The imminent recognition of an inherent Aboriginal right to selfgovernment signals the beginning of the reversal of a colonization process which threatened the cultural survival of a people. The Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba , hereinafter referred to as the Inquiry, advocates an autonomous Aboriginal criminal justice system as a significant component of this cultural revitalization. This Aboriginal criminal justice system would differ markedly from the conventional system in giving priority to collective rights over conflicting individual rights. The Inquiry rejects the Charter as alien to Aboriginal values and advocates a “tailor-made” Aboriginal charter that would incorporate “only those fundamental freedoms and civil liberties that do not violate the beliefs and paramount collective rights of the Aboriginal peoples.” The conventional justice system’s paramount concern for individual rights is premised on the potential of punishment. The Inquiry’s starkly contrasting paramount emphasis on collective rights is premised on an Aboriginal view of justice which this thesis refers to as the “harmony ethos”: The underlying philosophy in Aboriginal societies in dealing with crime was the resolution of disputes, the healing of wounds and the restoration of social harmony… Atonement and restoration of harmony were the goals - not punishment. The tension between individual and collective rights apparent in the proposal of the Inquiry is the specific focus of this thesis. The colonization process may justify a separate Aboriginal justice system. However, the harmony ethos premise, while appropriate to the mediation-reconciliation communitarian model of justice advocated by the Inquiry, blinds the Inquiry to the additional, and crucially different, adjudicative-rights imperatives of the contemporary Aboriginal society. Actually existing Indianism reveals conflict-generating fault lines in the harmony premise which challenge the sufficiency of the Inquiry’s group-based justice paradigm and indicate a need and desire for an adjudication justice component and concomitant Charter values. This adjudication hiatus in the Inquiry position is a reflection of a similar void in historical Aboriginal justice which challenges the asserted rationale of cultural survival for the paramountcy of collective rights in the contemporary Aboriginal justice system. This historical adjudication hiatus does not preclude a separate Aboriginal justice system, but favours the inclusion of Charter values to strengthen an adjudication cultural foundation which is frail relative to its reconciliation-mediation strength. This thesis is a modest attempt to address the interface between two systems; one mature, but in need of change, the other, fledging and in need of assistance. The Charter provides a ready and flexible framework to join the Aboriginal community both to the larger society and to the unlanded Aboriginal diaspora by principled standards of justice. These fundamental indicia of fairness, recognized by all civilized self-governing units, constitute no significant threat to the cultural survival of the Aboriginal mediation justice heritage, while buttressing its inherent adjudication frailty.

The imminent recognition of an inherent Aboriginal right to selfgovernment signals the beginning of the reversal of a colonization process which threatened the cultural survival of a people. The Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba , hereinafter referred to as the Inquiry, advocates an autonomous Aboriginal criminal justice system as a significant component of this cultural revitalization. This Aboriginal criminal justice system would differ markedly from the conventional system in giving priority to collective rights over conflicting individual rights. The Inquiry rejects the Charter as alien to Aboriginal values and advocates a “tailor-made” Aboriginal charter that would incorporate “only those fundamental freedoms and civil liberties that do not violate the beliefs and paramount collective rights of the Aboriginal peoples.” The conventional justice system’s paramount concern for individual rights is premised on the potential of punishment. The Inquiry’s starkly contrasting paramount emphasis on collective rights is premised on an Aboriginal view of justice which this thesis refers to as the “harmony ethos”: The underlying philosophy in Aboriginal societies in dealing with crime was the resolution of disputes, the healing of wounds and the restoration of social harmony… Atonement and restoration of harmony were the goals - not punishment. The tension between individual and collective rights apparent in the proposal of the Inquiry is the specific focus of this thesis. The colonization process may justify a separate Aboriginal justice system. However, the harmony ethos premise, while appropriate to the mediation-reconciliation communitarian model of justice advocated by the Inquiry, blinds the Inquiry to the additional, and crucially different, adjudicative-rights imperatives of the contemporary Aboriginal society. Actually existing Indianism reveals conflict-generating fault lines in the harmony premise which challenge the sufficiency of the Inquiry’s group-based justice paradigm and indicate a need and desire for an adjudication justice component and concomitant Charter values. This adjudication hiatus in the Inquiry position is a reflection of a similar void in historical Aboriginal justice which challenges the asserted rationale of cultural survival for the paramountcy of collective rights in the contemporary Aboriginal justice system. This historical adjudication hiatus does not preclude a separate Aboriginal justice system, but favours the inclusion of Charter values to strengthen an adjudication cultural foundation which is frail relative to its reconciliation-mediation strength. This thesis is a modest attempt to address the interface between two systems; one mature, but in need of change, the other, fledging and in need of assistance. The Charter provides a ready and flexible framework to join the Aboriginal community both to the larger society and to the unlanded Aboriginal diaspora by principled standards of justice. These fundamental indicia of fairness, recognized by all civilized self-governing units, constitute no significant threat to the cultural survival of the Aboriginal mediation justice heritage, while buttressing its inherent adjudication frailty. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

La justice est rendue « au nom du peuple français », c’est ce qu’on peut lire en première page des décisions rendues par les juridictions françaises. Tout citoyen peut être conduit à l’œuvre de justice. Néanmoins, juger requiert des capacités et aptitudes propres aux magistrats professionnels en raison de leur formation. Pour autant, en France, le système juridique fait participer à la justice des citoyens peu accoutumés à ce qui peut sembler à un véritable métier. Ces citoyens non professionnels endossent la fonction de juge et le pouvoir de juger à leur prestation de serment à l’instar des juges de carrière. Ces juges, jurés ou juges occasionnels offrent-ils une garantie de bien juger ? Pour les premiers, les jurés, recrutés ponctuellement par tirage au sort le temps d’une session d’assises selon une obligation civique, il s’agit de « citoyens juges » qui découvrent la justice criminelle le jour de leur recrutement. Si le bon sens est utile au jugement criminel, il est loin d’être suffisant. Pour les seconds, les juges occasionnels recrutés partiellement le temps d’un mandat, il s’agit de « juges citoyens », considérés comme plus proches du « terrain », plus habitués aux usages d’une profession. Membres des tribunaux de commerce, juges de proximité ou conseillers prud’hommes statuent ainsi sans l’assistance d’un juge professionnel. Leur mode de recrutement garantit-il leur compétence ? La reconnaissance de l’expérience juridique traduit-elle l’aptitude à juger ? A l’inverse que vaut l’expérience, la pratique dans un secteur d’activité au regard d’un droit de plus en plus légiféré, réglementé, qui exige, au quotidien, de solides connaissances juridiques ? / On the front page of the decisions made by the French courts can be read « Justice is given in the name of the French people ». Every citizen may be brought to work for the justice. Nevertheless, judging requires professional skills and abilities that magistrates have acquired through their training. In France, the legal system however, uses citizens that are little accustomed to what may be considered as a real profession. These non-professional citizens take on the role of the judge and the right to judge by giving sermon in the same manner as a career judge. Do these judges, jurors or occasional judges offer the same guarantee of good judgement? First, the jurors, recruited punctually by random selection for a session of assizes according to a civic obligation, are “citizen judges” who only discover criminal justice on the day of their recruitment. If common sense is useful to criminal judgment, it is far from being sufficient. Second, occasional judges recruited partly during a mandate, are “citizen judges”, considered to be closer to be closer to their specific “field” and more accustomed to the uses of a particular profession. Members of commercial tribunals, local judges of industrial tribunal advisors decide without the assistance of a professional judge. Do their recruitment methods guarantee their competence? Does the recognition of legal experience reflect the ability to judge? Conversely, what does this experience worth, when practicing in a sector of activity with regard to an increasingly legislated, regulated law, which requires a strong legal knowledge on a daily basi?