System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Accompanied by 2 recitals, recorded Nov. 18, 2004, and Nov. 19, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-62).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of South Carolina, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 194-212).

Thesis (D.Min.)--Liberty University, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references.

Rev. diss. Univ. of Hawaii.

Dans ses plus récents écrits, Jaegwon Kim soutient que seule une approche réductionniste est en mesure de rendre compte de la causalité mentale tout en respectant nos convictions physicalistes. Ce faisant, il va à rencontre de la tendance actuelle en philosophie analytique de l’esprit représentée par le physicalisme non-réductif. Je tente ici d’évaluer si Kim réussit à faire du réductionnisme une approche valable et intéressante. Pour ce faire, je présente en détail et commente l’argument de Kim servant à réfuter le physicalisme non réductif, de même que les deux modèles de réduction qu’il a élaborés. Je conclus que Kim réussit à réfuter le physicalisme non-réductif, mais que le réductionnisme qu’il propose ne présente qu’un intérêt limité puisqu’il laisse de côté les qualia. Aucune solution satisfaisante ne semble donc pouvoir être apportée au problème de la causalité mentale.

The thesis recontextualises the fiction of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century writer Rudyard Kipling by exploring aspects of Victorian Buddhism in a selection of his published work. It demonstrates his engagement with a variety of Buddhist histories and cultures, showing a serious artistic and imaginative response to and interpretation of Buddhism. Focusing primarily on the novel Kim, the thesis develops existing criticism, examining the character of the lama. Additionally, it studies features of Victorian Buddhism other than textual sources, drawing on work by scholars in fields such as the history of art and the history of religion. As well as considering varied Buddhist elements in Kim, the thesis examines the theme of the survival of the soul, situating short stories from various periods of Kipling's writing life in the context of scholarly debates about Nirvana and reincarnation. Attention is also given to critically neglected travel writing from the Letters of Marque series written for periodical publication. Kipling's work is shown to be deeply concerned with and sympathetic to Buddhism and Buddhist cultures.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008. / Title from file title page. Eddy Nahmias, Andrea Scarantino, committee co-chairs; Sebastian Rand, committee member. Electronic text (42 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed September 17, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-42).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaiʹi, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 338-352).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Cincinnati, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 273-300).

Mental causation is with us all the time. Being a table is different from being a human---although we are composed of physical particles, we have understanding, reason, or perception, which are able to make a difference in the physical world. In this dissertation, I have detail discussions of contemporary substance dualism, the mind-brain identity theory, and Jaegwon Kim's functionalism, and thus conclude that none of them can provide an appropriate account to the problem of mental causation. By distinguishing the mind from the body, substance dualists face the pairing problem: How does this particular mind unite with this particular body and thus interact? With the pairing problem, more and more philosophers accept physicalism. However, it is surprising that the problem of mental causation arises again from the heart of physicalism. It means that accepting physicalist ontology does not make this problem go away. On the contrary, basic physical assumptions can even be seen as the source of the current difficulties with mental causation. My preferred idea is that mental properties emerge from physical properties, and both of them together make an occurrence to cause an effect. Emergence makes mental causation autonomous and also avoids epiphenomenalism.