Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASCs) are marked by social-communicative difficulties and unusually fixed or repetitive interests, activities, and behaviors (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In this thesis, I review empirically and conceptually based philosophic proposals that maintain the social-communicative difficulties exhibited by persons on the autism spectrum result from a lack of capacity to understand other persons as minded. I will argue that the social-communicative difficulties that characterize ASCs may instead result from a lack of ability to access other minds, and that this lack of ability is due to a contingent lack of external resources.

The goal of the present study is to examine the enactive approaches of Susan Hurley and Alva Noë through the prism of Husserlian temporal constitution. In the first part we offer criticism to Hurley’s notion of ‘non-instrumental interdependence of perception and action’. Her grounding of this interdependence on the subpersonal level constitutional sensory input-motor output interdependence will be viewed as necessary but not sufficient for the first-personal level perception-action interdependence. That sufficiency can only be provided through an exposition of their constitutive interdependence at the first-personal level itself by a phenomenological analysis of perceptual and intentional acts. In the second part we examine Noë’s notion of the ‘virtuality’ of perceptual content. By interpreting his relevant concept of ‘free access’ according to the proposed motif of ‘expectation fulfillment’ we suggest that the problem of the virtuality of content should be interpreted as the problem of the constitution of the temporally enduring perceptual object. We shall work out this issue by appealing to the Husserlian account of perception. By a constructive reading of Husserl’s notions of ‘motivation’ and ‘kinesthesis’ we arrive at the ‘subjective temporal self-relating core’ of perceptual and motor acts. It is this functional temporal self-relatedness, described exclusively on the first-personal descriptive level, that finally offers us the sought after first-personal non-instrumental interdependence of perception and action. We finally suggest that augmented by this notion the sensorimotor approaches can have a better understanding of the neuroscientific explanandum and thus be better informed in their potential epistemological role. Some empirical literature is reviewed at the closure of the study in support of our case. / Στόχος της παρούσας εργασίας είναι η εξέταση των κιναισθητηριακών προσεγγίσεων της Σούζαν Χάρλεϋ και του Άλβα Νόε μέσα από το πρίσμα της χουσερλιανής χρονικής σύνθεσης. Στο πρώτο μέρος ασκούμε κριτική στην έννοια της ‘μη-εργαλειακής αλληλεξάρτησης αντίληψης-πράξης’, της Χάρλεϋ. Η θεμελίωση, εκ μέρους της συγγραφέως, της παραπάνω αλληλεξάρτησης στην συγκροτητική αλληλεξάρτηση αισθητηριακών εισόδων-κινητικών εξόδων του υποπροσωπικού επιπέδου περιγραφής θα χαρακτηριστεί ως αναγκαία αλλά όχι επαρκής για την αλληλεξάρτηση αντίληψης-πράξης στο πρώτο-προσωπικό επίπεδο. Η επάρκεια αυτή μπορεί να χορηγηθεί μόνο μέσα από την έκθεση της συγκροτητικής αλληλεξάρτησης τους στο ίδιο το πρώτο-προσωπικό επίπεδο, δια μίας φαινομενολογικής ανάλυσης των αντιληπτικών και προθεσιακών ενεργημάτων. Στο δεύτερο μέρος εξετάζουμε της έννοια της ‘δυνητικότητας’ του αντιληπτικού περιεχομένου, του Νόε. Ερμηνεύοντας της σχετική έννοια του της ‘ελεύθερης πρόσβασης’ με βάση το μοτίβο της ‘πλήρωσης προσδοκιών’ το οποίο εισάγουμε, προτείνουμε πως το πρόβλημα της δυνητικότητας των αντιληπτικών περιεχομένων θα πρέπει να κατανοηθεί ως πρόβλημα συγκρότησης του χρονικά διαρκούς αντιληπτικού αντικειμένου. Καταπιανόμαστε με αυτό το ζήτημα κάνοντας χρήση της χουσερλιανής άποψης περί αντίληψης. Μέσω μίας εποικοδομητικής ανάγνωσης των εννοιών της ‘κινητοποίησης’ (σχέσης-κινήτρων) και ‘κιναίσθησης’, του Χούσερλ, καταλήγουμε στον ‘υποκειμενικό πυρήνα χρονικού αυτοσχετισμού’ των αντιληπτικών και κινητικών ενεργημάτων. Είναι αυτός ο λειτουργικός χρονικός αυτοσχετισμός, η περιγραφή του οποίου γίνεται κατ’ αποκλειστικότητα στο πρώτο-προσωπικό επίπεδο, ο οποίος μας προσφέρει την ζητούμενη πρώτο-προσωπική μη-εργαλιακή αλληλεξάρτηση αντίληψης-πράξης. Καταλήγουμε προτείνοντας, ότι συνεπικουρούμενες από αυτή την έννοια οι κιναισθητηριακές προσεγγίσεις μπορούν να έχουν μία καλύτερη κατανόηση του νευροφυσιολογικού εξηγητέου και συνεπώς να δύναται να καταστούν πιο ενήμερες όσον αφορά τον πιθανό επιστημολογικό τους ρόλο. Η μελέτη κλείνει με μία ανασκόπηση μέρους της σχετικής εμπειρικής βιβλιογραφίας προς υποστήριξη των θέσεων μας.

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The theory-ladenness of perception thesis claims that the perception of different subjects might differ depending on prior knowledge, concepts and theories they hold. Oftentimes this thesis is associated with relativistic views, and therefore rejected. One of the strategies introduced to avoid the theory-ladenness of perception consists in affirming a strong version of the modularity of mind thesis, put forth by Fodor (1983). According to this thesis, some of the processing stages of perception would be performed by informationally encapsuled modules. This dissertation contains two independent papers, the first of which questions the empirical and theoretical plausibility of informational encapsulation of the perceptual modules. The second paper puts forth arguments for an enactivist view of the mind, in which the thesis of the theory-ladenness of perception is not thought to be problematic, but an essential element. This latter paper draws mainly on Noë (2004, 2009, 2012), and defends a version of the thesis of the theory-ladenness of perception grounded in the practice and the abilities of perceiving organisms in the physical environments in which they find themselves and with which they interact. / A tese da impregnação teórica da percepção afirma que a percepção de sujeitos diferentes pode diferir em função dos conhecimentos, conceitos e teorias prévias de que dispõem. Frequentemente, essa tese é associada a posições relativistas e, por isso, rejeitada. Uma das estratégias apresentadas para evitar a impregnação teórica da percepção consiste em afirmar uma versão forte da tese da modularidade da mente, proposta por Fodor (1983). De acordo com essa tese, alguns estágios do processamento perceptual seriam realizados em módulos informacionalmente encapsulados. Esta dissertação compreende dois artigos independentes, o primeiro dos quais questiona a plausibilidade empírica e teórica do encapsulamento informacional dos módulos perceptuais. O segundo artigo apresenta argumentos favoráveis a uma concepção enativista da mente, na qual a tese da impregnação teórica não é tida como problemática, mas como um componente essencial. Esse segundo artigo baseia-se principalmente nos trabalhos de Noë (2004, 2009, 2012), e defendemos uma versão da tese da impregnação teórica da percepção que tem como fundamento a prática e as habilidades dos organismos nos ambientes físicos nos quais se encontram e com os quais interagem.

In this dissertation, I criticize current approaches to moral cognition research and develop an embodied account of moral cognizing. Contemporary research into moral cognizing is strongly influenced by an orthodox cognitive mindset. Modern approaches to cognitive science, especially situated, i.e., embodied-enacted, approaches emphasize the role of affectivity, emotions, bodily experiences, sociality, culture, interpersonal relationship, and dynamic interactions in human cognizing. However, these non-orthodox approaches have only occasionally been applied to the study of the moral mind. The embodied account defended analyzes moral actions in terms of an agent's engagement with the world. Agents acquire a repertoire of possible interactions with the world rooted in their sensorimotor expertise. This embodied view of moral action focuses on the role culture, sociality, and interpersonal relations play in contextualizing actions and constituting an agent's identity. Enactive theory provides a broader cognitive framework to understand embodied action and moral identity, overcoming the dominant logic of doing and being done to, opening up moral agency to a sphere of joint action.

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[pt] A partir do Enativismo, perspectiva filosófica emergente no campo das ciências da mente, este trabalho investigou a dimensão cognitiva pertinente à Educação Ambiental (EA) no Brasil. Para tanto, foi desenvolvida uma leitura analítica e crítica do livro Mind in Life, de Evan Thompson, e posterior articulação de conceitos com o objetivo de questionar as premissas em cognição predominantes na EA no Brasil. Para tal, fiz um recorte de autoras brasileiras que discutem cognição em EA, destacando seus principais argumentos, e busquei explicitar os conceitos do Enativismo que julguei mais relevantes para o diálogo. Fiz uma sobreposição entre as autoras brasileiras e Thompson, indicando aproximações e afastamentos. Saliento que, investigando sobre cognição, encontrei as dicotomias humano/natureza, cultura/natureza e cognição/emoção apontadas como algo a ser revisto e superado em EA bem como o Antropocentrismo. Encontrei no Enativismo um arcabouço teórico denso e satisfatório para superar tais obstáculos. Como parte final, encontrei em Ailton Krenak, filósofo e indígena, uma fala que aponta na mesma direção. Buscando aplicar as descobertas em algo mais concreto, fiz uma releitura dos princípios orientadores em EA no Brasil. / [en] Based on the Enactive approach, an emergent philosophical perspective in the field of sciences of the mind, this work investigated the cognitive dimension pertinent to Environmental Education (EE) in Brazil. To this end, an analytical and critical reading of the book Mind in Life, by Evan Thompson, was undertaken and, subsequently, concepts were articulated in order to question the cognitive assumptions prevalent in EE in Brazil. In this regard, I selected Brazilian authors who discuss cognition in EE, highlighting their main arguments, aiming to explain the concepts of Enactivism that I found most relevant to the dialogue. I developed an analysis of the overlap between the Brazilian authors and Thompson, indicating approximations and differences. I found that, investigating cognition, the dichotomies human / nature, culture / nature and cognition / emotion, as well as Anthropocentrism, need to be reviewed and overcome in EE. I found in Enactivism a dense and satisfactory theoretical framework for overcoming such obstacles. Finally, I found in Ailton Krenak, philosopher and indigenous writer, a point of view that points in the same direction. Seeking to apply the findings to something more concrete, I reinterpreted the guiding principles in EE in Brazil.

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