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This thesis will explore the origins of the U.S.-Israeli alliance during the Kennedy administration. John F. Kennedy provided Israel with the first U.S. weapons sale, issued the first informal security guarantee, and established the first joint security consultations between both nations. Ironically, Kennedy gave these concessions to contain Israel, not to establish closer relations. His primary objective for the Middle East was to improve U.S. relations with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, seeing Nasser as the path for gaining pro-American sentiments among the Arab population in the region to the detriment of the Soviets. Kennedy unintentionally laid the foundations of the U.S.-Israeli alliance while trying to restrain Israel, fearing Israeli actions would impede his plans. The Palestinian refugee issue, the regional arms race between Egypt and Israel, and Israel's secret nuclear weapons program became three pivotal concerns for Kennedy that unintentionally led to the U.S.-Israeli alliance. / by Michael Bocco. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2008. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, FL : 2008 Mode of access: World Wide Web.

The purpose of this study is to examine the 1960 presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy and the 1968 presidential campaign of Robert F. Kennedy in order to analyze the similarities and differences that exist in their campaigns and their rhetoric. Specifically, the study examines the primary campaign rhetoric of the candidates and determines the rhetorical vision and fantasy themes that are created in three speeches from each campaign. The following research questions are proposed: What are the differences and similarities between John Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, in terms of their presidential rhetoric, their presidential campaigns, and their rhetorical visions? Does Robert Kennedy's rhetoric seem to be an extension of his brother's rhetoric or does it stand as his own?The study selects three speeches from each campaign as artifacts. The first speech by each candidate was the announcement of his candidacy. The second followed soon thereafter, before primary election results were a factor. The last speech reviewed in each campaign occurred after primary election results were announced, and the candidates had achieved success and failure in their campaigns.Fantasy theme analysis is employed to determine the fantasies that exist in the rhetoric and the rhetorical vision that is presented in each campaign. The analysis finds that each vision is comprised of four fantasy themes. The findings reveal that Robert Kennedy's rhetoric and rhetorical vision act as an entity separate from John Kennedy's, with unique goals and a different focus. / Department of Speech Communication

This study argues that despite the basic inertia in U.S. China policy during the Kennedy and Johnson years, the period nonetheless witnessed a fundamental evolution in the strategic presumptions underlying Washington’s approach to the China “problem.” By increments, U.S. policymakers began to seriously question the wisdom of a policy predicated on the idea that the containment of the People’s Republic of China necessitated its political and economic isolation. Inversely, a basic consensus emerged in interested corners of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy that considered attempts to engage the Chinese—on levels bilateral and multilateral, official and unofficial—could serve to socialise China’s revolutionaries, thereby facilitating a reduction in Sino-American tensions and paving the way to a bilateral rapprochement. Critically, in this analysis “engagement” was seen as a means of enhancing, rather than simply supplanting, the larger effort to contain China. The dynamics involved in the emergence of this consensus are manifold and complex, and cannot be properly understood without close reference to changes in both the international strategic environment and the domestic political context through the 1960s. At the heart of this process, however, were advocates of policy moderation within the U.S. bureaucracy, mediating external pressures for policy movement, and championing the case for a more conciliatory approach to Sino-American relations. The growing acceptance of what was sometimes articulated as “containment without isolation”—shorthand for a policy framework that implicitly rejects the either/or choice between containment and engagement—found expression in, and was in turn fostered by, basic adjustments in Washington’s posture toward Mao’s China. By the end of 1968 senior U.S. officials had repeatedly signalled that Washington was reconciled to the reality of a Communist-controlled mainland China, and would in fact welcome expanded efforts toward bilateral accommodation and even cooperation. These postural shifts may not have been matched by concrete policy changes, yet they remain significant. In the most immediate sense, the less provocative posture toward China enhanced Washington’s capacity to communicate U.S. intent to China’s leadership, thereby helping avert a direct Sino-American conflict in the 1960s, even as the two sides pursued antithetical objectives in the Asian region. In a longer-term frame of reference, the more flexible posture adopted in the 1960s played an important role in challenging the domestic politicisation of China policy, while establishing a rhetorical framework and conceptual foundation for more substantive policy movement. In the course of tracing these developments, this study also provides new interpretative insights on a number of specific issues pertaining to U.S. China policy in the Kennedy and Johnson years, including the policy preferences, relationships, and roles of key U.S. officials in shaping the policy process; the impact of domestic politics, alliance politics, and various Cold War strategic concerns on policy outcomes; the question of how to deal with China’s nuclear development; and the manner in which major China-related events and developments in the 1960s—such as the failure of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, the 1962 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Sino-Indian border war, China’s involvement in Vietnam, and the Cultural Revolution— were interpreted by U.S. officials, and, in turn, shaped understandings of and responses to the China problem. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1330812 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, 2008