This thesis investigates the relationship between consciousness, attention, and experience in the periphery of the visual field. I argue that there are some visual experiences that lack content in the sense of lacking accuracy conditions and also in stronger senses. I define subjective space as the manifold constituted by the various factors that modulate awareness of an object including attention, eccentricity, eccentricity-relative spacing, and so on. The subjective periphery is that area of subjective space in which no objects or properties are experienced. It is subjectively peripheral experiences that lack content. In part my argument depends on claims about phenomenal experience. I establish these by considering a variety of introspective and experimental phenomena related to attention and conscious awareness and extracting a set of data that are neutral with respect to the theories that might explain them. I pursue an argument to the best explanation, refuting three popular explanations and championing my own. The first is that endorsed by Dennett (1991) and Noë (2004). They each claim that our experience of phenomenal character in the subjective periphery is an illusion (or a defeasible illusion). The second explanation, endorsed by Block (2007), is that there is phenomenal experience and content in the periphery but no cognitive awareness of it; thus, reports and other indicators of content fail. The third explanation is that there are indeterminate or general contents in the subjective periphery. This is the representationalist’s explanation. The fourth explanation, my explanation, is that there are in fact experiences that do not present objects or properties at locations in the subjective periphery, and that consequently lack content. I argue that this is the best explanation of the data since the others either fail to account for all the neutral data, can be shown to be false for independent reasons, or both. I also defend a number of distinct conclusions that nevertheless strengthen the main line of argument. For example, I consider the view that all attention is conscious, which helps to salvage the reliability of introspection as a method of investigating attention and experience.

In "A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Content" and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, Georges Rey challenges the tradition of combining externalism and representationalism about mental states. Specifically, his challenge takes the form of an internalist representationalist account of states with qualitative content. I examine his account, and find it problematic on the grounds that it fails to appropriately account for the substantiality and determinacy of qualitative content. However, I propose a solution to this problem in the form of an alternative view. This view compromises several aspects of Rey's view, most importantly in virtue of being a weak externalist position rather than internalist one. Yet, in keeping with Rey's project, this alternative view challenges the traditional combination of representationalism and externalism. It is a view on which mental states with qualitative contents are only indirectly individuated by elements in the external world. Mental states are not, as on a standard representationalist account, individuated by elements in the external world that they represent. While I conclude that Rey's view is incorrect, I salvage his project.

Thesis advisor: Ronald Tacelli / Thomas Aquinas and Thomas Reid are philosophers who, while writing from very different historical and intellectual contexts, both share a common conviction as epistemological realists. This paper will argue that, despite any initial appearances of conflict, their arguments and conclusions are both compatible and complementary, and that through such an agreement we can come to a richer understanding of the realist tradition. At the heart of this unity lie the shared principles that: * Knowledge involves a direct apprehension of things themselves. * Ideas are not themselves objects or intermediaries, but the active means by which the intellect understands. * The relationship between the mind and its object is not one of a material likeness, but of a formal likeness. * The existence of external objects of knowledge is not demonstrable, but is a self-evident first principle. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The goal of this thesis is to defend non-representationalist perceptualism about pain against the challenges brought to it by Murat Aydede. These challenges are intended to apply to both a strong version of representationalism and general perceptualism about pain, however I maintain that they are less effective when aimed at the latter. In the interest of pulling apart these two views, I suggest that a more comprehensive theory of introspection than what is currently being used in the debate should be given. This thesis is an attempt to put forward such a view in service of the perceptual theorist. Once an alternative theory of introspection is given, several of the challenges that target perceptualism are avoided. Additionally I argue that the version of representationalism developed by Michael Tye is undermined by his explanation of pain’s negative affect. Consequently, I claim that one need not endorse representationalist commitments in order to maintain the attractive tenets of perceptualism. / Graduate

For centuries, the ontological question of representation has plagued the philosophical tradition: does the mind represent the external world? By taking a critical perspective, I will briefly survey the philosophical literature and analyze the usage of representation in modern philosophical and scientific circles, providing a historical context for the ontological question of representation. After determining that modern philosophy and cognitive science is, counter intuitively, moving away from the representational stance, I then look back on the twentieth century and give an examination of the roots of the anti-representationalist paradigm, focusing on the work of Martin Heidegger, James Gibson, and the proponents of dynamic systems theory. Through the use of Heideggerian phenomenological-ontology, I propose an ontological solution to the problem of mental representation. By taking an ecumenical phenomenological approach, I recast the dichotomy between representationalism and non-representationalism into a derivative continuum, focusing on how the phenomena of mental content, and thus representation, only arises in breakdown cases of our normal ontological familiarity. After having contrasted this conception of our Being with the metaphysics of Descartes, I explain how we can avoid dualism while maintaining the phenomenology of "thinking" which has been typical of the philosophical tradition.

[pt] A percepção é inerentemente representacional? Esta é, como eu a penso, a questão mais fascinante na filosofia da percepção. Para responder a essa pergunta, eu analiso duas formas rivais de pensar a percepção, a saber: representacionalista e anti-representacionalista ou, como prefiro, não-representacionalista. Assim, eu discuto se a percepção é melhor compreendida em termos representacionais ou em termos não-representacionais. Ao fazer isso, busco desenvolver uma variedade radical de enativismo segundo a qual a percepção nem sempre envolve a posse pelo próprio estado mental de conteúdo semântico representacional. Ao rejeitar a visão de que a percepção sempre tem conteúdo representacional, sustento que a percepção deve ser vista em termos de funcionalidade biológica. Ao fazer isso, distingo dois tipos diferentes de normatividade. O primeiro é o que muitos filósofos chamam de normatividade biológica. A segunda, a chamada normatividade semântica, é aquela exibida por nossas habilidades linguísticas, tais como julgamentos, crenças e inferências com conteúdo. Com essa distinção em mente, clarifico em que sentido existem erros perceptuais. Como resultado, defendo que existem erros perceptuais, embora de tipos diferentes. Finalmente, tento explicar as ilusões ópticas, dado por excelência a ser explicado por qualquer teoria da percepção. / [en] Is perception inherently representational? This is, I take it, the most fascinating question in philosophy of perception. To answer it, I analyze two rival ways of thinking about perception, namely: representationalism and anti-representationalism or, as I would rather call it, non-representationalism. Thus, I discuss whether perception is best understood in representational or in non-representational terms. In doing so, I seek to develop a radical variety of enactivism according to which perception has nothing to do with content, representation, or semantic norms. In rejecting the view that perception always has representational content, I hold that perception must be seen in terms of biological functionality. In doing so, I distinguish two different types of normativity. The first is what many philosophers call biological normativity. The second, called semantic normativity, is the kind of normativity exhibited by our linguistic abilities, such as judgments, beliefs, and content-involving inferences. With this distinction in mind, I clarify the sense in which there are perceptual errors. As a result, I argue that there are perceptual errors, albeit of different kinds. Finally, I try to explain optical illusions, datum ​par excellence to be accounted for by any theory of perception.

This thesis explores recent Turkish-German film through a radically postrepresentationalvision of aesthetics and ethics. Post-representationalism as amethodology involves confronting conventional cognitive and hermeneuticapproaches to film, and going beyond representational schemes and nationalparadigms for a closer engagement with the aesthetic. This thesis puts emphasison tropes such as movement, gesture, process and becoming through anengagement with the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari as analternative to the theoretical models that dominate the scholarship on migrant anddiasporic cinemas which place emphasis on dualisms and notions such as culturaland national identity. It attempts to broaden the discussions on post-ReunificationTurkish German cinema by exploring a wide range of works including fiction,documentary and artist films dealing with labour migration from Turkey toGermany. The first chapter focuses on Thomas Arslan’s Berlin Trilogy andChristian Petzold’s Jerichow (2009) as ‘Berlin School’ films that convey adistinct aesthetic approach to labour migrants and their second generationoffspring in Germany, which tends to focus on questions of work and thechanging nature of labour under globalisation. The second chapter looks atdocumentary films by Thomas Arslan, Aysun Bademsoy, Harun Farocki andSeyhan Derin to re-evaluate the dominance of historical narratives and reassessthe documentary form as an archival and creative practice through new politicaland ethico-aesthetic paradigms. The third chapter investigates social realist genrecinema through Feo Aladağ’s Die Fremde (2011) and Yüksel Yavuz’s KleineFreiheit (2003) to explore whether new encounters with conventional aestheticsthat zoom in on gestures and movements can call into question the limitation oflinguistic and semiotic terms and categories of analysis. These chapters aim tomove beyond representational and definitive frameworks in favour of a creativecritical engagement with migrant film as a political vocation, which carries withinitself the potential to invent new forms of thought, resistance, movement andpeople.

In recent years there has been increasing interest in philosophical theories which downplay the importance of the idea that our words and thoughts represent aspects of the world. The best-known example of these non-representational theories is metaethical expressivism, the view that ethical language and thought is best understood not as representing or describing ethical features of the world, but as expressing our attitudes towards it. Other theories apply similar ideas to other kinds of language and thought, and global versions apply it to all kinds. Non-representationalism has undergone a major shift in the last few decades, and lack of clarity about what it now involves has led some to worry that it is either unintelligible, or else indistinguishable from its representationalist rivals. In the first part of my thesis, I offer a novel reading of the new kind of non-representationalism. I argue that this reading, for the first time, makes the view both intelligible and distinct from representationalism. However I also show that this reading collapses one of the major debates in the recent literature – the debate between global and local non-representationalists. This debate turns out to be empty: properly understood, the disputants already agree with each other. Many writers think that non-representationalism threatens metaphysics, particularly theories which purport to say what makes statements of given kinds true, and to what various kinds of terms refer. Some take this to be an advantage of the view, others a disadvantage. In the second part of my thesis I argue that this common view is deeply mistaken – nonrepresentationalism does not undermine metaphysics. I respond to a number of recent arguments, showing that neither global nor local forms of non-representationalism undermine metaphysics. I argue that non-representationalism is compatible with metaphysics, and that this is not a problem for the view.

Philosophers commonly distinguish between an experience’s intentional content—what the experience represents—and its phenomenal character—what the experience is like for the subject. Separatism—the view that the intentional content and phenomenal character of an experience are independent of one another in the sense that neither determines the other—was once widely held. In recent years, however, separatism has become increasingly marginalized; at present, most philosophers who work on the issue agree that there must be some kind of necessary connection between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. In contrast with the current consensus, I believe that a particular form of separatism remains the most plausible view of the relationship between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. Accordingly, in this thesis I explain and defend a view that I call “moderate separatism.” The view is “moderate” in that the separatist claim is restricted to a particular class of phenomenal properties: I do not maintain that all the phenomenal properties instantiated by an experience are independent of that experience’s intentional content but only that this is true of the sensory qualities instantiated by that experience. I argue for moderate separatism by appealing to examples of ordinary experiences where sensory qualities and intentional content come apart. First I argue that an experience’s intentional content does not determine the sensory qualities it instantiates by appealing to cases where two experiences share the same intentional content but instantiate different sensory qualities. Then I argue that the sensory qualities instantiated by an experience do not determine its intentional content by appealing to cases where two experiences that instantiate the same sensory qualities differ with regard to intentional content. I consider a number of alternatives to my account of the intentional content and phenomenal character of the experiences at issue and argue that none is plausible. If so, it follows that the intentional content and sensory qualities instantiated by an experience are independent of one another.

Philosophers commonly distinguish between an experience’s intentional content—what the experience represents—and its phenomenal character—what the experience is like for the subject. Separatism—the view that the intentional content and phenomenal character of an experience are independent of one another in the sense that neither determines the other—was once widely held. In recent years, however, separatism has become increasingly marginalized; at present, most philosophers who work on the issue agree that there must be some kind of necessary connection between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. In contrast with the current consensus, I believe that a particular form of separatism remains the most plausible view of the relationship between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. Accordingly, in this thesis I explain and defend a view that I call “moderate separatism.” The view is “moderate” in that the separatist claim is restricted to a particular class of phenomenal properties: I do not maintain that all the phenomenal properties instantiated by an experience are independent of that experience’s intentional content but only that this is true of the sensory qualities instantiated by that experience. I argue for moderate separatism by appealing to examples of ordinary experiences where sensory qualities and intentional content come apart. First I argue that an experience’s intentional content does not determine the sensory qualities it instantiates by appealing to cases where two experiences share the same intentional content but instantiate different sensory qualities. Then I argue that the sensory qualities instantiated by an experience do not determine its intentional content by appealing to cases where two experiences that instantiate the same sensory qualities differ with regard to intentional content. I consider a number of alternatives to my account of the intentional content and phenomenal character of the experiences at issue and argue that none is plausible. If so, it follows that the intentional content and sensory qualities instantiated by an experience are independent of one another.