Univ., Diss.--Tübingen, 2006. / Literaturverz. S. [413] - 453.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, Osgoode Hall Law School, / "December 2007". Includes bibliographical references (leaves 558-599). Also available on the Internet.

Univ., Diss.--Göttingen, 2004.

Thesis (doctoral)--Utrecht University, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 263-268).

In the case of LaGrand (Germany v United States), the International Court of Justice held that the United States (US) had violated its international obligation to Germany under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations when it executed two German nationals without first informing them of their consular rights. The case came before the court after the United States had disregarded a preliminary ruling passed by the IC], which directed the US not to execute the German nationals pending the outcome of the ICJ case. The decision raised the issue of the effect of ICJ decisions in domestic proceedings and the effectiveness of ICJ enforcement mechanisms. This thesis considers the possibility of a role for national courts as active enforcers of ICJ decisions. It is argued that whilst evidence shows that there is no legal obligation on courts to enforce ICJ decisions, there is certainly room in international law to facilitate this development. In support of this argument, the thesis demonstrates how basic presuppositions about international law have shifted over the last few decades. This shift has been both the impetus and the result of globalisation. The case of LaGrand alongside similar cases is used to show how national courts may play an increased role in the enforcement of ICJ decisions.

Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. M.

At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in April 1945 South Africa affirmed the principle of respect for human rights in a Preamble it proposed for inclusion in the Charter of the United Nations. The proposal was approved and the Preamble was accorded binding force. While South Africa participated in the earliest attempts of the United Nations to draft a bill of rights, it abstained on the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because its municipal legislation was incompatible with some articles. Similarly, South Africa did not become a party to the international human rights instruments the declaration inspired, and avoided an active role in their elaboration. Subsidiary organs of the General Assembly undertook several studies on discrimination in the field of human rights. They provided evidence that racial discrimination in South Africa intensified after the National Party came to power in May 1948 on the platform of apartheid and diverged from global trends in humanitarian law. The gap between the Union and the United Nations widened. At the first General Assembly in 1946, India successfully asked that the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa be inscribed on the agenda. The Indian question was later subsumed in the charge that South Africa's racial policies violated the Charter and in 1952 the General Assembly began to discuss apartheid. South Africa protested that these actions contravened Charter Article 2(7), which prohibited intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction, and were ultra vires. Criticism of the Union increased in intensity, until in 1960 it culminated in calls for economic and diplomatic sanctions. Research shows that South Africa was the main architect of its growing isolation, since it refused to modify domestic policies that alienated even its potential allies. Moreover, it maintained a low profile in United Nations debates on human rights issues, abstaining on all substantive clauses in the two draft covenants on human rights. These actions were interpreted as lack of interest in global humanitarian affairs. South Africa had little influence on the development of customary international law in the field of human rights but was a catalyst in the evolution of international machinery to protect them. / Jurisprudence / (LL.D)

At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in April 1945 South Africa affirmed the principle of respect for human rights in a Preamble it proposed for inclusion in the Charter of the United Nations. The proposal was approved and the Preamble was accorded binding force. While South Africa participated in the earliest attempts of the United Nations to draft a bill of rights, it abstained on the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because its municipal legislation was incompatible with some articles. Similarly, South Africa did not become a party to the international human rights instruments the declaration inspired, and avoided an active role in their elaboration. Subsidiary organs of the General Assembly undertook several studies on discrimination in the field of human rights. They provided evidence that racial discrimination in South Africa intensified after the National Party came to power in May 1948 on the platform of apartheid and diverged from global trends in humanitarian law. The gap between the Union and the United Nations widened. At the first General Assembly in 1946, India successfully asked that the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa be inscribed on the agenda. The Indian question was later subsumed in the charge that South Africa's racial policies violated the Charter and in 1952 the General Assembly began to discuss apartheid. South Africa protested that these actions contravened Charter Article 2(7), which prohibited intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction, and were ultra vires. Criticism of the Union increased in intensity, until in 1960 it culminated in calls for economic and diplomatic sanctions. Research shows that South Africa was the main architect of its growing isolation, since it refused to modify domestic policies that alienated even its potential allies. Moreover, it maintained a low profile in United Nations debates on human rights issues, abstaining on all substantive clauses in the two draft covenants on human rights. These actions were interpreted as lack of interest in global humanitarian affairs. South Africa had little influence on the development of customary international law in the field of human rights but was a catalyst in the evolution of international machinery to protect them. / Jurisprudence / (LL.D)

The Southern African Development Community Tribunal (the Tribunal) is the only judicial organ of the Southern African Development Community (the SADC). Its mandate includes ensuring “adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of the Southern African Development Community Treaty” (the Treaty). The decisions of the Tribunal are final and binding in the territories of member states party to a dispute before it. The responsibility to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced lies with the Southern African Development Community Summit (the Summit). The Summit is the supreme policy-making body of the SADC. It comprises the Heads of State or Government of all SADC member states. The decisions of the Summit are binding on all member states and, upon referral from the Tribunal, it has the power to take appropriate action against a member state who refuses to honour a decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal was established primarily to deal with disputes emanating from the SADC’s economic and political units and not with human rights. A dispute concerning allegations of human rights violations in Zimbabwe was brought before the Tribunal by farmers affected by the country’s land-reform policy. The Tribunal, through reliance on the doctrine of implied powers, and the principles and objectives of the SADC as contained in the Treaty, extended its jurisdiction. In particular, the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to hear cases involving human rights violations and that there had indeed been human rights violations in the case before it. It consequently ruled against Zimbabwe. This decision has been welcomed by many within the SADC region as showing the Tribunal’s commitment to interpreting the Treaty in a way that does not run counter the rights of SADC citizens. However, the Tribunal’s decision has met with resistance from Zimbabwe and has not been implemented on the ground, inter alia, that the Tribunal acted beyond its mandate. The Tribunal has on several occasions referred cases of non-compliance to the Summit for appropriate action against Zimbabwe. The Summit, however, has done nothing concrete to ensure that the Tribunal’s decisions are enforced in Zimbabwe. Instead, in an unexpected move that sent shockwaves through the SADC region and beyond, the Summit suspended the Tribunal and resolved that it should neither receive nor adjudicate any cases. During the SADC summit in August 2014, a Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community was adopted and signed (the 2014 Protocol). In terms of this Protocol the iii jurisdiction of the (new) Tribunal will be limited to inter-state disputes. Unfortunately, it also does not provide any transitional measures to address issues such as the manner to deal with pending cases and the enforcement of judgments. When it comes to the execution and enforcement of judgments, it can be argued that the 2014 Protocol is largely a replica of the original 2000 Tribunal Protocol. The reason for this is that the envisaged mechanisms to enforce the decisions of the new Tribunal is to a large extent similar to the previous one. Unsatisfied over the non-compliance with the decision by Zimbabwe, the litigants approached the South African courts to enforce the Tribunal’s decision in South Africa.1 The South African courts found that South Africa is obliged under the SADC Treaty to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced, and ruled against Zimbabwe. However, the decision is yet to be enforced. The non-compliance with the judgments and a lack of mechanisms to enforce the decisions of the Tribunal, are crucial issues as they undermine the authority of the Tribunal. This thesis explores whether the Tribunal acted within its mandate in receiving and hearing a human rights case. It further considers whether, in the absence of a human rights mandate, the Tribunal enjoys implied powers under international law to invoke the powers necessary for the fulfilment of the objectives set out in the Treaty. It also reviews the concept of state sovereignty and the extent to which it has been affected by human rights norms post-World War II; regionalism; and globalisation. An important aspect examined, is the relationship between SADC Community law and the national law of member states. The relationship between national courts and the Tribunal also receives attention. Ultimately, the discourse addresses compliance and enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions in the context of international law. To the extent relevant, I draw on other regional (the European Court of Justice) and sub-regional (the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, and the East African Court of Justice) courts to establish how they have dealt with human rights jurisdiction and the enforcement of their judgments. / Jurisprudence / LL. D.