No description available.

L'argument de la connaissance de Frank Jackson est l'un des arguments les plus célèbres en philosophie analytique. Son objectif est de démontrer que certains de nos états mentaux, nommément les états mentaux associés à l'effet que cela fait de percevoir ou de ressentir, ou qualia, ne peuvent pas être expliqués par une conception exclusivement matérialiste de l'esprit. L'argument de la connaissance s'inscrit dans une famille d'arguments en philosophie de l'esprit qui soulèvent le débat jamais résolu entre matérialisme et dualisme. Depuis sa parution en 1982, l'argument de la connaissance de Jackson a suscité de nombreuses réponses de la part des matérialistes qui ont tenté de le réfuter. Jackson lui-même s'est laissé convaincre par certaines de ces réponses et en 1998, il a finalement renoncé à son célèbre argument. Ce mémoire a pour objectif de présenter une classification des réponses adressées à l'argument de la connaissance ainsi qu'une analyse de chacune d'entre elles. Cette analyse permet de montrer que la seule réponse adéquate à l'argument de la connaissance est celle formulée par Jackson lui-même lorsqu'il a rejeté son argument. Ce mémoire montre également que la réponse de Jackson permet d'entrevoir une réfutation adéquate à tout un ensemble d'arguments dualistes en philosophie de l'esprit.

This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential states arise and their nature. After examining the desiderata for naturalistic explanations, I argue that theories which ascribe nonconceptual content to experiences are the most plausible versions of representationalism. Further, causal covariation and teleological theories yield distinctive and interesting representationalist positions, hence, they become the focus of this study. To assess representationalism, I investigate whether all differences in phenomenal character can be correlated with differences in content. I claim that a useful distinction can be drawn between implicit and explicit content, which allows one to best describe the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. I then argue that ambiguous figures show that two experiences can have the same content but different phenomenal character. I explicate the Inverted Earth hypothesis and claim that to identify content and phenomenal character, representationalists either have to condone the possibility of philosophical zombies, or hold that people lack authoritative first-person knowledge of their current experiences. Both these positions are unpalatable. Finally, I argue that representationalists cannot ascribe contents to experiences of novel colours to account for their phenomenal character. I also question, in light of dissociation phenomena, whether there is one distinctive relationship that all experiences bear to the cognitive system. I conclude that phenomenal character cannot be identical with the type of content under investigation, and that naturalistic representationalist theories cannot fully explain conscious experience.

Diplomarbeit Hochschule für Angewandte Psychologie Zürich, 2007.

Denna uppsatsen granskar Amy Kinds argument för kvaliarealism. I artikeln från 2008, ”How to Believe in Qualia”, hävdar hon att transparenstesen utgör ett hot mot kvaliarealism. En stor del av min uppsats handlar därför om att undersöka hennes avfärdande av transparenstesen. Uppsatsen ger henne ett visst, men inte fullt, stöd i detta och följaktligen också ett visst stöd för kvaliarealism. Samtidigt visar uppsatsen på andra argument gentemot transparenstesen, som också utgör ett hot mot kvaliarealism. / In this thesis Amy Kind’s argument for qualia realism is scrutinized. In the paper from 2008, “How to Believe in Qualia”, she claims that the transparency thesis pose a threat to qualia realism. A major part of this thesis therefore deals with investigating her refutation of the transparency thesis. The thesis gives her some, but not fully, conclusive support and consequently gives some support for qualia realism. The thesis also sets out other arguments against the transparency thesis, arguments which however pose a threat to qualia realism.

Denna uppsatsen granskar Amy Kinds argument för kvaliarealism. I artikeln från 2008, ”How to Believe in Qualia”, hävdar hon att transparenstesen utgör ett hot mot kvaliarealism. En stor del av min uppsats handlar därför om att undersöka hennes avfärdande av transparenstesen. Uppsatsen ger henne ett visst, men inte fullt, stöd i detta och följaktligen också ett visst stöd för kvaliarealism. Samtidigt visar uppsatsen på andra argument gentemot transparenstesen, som också utgör ett hot mot kvaliarealism. / In this thesis Amy Kind’s argument for qualia realism is scrutinized. In the paper from 2008, “How to Believe in Qualia”, she claims that the transparency thesis pose a threat to qualia realism. A major part of this thesis therefore deals with investigating her refutation of the transparency thesis. The thesis gives her some, but not fully, conclusive support and consequently gives some support for qualia realism. The thesis also sets out other arguments against the transparency thesis, arguments which however pose a threat to qualia realism.

No description available.

Up to this date there are several scientific disciplines that deal with religion´s underlying mechanisms and certain functions of our consciousness, but there isn´t anyone who takes into account the entire aspect of consciousness. The aim of the present work is to bring the entire aspect of our consciousness into the scientific discussion of religion. To help in doing this, the philosophical concept of qualia is used. First the concept is problematized, then an examination whether the concept has explanatory value in the science of religion and in the understanding of religious experience is done.  The concept of qualia has in this manner been applied to several scientific theories of religion and place-related entity continuity has been used as an example of religious experience. The present work is developed as a literature study and uses literature and theories from de scientific disciplines of philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, neurotheology, cognitive science of religion and psychology of religion. As an underlying method the epistemological theory of holistic coherentism is used because it enables such an interdisciplinary study as this work is.   What this work shows is that qualia have a high explanatory value in the science of religion and in the understanding of religious experience and how we form religious concepts. However, the concept of qualia is problematic and great care must be exercised when inferences are made.

O debate da imagética mental consiste de uma controvérsia iniciada nos anos 1970 a respeito da forma das representações mentais, e foi travada principalmente entre Stephen Kosslyn, que propunha uma forma imagética, e Zenon Pylyshyn, que propunha um formato simbólico-estrutural, além de apontar falhas conceituais na teoria da afiguração implícita no modelo pictorialista. Nesta dissertação, apresenta-se um balanço filosófico deste debate, levando em conta também críticas adicionais de Daniel Dennett aos pressupostos da abordagem pictorialista. / The mental imagery debate is a controversy that began in the 1970s concerning the form of mental representation, and was carried out mainly by Stephen Kosslyn, who defended a picture-like representation, and Zenon Pylyshyn, who proposed a symbolic-structural format. The latter also pointed out conceptual problems of the pictorialist model. This thesis presents a philosophical discussion of the debate, also taking into account additional criticisms by Daniel Dennett to the presuppositions of the pictorialist approach.

O debate da imagética mental consiste de uma controvérsia iniciada nos anos 1970 a respeito da forma das representações mentais, e foi travada principalmente entre Stephen Kosslyn, que propunha uma forma imagética, e Zenon Pylyshyn, que propunha um formato simbólico-estrutural, além de apontar falhas conceituais na teoria da afiguração implícita no modelo pictorialista. Nesta dissertação, apresenta-se um balanço filosófico deste debate, levando em conta também críticas adicionais de Daniel Dennett aos pressupostos da abordagem pictorialista. / The mental imagery debate is a controversy that began in the 1970s concerning the form of mental representation, and was carried out mainly by Stephen Kosslyn, who defended a picture-like representation, and Zenon Pylyshyn, who proposed a symbolic-structural format. The latter also pointed out conceptual problems of the pictorialist model. This thesis presents a philosophical discussion of the debate, also taking into account additional criticisms by Daniel Dennett to the presuppositions of the pictorialist approach.