La CEDEAO est une organisation économique communautaire sous-régionale de l’Afrique de l’Ouest qui a été créée en 1975 dans un but purement économique. Lors de sa création, elle a observé le principe de la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Etats. Cependant, en 1993, lors de la révision de son traité, elle observe un changement radical de doctrine. En effet, indifférente des régimes politiques de ses Etats membres, elle s’ingère et cela de façon significative dans les affaires intérieures des Etats notamment dans la désignation des gouvernants, le fonctionnement des institutions internes et la protection des droits de l’homme. Ce qui a conduit l’organisation à se doter de moyens contre le changement anticonstitutionnel. L'organisation s’implique contre ce fléau dans le cadre de la sécurité collective sous-régionale. En effet, depuis la révision de son traité en 1993, elle observe avec une attention particulière, le fonctionnement des institutions internes de ses Etats, la dévolution du pouvoir et la protection des droits de l’homme. Cette thèse traite les moyens mis en place par l’organisation contre les changements anticonstitutionnels de pouvoir. Elle relève les avancées et les écueils, elle fait aussi des propositions d’amélioration. / The Economic Community of West-African States is a sub-regional organization that was created in 1975, initially with a purely economic purpose. Since its inception, the organization has observed a clear principle of non-interference in its member-states” internal affairs. But since then, the recrudescence of coups that affected political stability in various member-states and economic development for the sub-region, have led the organization to operate a change in its doctrine and missions. Indifferent to the political regimes of its member-states, and their effect on Human rights protection, ECOWAS has been increasingly involved in conflict prevention and anti- constitutional changes in power. For ECOWAS, coups fall under its mission to promote and preserve sub-regional collective security. Since the 1993 revision of the Lagos Treaty that saw its creation, ECOWAS pays close attention to the inner working of its member-states” institutions, the legality and constitutionality of power transfers as well as the protection of Human rights. This dissertation deals with the instruments developed by the sub-regional organization to prevent and counter anti- constitutional power transfers. It pays attention to the progresses made as well the tools missing from ECOWAS’ legal arsenal. At last, this dissertation offers a set of proposals designed to improve the organization’s capacity to prevent and respond to coups threatening its member- states political stability and the region’s security.

L'objectif principal de l'Accord de partenariat économique (APE) est la mise en conformité des arrangements commerciaux entre les États ou groupes d'États avec les dispositions de l'Organisation Mondiale de Commerce (OMC)notamment l'introduction de la réciprocité dans les relations commerciales entre l'Union européenne (UE) et les pays d'Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP).La signature de l'Accord de partenariat économique par certains pays ACP, suscite encore à l'heure actuelle des critiques sur les effets de la suppression des préférences commerciales dont dépendent de nombreux pays ACP. / The main purpose of te economic partnership agreement (EPA) is to make the commercial settlements between states or groupe of states cumply with the clauses of the World Trade Organization (WTO) namely the introduction of the principle of the reciprocity in the commercial relations between the European Union (EU)and the African, Caribbean and Pacifique states (ACP).The signing of the economic partnership agreement by some ACP countries,still currently sparks of critisims upon the consequences deriving from the revocation of trade preferences, of wich numerous countries are dependent on.

The Southern African Development Community Tribunal (the Tribunal) is the only judicial organ of the Southern African Development Community (the SADC). Its mandate includes ensuring “adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of the Southern African Development Community Treaty” (the Treaty). The decisions of the Tribunal are final and binding in the territories of member states party to a dispute before it. The responsibility to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced lies with the Southern African Development Community Summit (the Summit). The Summit is the supreme policy-making body of the SADC. It comprises the Heads of State or Government of all SADC member states. The decisions of the Summit are binding on all member states and, upon referral from the Tribunal, it has the power to take appropriate action against a member state who refuses to honour a decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal was established primarily to deal with disputes emanating from the SADC’s economic and political units and not with human rights. A dispute concerning allegations of human rights violations in Zimbabwe was brought before the Tribunal by farmers affected by the country’s land-reform policy. The Tribunal, through reliance on the doctrine of implied powers, and the principles and objectives of the SADC as contained in the Treaty, extended its jurisdiction. In particular, the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to hear cases involving human rights violations and that there had indeed been human rights violations in the case before it. It consequently ruled against Zimbabwe. This decision has been welcomed by many within the SADC region as showing the Tribunal’s commitment to interpreting the Treaty in a way that does not run counter the rights of SADC citizens. However, the Tribunal’s decision has met with resistance from Zimbabwe and has not been implemented on the ground, inter alia, that the Tribunal acted beyond its mandate. The Tribunal has on several occasions referred cases of non-compliance to the Summit for appropriate action against Zimbabwe. The Summit, however, has done nothing concrete to ensure that the Tribunal’s decisions are enforced in Zimbabwe. Instead, in an unexpected move that sent shockwaves through the SADC region and beyond, the Summit suspended the Tribunal and resolved that it should neither receive nor adjudicate any cases. During the SADC summit in August 2014, a Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community was adopted and signed (the 2014 Protocol). In terms of this Protocol the iii jurisdiction of the (new) Tribunal will be limited to inter-state disputes. Unfortunately, it also does not provide any transitional measures to address issues such as the manner to deal with pending cases and the enforcement of judgments. When it comes to the execution and enforcement of judgments, it can be argued that the 2014 Protocol is largely a replica of the original 2000 Tribunal Protocol. The reason for this is that the envisaged mechanisms to enforce the decisions of the new Tribunal is to a large extent similar to the previous one. Unsatisfied over the non-compliance with the decision by Zimbabwe, the litigants approached the South African courts to enforce the Tribunal’s decision in South Africa.1 The South African courts found that South Africa is obliged under the SADC Treaty to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced, and ruled against Zimbabwe. However, the decision is yet to be enforced. The non-compliance with the judgments and a lack of mechanisms to enforce the decisions of the Tribunal, are crucial issues as they undermine the authority of the Tribunal. This thesis explores whether the Tribunal acted within its mandate in receiving and hearing a human rights case. It further considers whether, in the absence of a human rights mandate, the Tribunal enjoys implied powers under international law to invoke the powers necessary for the fulfilment of the objectives set out in the Treaty. It also reviews the concept of state sovereignty and the extent to which it has been affected by human rights norms post-World War II; regionalism; and globalisation. An important aspect examined, is the relationship between SADC Community law and the national law of member states. The relationship between national courts and the Tribunal also receives attention. Ultimately, the discourse addresses compliance and enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions in the context of international law. To the extent relevant, I draw on other regional (the European Court of Justice) and sub-regional (the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, and the East African Court of Justice) courts to establish how they have dealt with human rights jurisdiction and the enforcement of their judgments. / Jurisprudence / LL. D.