Thesis (M.A.)--Kent State University, 2010. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed May 26, 2010). Advisor: David Odell-Scott. Keywords: qualia; Whitehead; self-organizing system; chaos; chaotic systems; dynamical systems; subjective experience; actual entity; actual occasion; eternal objects; god; phenomenal stance; process philosophy; hard problem; consciousness; cellular automata. Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-108).

Berlin, Humboldt-Universiẗat, Diss., 1998.

This study proposes a primarily esthesic, listener-oriented approach to discussing music that is "out of tune" or discordant. The paper is divided into two main sections: in part one I work to define discordance as a type of qualia experienced when a hypothetical listener perceives something as "out of tune." I then present a classification scheme for categorizing different varieties of discordance qualia, based on the perceived intentionality behind discordant events. This system details three primary categories of discordance: 1) incidental, whereby discordance is introduced via a performer's mistake or oversight; 2) expressive, which includes discordances introduced intentionally by a performer; and 3) structural, whereby the discordance is systemic, resulting from factors outside the control of any individual performer. In part two, I present an analytic essay on a movement from Easley Blackwood's 1980 Twelve Microtonal Etudes, a work that invokes structural discordance qualia in listeners enculturated in twelve-tone equal temperament. This analysis explores Blackwood's attempt to mimic functional tonal syntax in nineteen-tone equal temperament, and describes the impact of the structural discordance qualia on familiar varieties of tonal ambiguity. / text

This is an attempt to arrive at a philosophical understanding of (qualitative) consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, tickles, experienced colors, sounds, tastes, and odors. Consciousness is analyzed as the having of qualia. Qualia (or phenomenal properties) are problematical because nothing (neither physical nor nonphysical, neither actual nor merely possible) can bear them. This suggests qualia eliminativism; but it is argued that qualia should be retained as properties that can be exemplified though nothing bears them. Phenomenal objects are then presented as bundles of qualia. The bundle theory of phenomenal objects is complemented with a bundle theory of the conscious subject. Qualia are crucial elements of the bundle that constitutes a conscious subject. For a subject to have a quale is for this quale to be included in the bundle that is the subject. This account makes consciousness into a noncognitive phenomenon. Having a quale is not a matter of knowing anything, believing anything, or cognizing anything in any way. It is simply to feel a certain way. Two theses are singled out for particular critical attention. Concerning the nature of qualia, David Armstrong has argued that (color) qualia are complexes of primary qualities borne by the surfaces of (actual or possible) physical objects that we perceive or seem to perceive. More than other reductionists, Armstrong is concerned to ensure the phenomenologial adequacy of his reductionist theory. This phenomenological sensibility makes his theory of qualia particularly interesting and also particularly vulnerable. Concerning the question what it takes to have qualia, introspection appears to be the chosen tool of many contemporary theorists. Using John Pollock's introspectionist account of qualitative consciousness as a model, it is argued that introspection can play no part in an adequate explanation of qualitative consciousness. Throughout the investigation the methodological importance of the first-person point of view is emphasized. The primary responsibility of philosophical theory of consciousness is to insure phenomenological adequacy. Straying from the first-person point of view makes it easy to forget this.

伍文亮. / 論文(哲學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部, 1998. / 參考文獻: leaves 95-99. / 中英文摘要及詞彙表. / Wu Wenliang. / Chapter 1. --- 引言 --- p.3 / Chapter 2. --- 「意識」與物理主義理論 --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- 何謂意識？ --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- 心靈主義到物質主義一從不同的觀點看意識難題 --- p.10 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 物理主義的基本觀點 --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3 --- 一種功能主義：電算機功能主義理論 --- p.18 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- 電算機可否具有意識呢？ --- p.19 / Chapter 3. --- 意識問題的解釋缺口 --- p.26 / Chapter 3.1 --- 麥堅的「本體自然主義」 --- p.27 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- 支持的理由（一）：認知能力的限制 --- p.27 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- 支持的理由(二）：意識的隱藏結構 --- p.33 / Chapter 3.2 --- T.賴格爾對「主觀意識内容」的論証 --- p.36 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 作爲一隻蝙蝠的主觀内在特性 --- p.36 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 對「主觀性」及「觀點」的批評 --- p.40 / Chapter 4. --- 反駁物理主義理論的論証 --- p.46 / Chapter 4.1 --- 副現象主義 --- p.48 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- 對副現象主義理論的批評 --- p.49 / Chapter 4.2 --- 知識論証 --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 對知識論証的批評 --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3 --- 對物理主義的其他反駁：無意識呆子的存在及光譜倒置的可能 --- p.63 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- 「無意識呆子論証」及「主觀意識内容欠缺論証」 --- p.63 / Chapter 4.3.1.1 --- 對主觀意識内容欠缺論証的初步反駁 --- p.65 / Chapter 4.3.1.2 --- 進一步的反駁：主觀意識内容的減褪 --- p.67 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- 光譜倒置論証 --- p.70 / Chapter 4.3.2.1 --- 對光譜倒置論証的反駁：主觀意識内容的跳躍 --- p.70 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- 小結 --- p.73 / Chapter 5. --- 非還原主義的物理主義理論 --- p.74 / Chapter 5.1 --- 還原主義理論 --- p.74 / Chapter 5.2 --- 心物「從屬決定」關係與各式的物理主義理論 --- p.79 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- 甚麼是從屬決定的關係 --- p.79 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- 對強式心物從屬決定關係的評論 --- p.84 / Chapter 5.3 --- 一種非還原主義的物理主義理論 --- p.88 / Chapter 6. --- 結語 --- p.92 / 附錄 --- p.95 / 附錄1 ：參考資料 --- p.95 / 專書部份 --- p.95 / 論文部份 --- p.98 / 附錄2 ：中英對照詞彙表 --- p.100 / 人名 --- p.100 / 名詞/概念

Konstanz, Univ., Diss., 2009

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008. / Thesis Advisor(s): Simeral, Robert ; Bergin, Richard. "December 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on February 2, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 95-103). Also available in print.

Habilitationsschrift--Philosophie--Karlsruhe--Universität Karlsruhe, 1992.

El presente trabajo se propone como un análisis de las características fenomenológicas de la conciencia, y un examen de las razones del continuo fracaso por explicarlas reductivamente. Una explicación exitosa debería mostrarnos una continuidad entre el reino psíquico y el reino físico, y debería servirnos para unificar conceptualmente la teoría que trata ambos dominios. Sin embargo, el fracaso en esta unificación nos deja con una disunidad explicativa: por un lado, tenemos explicaciones puramente fenoménicas y por otro, explicaciones funcionales, físicas o mecánicas. La imposibilidad de reducir ambos dominios atenta contra el ideal de unidad de las explicaciones científicas, un ideal que parece estar detrás de toda búsqueda de reducción. El presente trabajo se divide en dos partes. En la primera parte haremos una evaluación crítica de las principales respuestas del filósofo John Locke acerca del problema de la unidad de la explicación mecanicista del mundo y la compatibilidad de dicha explicación con los estados de conciencia. El mecanicismo clásico intenta explicar el mundo mediante la reducción de todos los hechos del mundo a pautas mecánicas, pero se enfrenta a un problema insoluble cuando intenta operar esta reducción a los hechos mentales, o cuando intenta conectar el ámbito mental con el ámbito físico. Para conectar ambos ámbitos, la propia noción de ‘idea’ debe cabalgar ambiguamente entre dos mundos: es una entidad mental, interna, que sin embargo contiene una huella causal externa, lo cual por principio contraría la propia noción de ‘interno’. Mostraremos que, a pesar de los esfuerzos de la modernidad, el programa mecanicista clásico no puede encontrar una continuidad entre el aspecto fenoménico de la mente y el aspecto mecanicista de los cuerpos, pues aun cuando propone que en la idea hay una huella causal, tal huella causal no deja de ser inevitablemente fenoménica. El fracaso de la reducción del aspecto interno al aspecto externo no sólo vale para el siglo XVII, sino también para el siglo XXI. En la segunda parte analizaremos algunos de los intentos de explicación de los fenómenos mentales en términos funcionalistas y/o eliminativistas. El funcionalismo asume que una propiedad –como el color, por ejemplo- queda totalmente explicada si se especifican los mecanismos funcionales operantes subyacentes en un proceso. El eliminativismo afirma que la propia fenomenología resulta errónea y ociosa, y en rigor no representa un problema genuino, y por lo tanto debe eliminarse. Veremos que estos intentos llegan a ciertos callejones sin salida, pues los esquemas funcionales que se presentan como explicativos y reductivos de la naturaleza cualitativa de una percepción, contienen ellos mismos importantes elementos fenoménicos, con lo cual la explicación –tal como ocurría con el mecanicismo moderno- no puede establecer una continuidad entre el aspecto fenoménico y el mundo externo. Propondremos que el principal problema de las explicaciones reductivas acerca de la conciencia es que se valen de una fuerte demarcación entre el aspecto interno (mental) y el aspecto externo (físico, funcional) y que una mejor explicación de los hechos conscientes puede darse a partir de una teoría enactiva, según la cual la conciencia no es un hecho “interior”, sino un hecho ineliminablemente ecológico. / This work proposes an analysis of the phenomenological features of consciousness, and a review of the reasons for the continued failure by reductive explanations. A successful explanation should show continuity between the psychic realm and the physical realm, and should serve to conceptually unify the theory that treats both domains. However, this unification failure leaves us with an explanatory disunity: first, we have purely phenomenal explanations and secondly, functional, physical or mechanical explanations. The inability to reduce both domains attempts against the ideal of unity of scientific explanations, an ideal that seems to be behind any reduction. This work is divided into two parts. In the first part we will make a critical assessment of the main responses of the philosopher John Locke about the problem of the unity of the mechanistic explanation of the world and the compatibility of the explanation of states of consciousness. The classic mechanicism attempts to explain the world by reducing all facts of the mechanical world patterns, but faces an intractable problem when it tries to operate this reduction to mental events, or when tries to connect the mental realm to the physical realm. To connect the two areas, the very notion of 'idea' must ride ambiguously between two worlds: is a mental, internal entity, which however contains an external causal footprint, which in principle contradicts the notion of 'internal'. We show that, despite the efforts of modernity, the classical mechanistic program cannot find a continuity between the phenomenal aspect of mind and the mechanistic aspect of the bodies, because even when he proposes the idea that there is a causal footprint, such causal footprint is no longer inevitably phenomenal. The failure of the reduction of the internal to the external appearance looks not only applies to the seventeenth century, but also for the XXI century. In the second part we will analyze some of the attempts to explain mental phenomena in functionalist and / or eliminativists terms. Functionalism assumes a property-like color, for example, is fully explained if there is operative functional mechanisms underlying a specified process. Eliminativism claims that phenomenology itself is wrong and idle, and in fact does not represent a genuine problem, and therefore should be removed. We will see that these attempts come to some dead ends, because the functional diagrams presented as explanatory and reductive of the qualitative nature of perception, contains important phenomenal elements themselves, which explanation-such as with the modern mechanism - can not establish a continuity between phenomenal character and the external world. We propose that the main issue of reductive explanations of consciousness is the use of a sharp demarcation between the internal (mental) and external appearance aspect (physical, functional) and a better explanation of conscious events can occur from an enactive theory, according to which consciousness is not an "internal" fact but an ecological one.

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