Enactivism builds on the “embodied turn” in cognitive science to firmly establish the close connection between mind and life, exemplified in the work of Evan Thompson. The more recent “interactive turn” emphasizes that individuals’ mental and cognitive processes are shaped by social interactions with other cognitive agents. Regarding personal identity, Miriam Kyselo argues that it remains unclear how and to what extent the self is individuated by these processes, and whether or not social relations are necessary for self-persistence. Further, it remains unclear how the self of simple biological organisms is continuous with the much more complicated personal identity of human beings, who are subject not only to the forces of the natural world, but also to forces that arise only in their uniquely symbolic and sociocultural milieu. I contend that we can come to understand how evaluations dependent on the individual’s needs and desires, what Charles Taylor refers to as “weak evaluations,” are continuous with “strong evaluations,” whose validity are independent of the individual’s needs and desires, by recognizing that some organisms not only create value, but respond to values already present in their environment. The general notion of selfhood that results is one of axiological organization. I argue that what we are really referring to with the term “self” is the organization of evaluations that organisms make in regard to environmental affordances, a system which, over time, comes to take on definitive traits and characteristics. The self, regardless of the particular context in which it is situated, becomes individuated by the evaluations it makes, and is experienced as persistent because evaluative activity is an on-going process, ending only in death. The self is further experienced as persistent because these evaluations are made in accordance with a critical standard which itself rarely, and the overall axiological organization retains a high degree of stability. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA) / The aim of this thesis is to provide a conception of selfhood and personal identity capable of accounting for the both the “embodied turn” and the “interactive turn” in cognitive science. It seeks to explain the persistence and individuation of selves both biologically, as living systems, and socially, as members that participate in or distinguish themselves from social groups. The first chapter explores selfhood from the perspective of Evan Thompson’s work on the definition of living systems as self-producing and self-organizing. Chapter two introduces Charles Taylor’s work on the necessity of moral frameworks for personal identity, a view which initially appears difficult to reconcile with the approach outlined in the first chapter. The third chapter attempts to combine these approaches by demonstrating that selfhood is best conceived of as axiological organization – the way living beings evaluate and prioritize possible actions in their environment.

This thesis investigates the role of representations and intersubjectivity in explaining pretend play of young children. Its goal is to show that basic forms of pretending can be explained without recourse to mental representations. The thesis targets two aspects of pretence: imagining (underlying the ability to act as if), and guiding (underlying the ability to play in specific ways). It proposes an alternative account of pretence to cognitivist accounts that dominate in the literature. The alternative account is based on enactivism; it proposes to explain pretending through dynamic interactions of environmental affordances and animal effectivities in context. The thesis emphasises the role of social and environmental factors as well as cultural engagements in shaping the relevant context for pretence to occur. The thesis is an important contribution both to the literature on pretence as well as to philosophy of mind. While the topic of pretence is narrow, considering it through enactive lens involves considering some of the most debated issues, such as the applicability of mechanistic explanations to studying cognition.

Anticipation refers to preparation for upcoming events in the environment (Clark, 1998; Ondobaka & Bekkering, 2007; Allen & Friston, 2016). The ability to anticipate – as manifested in the preparatory actions and neural activation in expectation of an upcoming target stimulus – may play a key role in the development of cognitive skills. In the current study, cognitive skills are specified as the execution of stimulus-relevant, goal-directed actions (as indexed by reaction time) and individual differences in the ability to use goals to direct action (as indexed by executive function measures). A cross-sectional investigation was conducted in 40 adults and 40 6- to 8-year-old children to examine the association of neural correlates of anticipatory attention to visual, tactile and auditory stimuli with inter- and intra-individual variation in executive function (EF) abilities. Consistent with prior findings (Weiss, Meltzoff, & Marshall, 2018), the sensorimotor mu rhythm in the alpha range of the EEG signal was suppressed in the contralateral hemisphere during anticipation of tactile stimulation, with the extent of this suppression being related to children’s performance on EF tasks. Within-subject relations were also found between lateralized EEG modulation and single-trial reaction time responses to target stimuli. This relation was evident for visual and tactile stimuli (but not auditory stimuli) and was more prominent in adults than children. Further, these relations were responsible for significant variance in executive function scores using a multi-level model. Results indicated that inter-individual differences in anticipatory sensorimotor mu modulation (not visual alpha or auditory tau rhythms) contributed to the significant association with executive function variability. I discuss anticipatory EEG oscillations as an empirical, quantifiable indicator of stimulus prediction, advancing anticipation as a bridge concept embedded in neuroscientific, behavioral, computational and developmental science. / Psychology

Proponents of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) argue that the mind literally extends into the world because mental states literally extend into the world. But the arguments presented in favour of these claims are compatible with a much weaker conclusion, expressed as the Extended Machinery of Mind Thesis (EMMT) that secures only the extension of the enablers of mental states. What is required is a mark of the mental that can settle the constitutive versus enabling issue. Both sides of the debate accept non-derived content as a necessary condition on a state‘s being mental but this cannot settle the constitution versus enabling issue, meaning the debate has stagnated because there are no decisive moves left to make. Thus, the strongest move for the EM theorist to make is to reject non-derived content as the mark of the mental and seek an alternative. Because enactivism rejects the representational view of mind then if it can be made to work as an account of mentality it offers promise with regard to the formation of a new mark of the mental on which a genuinely interesting EMT can be based.

The 2007 revised mathematics curriculum in Ghana introduced many changes to the way mathematics should be taught and learned. However, before this research started in 2010, very little was known about how this subject is taught and learned. This study aims to investigate mathematics teachers’ teaching practices and students’ learning experiences in junior high schools (12-14 years) using a mixed methods design. The study’s conceptual framework is informed by two different, but interrelated theories: behaviourism and constructivism. Participants in the study were 24 mathematics teachers and 358 students from 12 schools. Semistructured questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data about participants’ perceptions, and classroom observations and interviews were used to collect qualitative data about actual classroom practices. The quantitative data was analysed using SPSS, STATSDIRECT and ORIGIN software and the qualitative data assessed using a thematic analysis approach. The key findings include: teachers and students espoused the belief that their teaching and learning practices are consistent with the principles and guidelines of the new mathematics curriculum. Teachers perceived teaching practices were complex as they contain both behaviourist and constructivist beliefs; however, their actual teaching practices were didactic. It also emerged that both teachers and students try to avoid making mistakes, despite the importance of correcting students’ misconceptions when promoting effective teaching and learning. The fact that peer influence is a key factor that shapes students’ learning was an important theme that emerged from the interview and the classroom observations. Students were only willing to participate in class discussions if they knew the correct answer, as they would be ridiculed by their peers for giving a wrong answer. The movement towards a more constructivist approach to teaching and learning, which is the prime objective of the new mathematics curriculum, occurred at a slower pace. Thus, a conceptual model for the teaching and learning of mathematics which advocates collaboration and partnership between teachers and students in the classroom is offered.

No description available.

Kognitivismen med rötter i analytisk filosofi och logik beskriver tänkande som symbolmanipulation efter logiska regler. Begrepp har sin mening genom att de refererar till objekt och händelser i världen. Embodied cognition (EC) eller kroppsbasserad kognition, med rötter i biologi, fenomenologi och pragmatism ser istället tänkande som ett emergent fenomen som uppstår ur erfarandet av kroppens aktivitet i världen. Begrepps mening har istället sin grund i det sensomotoriska systemet.  Abstrakta begrepp får sin mening via metaforer och metonymer. Likt konstruktivism ser EC lärande som modifiering av tidigare kunskap. Den skiljer sig dock från konstruktivism i avseende på dualism, hur kunskap finns organiserad och var begreppens mening finns. EC:s inflytande på didaktisk forskning inom naturvetenskap och matematik undersöktes genom sökning av artiklar där orden EC eller enactivism finns med. Resultatet visade ett klart större genomslag för EC inom matematikdidaktik med fler artiklar där teorin beskrivs utförligare. Inom naturvetenskapens didaktik har EC uppmärksammats i mycket mindre grad. Orsakerna till detta diskuteras.

Panpsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are basic phenomenal subjects, is motivated by a commitment to explaining human subjects of experience, as well as by a rejection of the possibility that phenomenal properties are arbitrarily necessitated – human subjects of experience are thought to only be possible if prefigured by more basic phenomenal subjecthood. In this paper I will consider autopoietic enactivism as an alternative to panpsychism when it comes to explaining human subjects of experience on the basis of subjective precursors. Both of the theories theorise possible subjective precursors but panpsychism (which will be referred to as panphenomenal monism) is mostly based on speculative, unobservable, fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Autopoietic enactivism does not require that there is fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Instead it describes emergent individuals with subjective behaviour at the biological level. This involves a form of bodily subjecthood that may be pre-phenomenal. If autopoietic enactivism involves describing phenomenal subjecthood as possible on the basis of bodily subjecthood, it is not describing an arbitrary but an intelligible necessitation, because phenomenal subjecthood, then, is understandable on the basis of some other subjecthood. However, that other subjecthood is not fundamental. Since autopoietic enactivism does not require fundamental phenomenal subjecthood it is compatible with the NFM (The No Fundamental Mentality Constraint) which means that it is seamlessly compatible with a form of physicalism that panpsychism is not compatible with. The fundamental question that panpsychists start out with is The Hard Problem of Consciousness, a version of the problem of experience that may contain an unnecessarily wide, or even insurmountable, gap between two types of mutually exclusive properties – phenomenal and physical properties. Autopoietic enactivism has a corresponding problem that is tied to a common denominator between phenomenal and physical properties, namely biological life. The enactivist's Body-Body Problem involves an explanatory gap between the living body and the lived body. Since the phenomenal and the physical are united in (at least some) biological life, life is a relevant starting point for investigation regarding the problem of consciousness. I will argue that autopoietic enactivism offers a way of understanding the intelligible necessitation of the known subjects of experience on the basis of emergent, and not necessarily fundamental, subjective precursors. Moreover, I will briefly show how autopoietic enactivism also is compatible with panprotopsychism, a view closely related to panpsychism. My argument in favor of autopoietic enactivism, and against the need for fundamental phenomenal subjecthood, may lead undecided pan(proto)psychists to choose panprotopsychism over panpsychism.

No description available.

The sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment. In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies perceptual consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to offer a new and improved account the logical and phenomenological character of perceptual experience, and the relation between physical and phenomenal states. Since its inception in a 2001 paper by O'Regan and Noë, the theory has prompted a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical work in cognitive science, as well as a large body of secondary literature in philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of perception. In spite of its influential character, many of the theory's most basic tenets are incompletely or ambiguously defined, and it has attracted a number of prominent objections. This thesis aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of the sensorimotor theory, including the key theoretical concepts of sensorimotor contingency, sensorimotor mastery, and presence-as-access, and defends a particular understanding of the respective theoretical roles of internal representation and behavioural capacities. In so doing, the thesis aims to highlight the sensorimotor theory's virtues and defend it from some leading criticisms, with particular attention to a response by Clark which claims that perception and perceptual experience plausibly depend on the activation of representations which are not intimately involved in bodily engagements between the agent and environment. A final part of the thesis offers a sensorimotor account of the experience of temporally extended events, and shows how with reference to this we can better understand object experience.