Är upplevelsen av musik meningsfull och på vilket sätt är det möjligt för ett musikstycke att gestalta en yttre värld? I denna uppsats undersöker jag lite kort vad inom musiken skulle kunna förstås som en mening. Genom att se till olika förhållanden av meningsfullhet och musikalisk upplevelse går det att förstå dess breda förklaringssvårigheter. Meningen ter sig subjektiv men kan också bidra till en kollektiv samstämmighet om ett musikstyckes meningsfullhet. Upplevelsen av musik i sin tur kan hjälpa en kompositör eller artist att gestalta en omvärld för sig själv. Denna gestaltning bebor inte musiken på liknande sätt som en manual beskriver ett tillvägagångssätt utan med hjälp av medlet musik kan artisten uttrycka något som en vokabulär inte möjligtvis är kapabelt till. Med kroppen som länk mellan den yttre världen och subjektets vilja används vanan av att bruka ett instrument som en förlängning för kroppen. Att utgå från kroppen som en medvetandehorisont är något som är nära besläktat till Merleau-Pontys existentiella fenomenologi i Phenomenology of Percetion och utgör en bra grund för denna uppsats. Även om jag inte kommer fram till ett svar ifall musik besitter en mening så har upplevelsen av musik utforskats genom olika musikaliska verk och hur musikalisk gestaltning kan användas för varseblivning. / Is the experience of music meaningful and in which way is it possible for a musical arrangement to depict an external world? This essay will firstly examine what meaning within music might refer to. Though there are difficulties to pinpoint an exact definition of meaning in regard to several different experiences of music it seems to originate from the subject itself. Even so, music can possess a collective acceptance within their respective social groups. The experience of music can help a composer to portray a surrounding, not by the virtue of musical characteristics, but by mediating the will of the composer. Unlike a manual which is guiding the reader to take certain steps the composer can express what a vocabulary is lacking by the habit and familiarity of ones instrument as an extension of the performers body to link an external world. This is very much related to the existential phenomenology put forward by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception and on which I base my arguments on. Even though I might not find a meaning within music I have examined the possibility for experiencing music as a way of portraying the surrounding world.

Trata-se da análise de três leituras do corpo fenomenal que se desenrolam nas duas primeiras partes da Fenomenologia da Percepção, tomando como fio condutor a motricidade, a sensibilidade e o desejo enquanto manifestações da atividade no corpo no mundo. Na primeira parte da Fenomenologia da Percepção, Merleau-Ponty descreve a faculdade motriz do corpo, que desemboca na atividade expressiva; na segunda, a sensibilidade surge como iniciação e contato com o mundo. Já a leitura através do desejo, localizada nos caps. V da primeira parte e IV da segunda, conecta as duas precedentes e as unifica sob o tema da liberdade. Para tanto, a pesquisa trabalhará com a reconstituição dos conceitos de comportamento, percepção, campo fenomenal e da relação sujeito-mundo presentes nas primeiras obras de Merleau-Ponty. / This is the analysis of three readings of the phenomenal body that take place in the first two parts of the Phenomenology of Perception, taking as a guide the motility, sensibility and desire as manifestations of bodys activity in the world. In the first part of the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes the motor power of the body, which flows in expressive activity ; in the second, the sensibility arises as initiation and contact with the world . Already the reading through desire, located in chapters V of the first part and IV of the seconds, connects the two preceding and unifies them under the theme of freedom. To this end, the research work with the reconstitution of the concepts of behavior, perception, phenomenal field and subject- world relationship present in early works of Merleau -Ponty .

In the history of sartorial reflection, the usual offerings for human motivations to dress are: protection (i.e. from the elements), modesty, decoration, and socio-political self-expression. The literature on clothing rarely attends, however, to the question of garments' impact on wearers' self-experience. There is some social science research, for example, suggesting that when we wear clothing we associate with individuals who have a high degree of mental focus and attention to detail, it causes us - probably, in most cases, pre-reflectively - to experience ourselves as such and therefore to perform better on tests that measure these qualities. Apart from this research, exploration into the matter, regardless of field, is scant, but it is especially thin in philosophy and theology. This thesis seeks to address the shortfall in these fields by providing at least one model of the human relationship to clothes that, unlike what is currently on offer, accounts for findings like the above. To do so, it draws on the sartorial reflection of the British artist and essayist Eric Gill, who understands clothes as architectural spaces of sorts, as encasements that house our being, and the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, whose philosophy of being and 'thinking about building' can do similar work less explicitly but more robustly. After outlining this new way of looking at humanity's relationship to clothes, the thesis will conclude by discussing some theological implications. In particular, it discusses how the overlap between Gill's sacramental perspective and Heidegger's similar understanding of an inherently meaning-infused 'world' can yield an account of clothes as facilitators (or hinderers) of the attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God through their potential to bear theological resonances.

Trata-se da análise de três leituras do corpo fenomenal que se desenrolam nas duas primeiras partes da Fenomenologia da Percepção, tomando como fio condutor a motricidade, a sensibilidade e o desejo enquanto manifestações da atividade no corpo no mundo. Na primeira parte da Fenomenologia da Percepção, Merleau-Ponty descreve a faculdade motriz do corpo, que desemboca na atividade expressiva; na segunda, a sensibilidade surge como iniciação e contato com o mundo. Já a leitura através do desejo, localizada nos caps. V da primeira parte e IV da segunda, conecta as duas precedentes e as unifica sob o tema da liberdade. Para tanto, a pesquisa trabalhará com a reconstituição dos conceitos de comportamento, percepção, campo fenomenal e da relação sujeito-mundo presentes nas primeiras obras de Merleau-Ponty. / This is the analysis of three readings of the phenomenal body that take place in the first two parts of the Phenomenology of Perception, taking as a guide the motility, sensibility and desire as manifestations of bodys activity in the world. In the first part of the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes the motor power of the body, which flows in expressive activity ; in the second, the sensibility arises as initiation and contact with the world . Already the reading through desire, located in chapters V of the first part and IV of the seconds, connects the two preceding and unifies them under the theme of freedom. To this end, the research work with the reconstitution of the concepts of behavior, perception, phenomenal field and subject- world relationship present in early works of Merleau -Ponty .

This thesis will explore three related concerns. First (Chapter 1), I discern some of the basic philosophical strategies at work in the Phenomenology of Perception. I will specifically discuss the teleological/ archaeological structure of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and his notion of "primordial unity". Second (Chapter 2), I will show how these strategies are manifest in his discussion of the other. And third (Chapter 3), I will consider some of the consequences of Merleau-Ponty's treatment of the other. In particular, I will examine his understanding of difference and plurality. A comparison with Hegel's master/slave dialectic will highlight some possible limitations of Merleau-Ponty's argument. In short, I will answer the following questions: How is the other known, according to Merleau-Ponty, and just how other is this other? / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Esta pesquisa investiga a percepção espacial que pessoas com deficiência visual têm da paisagem urbana. Compreende igualmente a sociabilidade das pessoas cegas com outros cidadãos, trazendo as questões do afeto, do conflito, do estranhamento, do estigma e do preconceito. Procura identificar os mecanismos subjetivos e emocionais de valoração do espaço que surgem durante os percursos, sem esquecer as condições físicas em que eles são feitos. Busca no reconhecimento de suas memórias os valores e a afeição pela paisagem. Entendendo que a paisagem é patrimônio coletivo e de partilha, pessoas cegas reclamam um tratamento igual de cidadãos e o acesso a ela, de maneira plena e independente. Pessoas com deficiência visual querem ser ouvidas e percebidas na cidade pelos seus talentos e capacidades, enquanto que a população insiste em reconhecê-las e rotulá-las apenas pelo que lhes falta. / This work researches the spatial perception that visual impaired persons have of the urban landscape. It also covers the social interactions of blind people with other citizens, discussing aspects of sympathy, conflicts, stigma, and prejudice. Furthermore, it seeks to identify the emotional - and subjective - mechanisms of evaluating the space that arise through the pathways, not disregarding its physical attributions. In addition it looks for the remembrance of values and affection towards the landscape. Based on the understanding that the urban landscape is a public and shared heritage, the visual impaired person claim equal treatment of citizens and independent access to it. People with visual impairment want to be heard and accepted for their talent and potential, while the population insists in recognizing and labeling them only for their disability.

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Esta pesquisa investiga a percepção espacial que pessoas com deficiência visual têm da paisagem urbana. Compreende igualmente a sociabilidade das pessoas cegas com outros cidadãos, trazendo as questões do afeto, do conflito, do estranhamento, do estigma e do preconceito. Procura identificar os mecanismos subjetivos e emocionais de valoração do espaço que surgem durante os percursos, sem esquecer as condições físicas em que eles são feitos. Busca no reconhecimento de suas memórias os valores e a afeição pela paisagem. Entendendo que a paisagem é patrimônio coletivo e de partilha, pessoas cegas reclamam um tratamento igual de cidadãos e o acesso a ela, de maneira plena e independente. Pessoas com deficiência visual querem ser ouvidas e percebidas na cidade pelos seus talentos e capacidades, enquanto que a população insiste em reconhecê-las e rotulá-las apenas pelo que lhes falta. / This work researches the spatial perception that visual impaired persons have of the urban landscape. It also covers the social interactions of blind people with other citizens, discussing aspects of sympathy, conflicts, stigma, and prejudice. Furthermore, it seeks to identify the emotional - and subjective - mechanisms of evaluating the space that arise through the pathways, not disregarding its physical attributions. In addition it looks for the remembrance of values and affection towards the landscape. Based on the understanding that the urban landscape is a public and shared heritage, the visual impaired person claim equal treatment of citizens and independent access to it. People with visual impairment want to be heard and accepted for their talent and potential, while the population insists in recognizing and labeling them only for their disability.

La notion d’« abstraction perceptuelle (perceptual abstraction) » apparaît dans le domaine de la psychologie cognitive avant d’être associée à l’art optique et cinétique dans les pages du catalogue de l’exposition « The Responsive Eye » au Museum of Modern Art en 1965. Ce lien tissé entre abstraction et phénoménologie de la perception, bien qu’il ait connu une résonance historiographique modeste, traduit avec justesse certains enjeux et complète les catégories du mouvement et de l’effet, sur lesquelles le débat et la réflexion se sont le plus souvent orientés. À partir de ce cadre initial des années 1950 et 1960 est établi un second cadre, plus vaste, allant des avant-gardes historiques à nos jours, d’un « art perceptuel ». Au sein de ce corpus transhistorique sont rassemblées des oeuvres caractérisées par leur oscillation constante entre surface et volume, fait et effet, matière et vibration. Le phénomène de palpitation et de dissolution, qui se substitue à la composition et à la polychromie, rend impossible la saisie d’oeuvres tantôt incandescentes, tantôt évanescentes. Dans cette exploration constante des seuils du visible, la perception est traitée comme un médium à part entière. À travers oeuvres et textes, cette étude entend mettre en avant les résonances thématiques entre les époques et les courants afin, précisément, d’établir un panorama, le plus large possible, des pratiques relevant de ce que Jean Clay présenta comme « une prise de conscience de l’instabilité du réel ». / The term “perceptual abstraction” appears within the field of cognitive psychology before being associated, in the catalogue of the exhibition "The Responsive Eye" at the MoMA in New York in 1965, with Optical Art and Kinetic Art, two parallel trends around which debate and reception were focused for about a decade. At the same time, this link between abstraction et perception, despite the modest resonance of its term, is relevant for understanding these kinds of artistic practices with the potential of covering a wider historical and aesthetic field. Beyond this narrow chronological frame of the 1950s and 1960s, this concept describes a type of Perceptual Art that is based on an oscillation between fact and effect, matter and flux, surface and volume—an art in which composition and polychromy give way to vibration and dissolution, from the historical avant-gardes until today. Through an analysis of diverse artworks and texts, this study approaches perception beyond the commonly used categories of mechanical movement and optical effect. Considered as a medium in itself by some artists, perception is driven to its limits and the spectator’s capacity to grasp form and space is questioned. Thematic echoes between periods and trends are highlighted, precisely in order to define the field as broadly as possible—to reflect on what Jean Clay aptly described as “an awareness of the instability of the real.”