O debate da imagética mental consiste de uma controvérsia iniciada nos anos 1970 a respeito da forma das representações mentais, e foi travada principalmente entre Stephen Kosslyn, que propunha uma forma imagética, e Zenon Pylyshyn, que propunha um formato simbólico-estrutural, além de apontar falhas conceituais na teoria da afiguração implícita no modelo pictorialista. Nesta dissertação, apresenta-se um balanço filosófico deste debate, levando em conta também críticas adicionais de Daniel Dennett aos pressupostos da abordagem pictorialista. / The mental imagery debate is a controversy that began in the 1970s concerning the form of mental representation, and was carried out mainly by Stephen Kosslyn, who defended a picture-like representation, and Zenon Pylyshyn, who proposed a symbolic-structural format. The latter also pointed out conceptual problems of the pictorialist model. This thesis presents a philosophical discussion of the debate, also taking into account additional criticisms by Daniel Dennett to the presuppositions of the pictorialist approach.

This thesis examines representations of sensation within modernist novels alongside contemporary philosophical debates over the concept of qualia. Concentrating on the work of Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, Percy Wyndham Lewis, and Samuel Beckett, it confronts a longstanding critical tradition that has tended to obscure or misunderstand the implications of arguments made by philosophers of mind in relation to literary descriptions of sensation. That the mind is a thing, and that modernist narrative fiction is particularly successful at representing that thing, has become a critical commonplace. In this thesis I argue that interpretations of modernism’s supposed ‘inward turn’ are founded on a mistaken notion of ‘cognitive realism’, a critical position endorsing the idea that it is both possible and desirable to describe the mind (conceived of as a stable and unchanging object) without loss through the development and judicial deployment of new literary techniques. The myth of the inward turn in its various incarnations – the psychologised modernism described by many literary critics in the 50s and 60s, and the neuromodernism subscribed to by many contemporary critics – is, I argue, largely the result of a set of inter-linked misconceptions which attend the cognitive realist paradigm. The notion of qualia is central to my thesis. Defined as the ineffable, irreducible, and subjective properties of conscious experience, qualia emerge concomitantly with modernism, developing out of G. E. Moore’s definition of ‘sense-data’ and Bertrand Russell’s category of ‘sensibilia’. Though still disputed within contemporary philosophy, qualia create huge problems for materialist theories of consciousness, threatening to undermine critical approaches to literature which contend that formal literary strategies can ever hope to transcend the limitations of symbolic language in conveying sensation. The ‘problem’ of qualia referred to in this thesis, therefore, is the problem the concept poses for symbolic descriptions (either mathematic, psychological, or literary) of mental states, especially when those descriptions make special claims (or are interpreted as making special claims) of mimetic veracity. The problem emerged within philosophy at precisely the point at which the representative claims of literature came under direct attack. This thesis argues, therefore, that it is a profoundly literary problem, and that the absence of ‘sensation’ from the written is simply a manifestation of the inherent limitations of language. A critical tendency to re-insert sensory experience into the process of reading – through phenomenological interpretations of modernism, or in contemporary ‘neuroaesthetic’ approaches to literature – thus point to a general anxiety that manifests itself most forcefully in relation to modernist fiction’s ability to ‘write’ sensation. This thesis employs the concept of qualia as a way of contextualising narratives of the mind – philosophical, literary and scientific – from the period. In doing so it seeks to historicise modernism’s ‘crisis of the senses’; locating this argument in a broader theoretical space and questioning the relevance (and novelty) of contemporary approaches to reading the senses in modernism.

This thesis presents and evaluates David Chalmers argument that the existence of phenomenal conscious experience constitutes a permanent barrier to the reductive aspirations of a purely materialistic neuroscience. My aim is to defend the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness, and argue that continued research in neuroscience and neurophysiology can result in a successful materialistic or reductive solution to the hard problem of consciousness. My argument against Chalmers is two-fold. First, I challenge Chalmers claim that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical. And second, I argue that his conceivability argument is implausible.

This thesis presents and evaluates David Chalmers argument that the existence of phenomenal conscious experience constitutes a permanent barrier to the reductive aspirations of a purely materialistic neuroscience. My aim is to defend the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness, and argue that continued research in neuroscience and neurophysiology can result in a successful materialistic or reductive solution to the hard problem of consciousness. My argument against Chalmers is two-fold. First, I challenge Chalmers claim that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical. And second, I argue that his conceivability argument is implausible.

In these years, people¡¦s standard of living began to increase, so that the pattern of consumption is different from past way that pursued to meet the physical need. It means that the age of experienced economy is coming. Consumers require not only tangible goods or intangible services , but the satisfying and memorable consumer experiences. In addition, consumers want to get feeling from the products, and realize something from the process of consumption, so as to feeling toughed. These are the influence of customer emotions and touched circumstances known as ¡§Qualia¡¨. In this study, explanation of ¡§Qualia space design¡¨ as spatial environment design with five qualia factors: attractiveness, beauty, creativeness, delicacy, and engineering, then this study expect to construct scale of qualia space design through five qualia factors matrix with store atmosphere for measuring score of qualia space design and make it bring contribution to enterprises and academic field. The qualia space design appertains to static perception, but the experience marketing can be regard as dynamic feeling. So, this study explores these two variables relationship with customer satisfaction, customer loyalty, and purchasing intention by questionnaire survey. Among this, 363 valid questionnaires were returned, and this research use regression analysis to analyze relationship between variables. In general, the results show that qualia space design or experience value would improve customer satisfaction, and in turn, it would increases customer loyalty. As a result, the qualia space design and experience value are the one of important competitiveness in current high competitive environment.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:25:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3071.pdf: 785861 bytes, checksum: bb17fdba72f0886b463d1614a7314738 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-10 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / Nowadays we have been observing the expansion of knowledge mainly caused by continuous changes in science and its techniques. Terminology, as an academic subject concerned with the so-called specialized languages, play an important role in this process. The relevance of this research can be justified by the lack of systematic terminological repertoire for a strategic sector of the Brazilian economy, as biofuels/biodiesel. In this sense, our goals are: i) systematize the terminology of biodiesel in Portuguese in order to promote more efficient communication, allowing both scientific and technological information exchange among users and researchers of this area, as well as, generate resources for the subsequent creation of the first dictionary of this knowledge domain; ii) investigate biodiesel terminology from a semantic perspective, choosing the Qualia Structure, model of semantic structure which integrates Pustejovsky s Generative Lexicon Theory (1995) as a theoretical frame. In order to develop this research, the methodology used was based on the one elaborated and improved by GETerm, adopting descriptive terminology of linguistic base, specifically the postulates of the Communicative Theory of Terminology (CTT) (CABRÉ, 1999, 2003). As results of this investigation, we attained: a biodiesel corpus with approximately 1.5 million words, an ontology containing 280 terms and a repertoire of 50 definitions. At the end, we concluded that the application of Qualia Structure in terminological work may support the terminographic activity. / Na contemporaneidade, presenciamos a expansão do conhecimento propiciada, fundamentalmente, pelas mudanças contínuas emanadas das ciências e das técnicas. A Terminologia, na qualidade de disciplina que estuda as chamadas linguagens de especialidade, desempenha um papel primordial nesse processo. A relevância desta pesquisa se justifica pela ausência de qualquer repertório terminológico sistematizado para um setor estratégico da economia brasileira, qual seja, os biocombustíveis/ biodiesel. Nesse sentido, temos como objetivos: i) sistematizar a terminologia do biodiesel em Língua Portuguesa, com vistas a promover uma comunicação mais eficiente, permitindo a troca de informações científicas e tecnológicas entre usuários e pesquisadores desta área, bem como gerar subsídios para a criação, a posteriori, do primeiro dicionário desse domínio do conhecimento; ii) investigar a terminologia do biodiesel a partir de um enfoque semântico, elegendo como quadro teórico a Estrutura Qualia, modelo de estruturação semântica que integra a Teoria do Léxico Gerativo de Pustejovsky (1995). Para a realização deste trabalho, pautamo-nos na metodologia desenvolvida e aperfeiçoada no âmbito do Geterm, sob o viés de uma Terminologia descritiva de base linguística, mais especificamente os postulados da Teoria Comunicativa da Terminologia (TCT) (CABRÉ, 1999, 2003). Como resultados desta pesquisa, obtivemos: o corpus do biodiesel com cerca de 1,5 milhão de palavras, a ontologia contendo 280 termos e um repertório de 50 definições. Por fim, concluímos que a aplicação da Estrutura Qualia em trabalhos terminológicos auxilia na atividade terminográfica.

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This dissertation concerns the location and nature of phenomenal qualities. Arguably, these qualities naively seem to belong to perceived external objects. However, we also seem to experience phenomenal qualities in hallucinations, and in hallucinations we do not perceive any external objects. I present and argue for a theory of the phenomenal qualities, "brain theory", which claims that all phenomenal qualities we experience are physical properties instantiated in the brain, regardless of whether they are experienced in veridical perceptions or in hallucinations. I begin by more carefully identifying the phenomenal qualities, discussing how they are related to "qualia" and "phenomenal character". Then I present brain theory, and investigate its implications for the perceptual relations we stand in to external objects, noting that it is mostly neutral. I also compare brain theory to a similar theory of perception advocated by Bertrand Russell. Next, I provide an overview over the competing theories of phenomenal qualities, and relate them to theories of perception, such as representationalism, qualia theory, sense data theory and disjunctivism. The majority of my argumentation for brain theory focuses on arguing that the phenomenal qualities are instantiated in the brain, rather than on arguing that they are physical properties. Instead, I largely assume physicalism. However, even independently of the physicalism assumption, I show that we have reason to believe that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations, and that qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects, such as our brains or sense data. In the first step towards this conclusion I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations face serious problems. In the next step I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects face serious problems. Finally, an important part of the argumentation is my replies to objections against brain theory, including common sense objections and the "observation objection". From these conclusions, together with the physicalism assumption, I infer that we have reason to believe that brain theory is true about hallucinations. On this basis, I then argue, through a generalizing argument, that the same is the case for veridical perceptions.

This essay studies the semantic structure of the noun dog with the help of qualia structure and adjectives that collocate with the noun. It also evaluates the idea of qualia structure and how well it works in studying the semantic structure of nouns. More specifically, the aim of this paper is to see how the information contained by the noun dog could be structured in terms of qualia structure. On a more general level the aim is also to evaluate, and add to, the idea of qualia structure as such. In order to accomplish this aim the top 100 adjectives that collocate with the noun dog were searched for in the COCA corpus (Corpus of Contemporary American English). The results were that with the help of qualia structure and some adjectives that collocate with the noun, it was possible to posit some substructures for the noun dog and create a tree that gave an overview of the semantic structure of the noun. However, some problems arose during the process making it clear where qualia structure needs improvement. This led to the discussion of the evolution of qualia structure and where the idea could be, and perhaps should be headed in the near future.

Dans ses plus récents écrits, Jaegwon Kim soutient que seule une approche réductionniste est en mesure de rendre compte de la causalité mentale tout en respectant nos convictions physicalistes. Ce faisant, il va à rencontre de la tendance actuelle en philosophie analytique de l’esprit représentée par le physicalisme non-réductif. Je tente ici d’évaluer si Kim réussit à faire du réductionnisme une approche valable et intéressante. Pour ce faire, je présente en détail et commente l’argument de Kim servant à réfuter le physicalisme non réductif, de même que les deux modèles de réduction qu’il a élaborés. Je conclus que Kim réussit à réfuter le physicalisme non-réductif, mais que le réductionnisme qu’il propose ne présente qu’un intérêt limité puisqu’il laisse de côté les qualia. Aucune solution satisfaisante ne semble donc pouvoir être apportée au problème de la causalité mentale.