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This thesis has four primary aims. Firstly, I develop an account of Adorno’s critique of Kant and Hegel’s philosophy. I argue that the role and structure of judgement is key to his critical analysis. Adorno's discussion of their metaphysics, epistemology revolves around an immanent critique of judgement. This critique reveals, in the dialectical sense, the irreducibility of the 'negative moment' within judgement. This critical exposition grounds the second aim of the thesis. Analysis of Kant and Hegel's philosophies enables us to discern a number of key concepts in Adorno's own thought, concepts which will help us to understand his notion of negativity. In particular, his dialectical critique produces a constellation of critical - or negative - dialectical concepts: conceptless [begriffslose], non-identity [Nichtidentität], mediation [Vermittlung]. The generation of these concepts and their elucidation provides the basis for the third aim: to give a textually viable and philosophically fruitful explanation of key commitments in Adorno’s negative dialectics. I argue that negative dialectics does not amount to a system, a standpoint, or even a set of principles. Rather, it is a critical activity. The commitments, which revolve around the constellation of concepts outlined above, indicate a critical sensitivity to the limits of epistemology and metaphysics and the problem that these limits pose for judgement. Finally, I develop the resources to answer Michael Rosen’s claim that Adorno’s rejection of Hegelian determinate negation leaves his dialectics without any dynamic force. Drawing upon aesthetics, we can better understand the dynamics of negative dialectics. Aesthetic engagement with artworks not only demonstrates an appropriate orientation of philosophy to material, it is also an appropriate medium through which we can gain a clearer understanding of the philosophical commitments elucidated above.

The thesis is concerned with theoretical work of the Russian legal philosopher P. I. Novgorodtsev, focusing on the concepts of natural law, social ideal, individualism, liberalism, rule of law and democracy. Novgorodtsev's interpretation of these concepts is embedded into broader contexts of both Russian and Western political philosophy and philosophy of law. Novgorodtsev's work is analysed with regards to Russian liberal doctrine transformations from classical liberalism towards liberal socialism. The thesis discloses progressive moments in the author's thought demonstrating ways as to develop them. Problems in question are inquired into through the prism of A. Honneth's critical theory of society which enables to approach the subject matter in its historical variability and conditionality and, at the same time, maintaining normativity. The aim of the thesis is not only to assess Novgorodtsev's work topicality and contribution but also critically research into relevant problems in terms of the chosen topic, primarily metaphysical roots of liberalism and its limits as to the notion of man, state and law. The thesis shows that the Russian philosopher offered reformulations of old concepts not being able, however, to go beyond the liberal paradigm. Hence his texts cannot be utilized for overcoming...

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Hannah Arendt argues that political action is only meaningful through the disclosure of who the actor uniquely is, and that this disclosure is the basis of human dignity. Arendt’s notion of performative disclosure helps us to rethink the individuated actor, not as a sovereign and self-transparent subject whose action expresses an authentic individual essence or constative what, but rather as a decentered and ecstatic who whose action reveals meaningful dimensions of the world and of the actor’s unique situation in history, through the performance of acts and speech before public spectators. The idea that no actor can stand in a position of control with respect to his life story extends to a critical displacement of the notion of freedom understood as sovereignty and of political projects that attempt to make history. Action, as praxis and not poiesis, is best understood through Arendt’s metaphor of performance, rather than productive art. There are new interpretive possibilities for Arendt’s theory of action, especially if we trace appearances of the ancient Greek daimon in Arendt’s publications and lecture notes, and among works that Arendt confronted: Plato’s Socratic dialogues and the myth of Er, Heidegger’s notion of aletheia as Dasein’s disclosure of Being, Jaspers’ valid personality, and Kant’s notion of aesthetic genius. The daimon implies that the public realm is a spiritual realm, that action is a form of connection to the divine, and that the actor is a decentered discloser of transcendent meanings and new possibilities within the world. The daimon also shows moral deliberation to be more vital to meaningful action than Arendt suggests prior to The Life of the Mind, so that the distinctions usually read in Arendt between actor and spectator, as well as those between acting, thinking, and judging, may be productively occluded. Arendt’s struggle to re-invigorate action’s disclosive capacity is at the center of her entire project. It sheds light on her critique of the world-alienating aspects of Marx, her insistent protection of a distinct political sphere from the private and the social spheres, and her rejection of Hegel’s philosophy of history in favor of a fragmentary historiography inspired by Kafka and Benjamin.

Zugl.: Regensburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006.