suggestions are made in order to address certain problems which have been identified. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.D.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.