Les moyens et l'organisation de la justice sont des déterminants importants de l'efficacité de cette institution. Pourtant, ces aspects restent encore marginalement étudiés dans l'analyse économique du droit. Après avoir mis en évidence le besoin d'un cadre d'analyse économique des relations entre les résultats de l'activité judiciaire, les moyens alloués au système, la demande de justice et ses modes d'organisation, nous contribuons directement à l'exploration de ces relations. D'abord grâce à un modèle théorique, nous démontrons l'existence d'un effet multiplicateur des dépenses publiques de justice en nous appuyant sur l'analyse d'un type de conflits particulier : les conflits locatifs. Nous démontrons alors qu'une augmentation marginale des dépenses consacrées à la résolution de ce type de conflits améliore de manière significative à la fois le fonctionnement des tribunaux et le fonctionnement du marché du logement locatif. Ensuite, grâce à un test économétrique à partir de données originales – en particulier celles produites par la Commission Européenne pour l'Efficacité de la Justice – nous mettons en évidence un lien positif et robuste entre la confiance des individus dans la justice et diverses variables budgétaires. Nous développons l'idée que le budget de la justice joue un rôle de signal de la qualité de l'institution pour les agents dont la connaissance réelle du système judiciaire est limitée. Enfin, dans un modèle de double aléa moral appliqué à la production de justice, nous analysons les relations entre les moyens et l'organisation de la justice puis entre cette dernière et les résultats de son activité. Nous démontrons alors que certains équilibres du jeu stratégique entre les agents responsables de la production des services judiciaires – le gouvernement et les magistrats – correspondent à des situations inefficaces car les magistrats sont amenés à effectuer des tâches administratives à la place du gouvernement, au prix d'un niveau de production de services judiciaires relativement faible. / The means and organization of justice are important determinants of the efficiency of this institution. Nevertheless, these aspects still remain marginally studied in the economic analysis of law. After we have highlighted the need for an economic analytical framework of the relationships between the results of judicial activity, the means allocated to the system, the demand of justice and its organizational features, we directly contribute to the exploration of these relationships. First, thanks to a theoretical model, we demonstrate the existence of a multiplier effect of public expenditure on justice by focusing on the analysis of a particular type of disputes: rental ones. We thus demonstrate that a marginal increase in expenditures dedicated to the resolution of rental disputes significantly improves both the functioning of courts and the functioning of the rental market. Then, thanks to an econometrical test on original data – in particular the ones produced by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice – we show a positive and robust link between individuals' trust in justice and different budget-related variables. We argue that the justice budget plays a role as a signal of the institution's quality for agents whose knowledge about the reality of the judicial system is limited. Finally, using a double-sided moral hazard model applied to the production of justice, we analyze the relationship between the means and the organization of justice and then, between the organization and the results of judicial activity. We thus demonstrate that some of the equilibria of the strategic game between the agents who are responsible for the production of judicial services – the government and the magistrates – correspond to inefficient situations because magistrates are led to perform administrative tasks instead of the government, at the cost of a relatively low level of production of judicial services.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic community established by Treaty in 1992 and comprising fifteen southern African countries. The Tribunal, SADC’s judicial organ, is situated in Windhoek, Namibia and became operational in 2005. The Tribunal enjoys a wide mandate to hear and determine disputes between states, states and SADC, and between natural and legal persons and states or SADC. It is mandated to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, general rules and principles of public international law, and principles and rules of law of member states. Being new in the field, the Tribunal has not as yet developed a significant jurisprudence although it has delivered a number of judgments some of which are referred to in the study. The Tribunal is expected to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to the jurisprudence developed by other international courts involved in the judicial settlement of disputes. The study offers a comparative review and analysis of the jurisprudence of two selected courts: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The focus is on four selected areas considered crucial to the functioning of the Tribunal and the selected courts. The study discusses the parties with access to the Tribunal and compares this with access to the ICJ and ECJ. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is contrasted with that of the two selected courts. The sources of law available to the Tribunal are discussed and contrasted to those of the two courts. Lastly, the enforcement of law in SADC is contrasted to what applies in relation to the selected courts. In each selected area, similarities and differences between the Tribunal and the two courts are noted and critically evaluated. Further, rules and principles developed by the two selected courts are explored in depth with a view to identifying those which could be of use to the Tribunal. Recommendations are made on rules and principles which could be of use to the Tribunal and on possible improvements to the SADC treaty regime. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic community established by Treaty in 1992 and comprising fifteen southern African countries. The Tribunal, SADC’s judicial organ, is situated in Windhoek, Namibia and became operational in 2005. The Tribunal enjoys a wide mandate to hear and determine disputes between states, states and SADC, and between natural and legal persons and states or SADC. It is mandated to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, general rules and principles of public international law, and principles and rules of law of member states. Being new in the field, the Tribunal has not as yet developed a significant jurisprudence although it has delivered a number of judgments some of which are referred to in the study. The Tribunal is expected to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to the jurisprudence developed by other international courts involved in the judicial settlement of disputes. The study offers a comparative review and analysis of the jurisprudence of two selected courts: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The focus is on four selected areas considered crucial to the functioning of the Tribunal and the selected courts. The study discusses the parties with access to the Tribunal and compares this with access to the ICJ and ECJ. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is contrasted with that of the two selected courts. The sources of law available to the Tribunal are discussed and contrasted to those of the two courts. Lastly, the enforcement of law in SADC is contrasted to what applies in relation to the selected courts. In each selected area, similarities and differences between the Tribunal and the two courts are noted and critically evaluated. Further, rules and principles developed by the two selected courts are explored in depth with a view to identifying those which could be of use to the Tribunal. Recommendations are made on rules and principles which could be of use to the Tribunal and on possible improvements to the SADC treaty regime. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.