Thesis (M.A.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2002. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-146).

Thesis (M.A.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2002. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-146).

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Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: What does it mean that the violence of aggression could justify the violence of resistance? What does such justification accomplish, and when, and how? What underlies the conditions and limitations of justified violence, as, for example, these have been formulated in western doctrines of "just war"? Most critically, how could one think about the possibility of a resistance to evil that would be effective without itself instituting further violence? The theoretical ground of this investigation is found in a close reading of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, specifically the section of his Otheruiise than Being, or Beyond Essence in which human consciousness is shown to be, from the first, called to justice in responsibility for others. For Levinas, to be a subject is to be always already for-the-other as a substitute or hostage. This is both a persecution and the "glory" of human being. Thus Levinas introduces an enigmatic "good violence" prior to any distinction between aggressive and just violences. The idea of an originary good violence opens up a reconsideration of the evil of aggression and the joyfulness of resistance. This in turn shows the instability or equivocation of just violence: even if it is inspired by goodness - by one's responsibility for the useless suffering of others - it is never finally good enough, and always at risk of slipping into injustice. The responsibility of a "just warrior" is thus not cancelled by the justness of the cause. The justness of the cause indeed demands ever greater responsibility, even for and before one's enemy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Wat sou dit kon beteken dat die geweld van aggressie die geweld van verset regverdig? Wat word bewerkstellig deur sodanige regverdiging, en wanneer, en . hoe? Waarop berus die voorwaardes en beperkinge van geregverdigde geweld, soos dit byvoorbeeld geformuleer is in Westerse leerstellings oor "regverdige oorlog"? Nog belangriker: hoe kan 'n mens dink oor die moontlikheid van verset teen die bose wat effektief is, maar sonder om self verdere geweld daar te stel? Die teoretiese grondslag van hierdie ondersoek is 'n nougesette bestudering van die werk van Emmanuel Levinas, meer spesifiek die afdeling van sy Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, waarin hy argumenteer dat die menslike bewussyn van meet af aan tot geregtigheid opgeroep word in verantwoordelikheid vir andere. Om 'n subjek te wees is vir Levinas om altyd alreeds vir-dié-ander te wees as 'n plaasvervanger of gyselaar. Dit is sowel 'n vervolging as die "heerlikheid" van menswees. Levinas argumenteer dus ten gunste van 'n "goeie geweld" voorafgaande aan enige onderskeidinge tussen aggressiewe en geregverdigde geweld. Die idee van 'n oorspronklike goeie geweld maak 'n herdenking van die boosheid van agressie en die vreugdevolheid van verset moontlik. Op sy beurt toon dit die onstabiliteit of dubbelsinnigheid van geregverdigde geweld: selfs al word dit geïnspireer deur goedheid - deur 'n mens se verantwoordelikheid vir die nuttelose lyding van ander - is dit nooit goed genoeg nie en loop dit altyd die gevaar om om te slaan in onreg. Die verantwoordelikheid van 'n "regverdige vegter" word daarom nie uitgekanselleer deur die regverdigheid van sy saak nie. Die regverdigheid van die saak eis trouens nog groter verantwoordelikheid, selfs vir en vóór jou vyand.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / In response to the 9/11 attacks and continuing threats of mass-casualty terrorism, the United States has adopted a new security strategy that emphasizes anticipatory actions including preventive war. Prevention, undertaken in the absence of an act of aggression or an imminent threat, is prohibited by modern conceptions of just war and international law. Many critics of the strategy fear that any legitimization of preventive war would endanger international stability. But an examination of the relevant ethical issues from the perspective of just war doctrine reveals contradictions within a blanket prohibition of preventive war. Preventive "strategic interventions" against illiberal regimes-states that correlate with the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction-parallel humanitarian interventions in that they have an ethical basis in the relationship between human rights and the right of state sovereignty. A widely-accepted minimum standard of human rights, incorporated into new international institutions and/or an explicit revision of the definition of just war, could serve as an ethical boundary for both preventive wars and humanitarian interventions. The formal qualification of prevention and its merger with humanitarian goals could bring enhanced international legitimacy and support to preventive actions by the United States and its allies. / Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

Ou Antony. / Thesis submitted in: October 2006. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 160-173). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / List of Appendices and Tables --- p.5 / Preface and Acknowledgements --- p.6 / Notes on Translations and References --- p.9 / Abstract --- p.11 / 中文摘要(Abstract in Chinese) --- p.12 / Chapter Chapter 1: --- Introduction --- p.13 / Chapter Chapter 2: --- "War, Confucianism and Ren: The Definitions" --- p.17 / Chapter Chapter 2.1: --- The Definition of War --- p.17 / Chapter Chapter 2.2: --- Confucianism: A Brief History of Thoughts --- p.20 / Chapter Chapter 2.3: --- Ren as Confucian Justice of war --- p.26 / Chapter Chapter 3: --- Literature Review --- p.34 / Chapter Chapter 3.1: --- Purposes of Just War Theory --- p.34 / Chapter Chapter 3.2: --- Just War Theory Development: Anglo-American Traditions --- p.38 / Chapter Chapter 3.21: --- The History --- p.38 / Chapter Chapter 3.22: --- "The Content: jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum" --- p.44 / Chapter Chapter 3.23: --- A Synthetic Analysis of Anglo-American Just War Tradition --- p.56 / Chapter Chapter 3.3: --- Just War Theory: Neo-Confucian approaches --- p.59 / Chapter Chapter 3.4: --- Spring and Autumn and Gongyangzhuan --- p.66 / Chapter Chapter 3.41: --- Nature of Spring and Autumn --- p.66 / Chapter Chapter 3.42: --- History of Gongyangzhuan --- p.70 / Chapter Chapter 3.43: --- The Contents of Gongyangzhuan --- p.79 / Chapter Chapter 4: --- Gongyangzhuan tradition as a source of Confucian just war theory --- p.86 / Chapter Chapter 4.1: --- Criteria for selecting Confucian Texts --- p.86 / Chapter Chapter 4.2: --- Conceptualization of Gongyangzhuan just war theory --- p.92 / """Non-ideal just war scenario"": Feudal lords and peoples in ""chaotic generations""" --- p.95 / """Non-ideal just war scenario"": Ba/Hegemon, feudal lords and peoples in ""transitional generations""" --- p.106 / """Ideal just war scenario"": The True king and peoples in ´ب´ب peaceful generations""" --- p.114 / Chapter Chapter 4.3: --- Synthetic Analysis of Gongyangzhuan Just War Theory --- p.119 / Chapter Chapter 5: --- The Contemporary Significance of Gongyangzhuan Just War Theory --- p.123 / Chapter Chapter 5.1: --- Theoretical Significance --- p.125 / Contribution to just war theory --- p.125 / Contribution to Modern Neo-Confucianism --- p.129 / Chapter Chapter 5.2: --- Practical Significance --- p.131 / Chapter Chapter 6: --- Conclusion --- p.135 / Appendices --- p.140 / Bibliography --- p.160

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2008. / Vita. Advisor : P. Terrence Hopmann. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 303-309).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, 2007. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 250-259).