Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 1985. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [92]-95).

Ph.D.--Cambridge--Faculty of Divinity, [1998?]. / Bibliogr. p. 171-182.

Thesis (M. Div.)--International School of Theology, 1988. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [66]-68).

This dissertation is a commentary on one of Spren Kierkegaard's most difficult works, The Concept of Anxiety. Its aim is to show that Kierkegaard does not have a modern existentialist understanding of the self. It is in his treatment of the problems of freedom and time in The Concept of Anxiety that the differences of his thought from the tradition of existentialism can be most clearly seen. The doctrine which is central to existentialism, according to which man makes himself and is therefore the creator of all meaning and value, is often attributed by some commentators to the thought of Kierkegaard. It is my claim that such a doctrine is incompatible with the religious basis of Kierkegaard's view of the self. For Kierkegaard the freedom of the self does not consist in the fact that the possibilities for choice are unlimited. The self becomes free only by acknowledging its dependence on a reality which is external to the self and which eternally defines it. Kierkegaard's view of freedom and the self is closer to that of Augustine's, according to which the self becomes free by being bound to God. Freedom is therefore not an immediate possession of the self but something which must be acquired by virtue of the supernatural action of grace, the origin of which is God. A corollary of the existentialist view of the self is that the self is inextricably caught within time relations, and therefore perpetually divided from the presence of the eternal. Kierkegaard's argument, as it is presented in The Concept of Anxiety, assumes, on the contrary, that for the self to be a self it must come into a real relation to the eternal in what he calls the "Moment". I will argue on the basis of this interpretation that Kierkegaard's articulation of the self's relation to time further differentiates him from the existentialist tradition. This conclusion also flows from the fact that Kierkegaard's understanding of the self is a theological one. Though it is quite widely held that Kierkegaard was the found.er of the existentialist movement, it will be my argument that such an assumption is based on a misconception. Though certain writers of the twentieth century adopted Kierkegaard as their own, they did so only by truncating the basic elements of his view of the self. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

No description available.

No description available.

Há muito discute-se o estatuto da dialética na filosofia kierkegaardiana: seria Kierkegaard um autor dialético? Qual sua relação com a dialética hegeliana? Tratar-se-ia de uma dialética existencial? Não há respostas simples para tais questões. Alguns dos comentários recentes que buscaram circunscrever esse problema ofereceram bons pontos de partida, mas nenhum foi capaz de colocar a questão em termos adequados, pois se aproximavam dela com uma série de pressupostos não tematizados. Nessa perspectiva, optamos por recuperar as reflexões de Theodor Adorno em sua Tese de Habilitação (Kierkegaard: A Construção do Estético) a fim de resgatar o potencial de uma análise dialética e recolocar o debate contemporâneo sob uma ótica mais apropriada. Partindo dessa problemática, configuraram-se como objetivos do presente trabalho: 1- Analisar as múltiplas facetas da dialética no conjunto da obra kierkegaardiana; 2- Avaliar criticamente as posições dos comentadores, sobretudo daqueles ligados à tradição anglo-saxã. Com isso, buscamos ressaltar a importância de uma leitura efetivamente dialética, que enfrente as contradições do autor em questão e leve-as às últimas consequências sem apelar para fechamentos arbitrários e para elementos exteriores ao seu objeto. / Dialectics status in Kierkegaards philosophy has long been debated in secondary literature: is Kierkegaard a dialectical author? What is his connection to Hegelian dialectics? Is it plausible to talk about an existential dialectics? Such questions have no simple answer. Contemporary commentators who attempted to circumscribe this problem have offered good starting points, but none were able to frame it adequately due to a series of veiled presuppositions in their arguments. Hence, we opted to recover Theodor Adornos reflections on the subject which can be found in his postdoctoral thesis Kierkegaard: The Construction of the Esthetic in order to revaluate the importance of dialectical analysis and to reframe the recent debate in more adequate terms. With that scope in mind, the present investigation has as main objectives: 1- To examine the many facets of dialectics in Kierkegaards work; 2- To evaluate the work of commentators, mainly those who belong to the anglo-saxon tradition. Accordingly, we aim to highlight the importance of a dialectical reading which confronts the authors contradictions and takes them to their final conclusion, thus avoiding partaking in arbitrary closures and appealing to elements external to their object.

Proefschrift-Groningen.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Philosophy, June 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-108).