Psychedelics can enable a broad and paradoxical spectrum of linguistic phenomena from the unspeakability of mystical experience to the eloquence of the songs of the shaman or curandera. Interior dialogues with the Other, whether framed as the voice of the Logos, an alien download, or communion with ancestors and spirits, are relatively common. Sentient visual languages are encountered, their forms unrelated to the representation of speech in natural language writing systems. This thesis constructs a theoretical model of linguistic phenomena encountered in the psychedelic sphere for the field of altered states of consciousness research (ASCR). The model is developed from a neurophenomenological perspective, especially the work of Francisco Varela, and Michael Winkelman’s work in shamanistic ASC, which in turn builds on the biogenetic structuralism of Charles Laughlin, John McManus, and Eugene d’Aquili. Neurophenomenology relates the physical and functional organization of the brain to the subjective reports of lived experience in altered states as mutually informative, without reducing consciousness to one or the other. Consciousness is seen as a dynamic multistate process of the recursive interaction of biology and culture, thereby navigating the traditional dichotomies of objective/subjective, body/mind, and inner/outer realities that problematically characterize much of the discourse in consciousness studies. The theoretical work of Renaissance scholar Stephen Farmer on the evolution of syncretic and correlative systems and their relation to neurobiological structures provides a further framework for the exegesis of the descriptions of linguistic phenomena in first-person texts of long-term psychedelic selfexploration. Since the classification of most psychedelics as Schedule I drugs, legal research came to a halt; self-experimentation as research did not. Scientists such as Timothy Leary and John Lilly became outlaw scientists, a social aspect of the “unspeakability” of these experiences. Academic ASCR has largely side-stepped examination of the extensive literature of psychedelic selfexploration. This thesis examines aspects of both form and content from these works, focusing on those that treat linguistic phenomena, and asking what these linguistic experiences can tell us about how the psychedelic landscape is constructed, how it can be navigated, interpreted, and communicated within its own experiential field, and communicated about to make the data accessible to inter-subjective comparison and validation. The methodological core of this practice-based research is a technoetic practice as defined by artist and theoretician Roy Ascott: the exploration of consciousness through interactive, artistic, and psychoactive technologies. The iterative process of psychedelic self-exploration and creation of interactive software defines my own technoetic practice and is the means by which I examine my states of consciousness employing the multidimensional visual language Glide.

The present study explores the nature and structure of spiritual and aesthetic experiences through the interdisciplinary application of neurophenomenology (NP). This approach merges aspects of psychology, neurophysiology, and phenomenology into a unified methodology. The study is nested within a larger project, Space, Science, and Spirituality, and as such, it carries a common goal to use simulation to evoke spiritual and aesthetic responses similar to those expressed by astronauts and cosmonauts. Careful analysis of previous work in NP provided methodological “lessons learned”, which guided the experimental design, execution, and analysis of the present study. The data collected provides support for experience as a phenomenon that can be studied through empirical means. Further, the articulation of spiritual and aesthetic experiences akin to astronaut experiences corresponds to specific neurological and psychological indicators. Among those indicators are differences in EEG measures during simulation time relative to expressions of spiritual experience following the simulation and changes in visual processing across theta, alpha, and beta signals as correlated with self-identification. These findings support an embodied theory of experience that incorporates memory, executive function, perception, and consciousness. In addition to its academic contribution, this research holds implications for commercial space flight, long-term space missions, post-traumatic stress disorder therapies, and the entertainment industry

In both form and content, Wim Wenders's films create a cinema of wandering, tracing a route of intersections between the modern and postmodern visual landscape. The space of the world, its deserted horizons and populated streets, are a kind of visual architecture through which the mobile vision of the film wanders, just as Wenders's peripatetic characters wander through space and time towards encounters with others. This wandering invites a phenomenological understanding of embodied spectator experience and perception, for as much as Wenders's films are about the representative image, they are also about the dynamic relationship of the embodied spectator to the visible world. A first avenue of inquiry leads through the deserts and cities that shape the visual terrain of Wenders's cinema. These locations are always sites (places) and sights (images) of recuperation that offer critique, analysis, and resistance to the hyperreal and the reductive visual practices of postmodernity. A second route follows the journeys of both Wenders's characters and films. The insistence in existential phenomenology that meaning and intentionality inhere in the body's motility provides a starting point for elucidating the relationship of cinematic technology to embodied vision. The film and the spectator share a way of being in the world, and the wandering vision and audition that shape the journeys of Wenders's films are always expressions of the modern experience of space and time. Finally, this dissertation undertakes a third course, applying naturalized phenomenology to a reading of the encounters of Wenders's wandering subjects. This methodology allows for a clearer understanding of the socially mediated subject, and of the relationship of spectator to film. The dynamic mirroring that constitutes cinematic experience as it occurs neurologically and phenomenologically shapes cinematic encounters. Film is a mirror, but more significantly, the spectator is a mirror. For the spectator, as for Wenders's characters, wandering is a way of engaging the contingencies of the other and confronting the truths and lies behind cinematic illusion. / English

Le travail présenté dans cette thèse vise à nous amener à une meilleure compréhension des relations fines entre ce que nous expérimentons phénoménologiquement sous la forme d'états mentaux, et les effets sous-jacents et potentiellement causaux sur l'activité neuronale. Afin d'étendre notre compréhension scientifique de l'expérience consciente, nous avons d'abord mis l'accent sur un phénomène appelé la pensée spontanée ou vagabondage de l'esprit. Notre paysage intérieur est un aspect essentiel et complexe de notre expérience humaine, avec des recherches suggérant que les gens sont engagés dans une forme de dialogue intérieur sans rapport avec leur environnement immédiat 50% de leur temps de veille. De plus, le vagabondage de l'esprit a constamment été associé à un affect négatif, même lorsque son contenu est positif. Il est alors intéressant de noter que les fondements de la plupart des pratiques méditatives et contemplatives sont la formation de l'observation flexible et continue des états mentaux et de l'expérience sensorielle, le développement d'une attention soutenue et la culture de la conscience métacognitive. Étant donné que nous ne sommes généralement pas au courant de la fluctuation temporelle de ces états mentaux dans le temps (vagabondage de l'esprit), les méditants sont des sujets idéaux pour obtenir de manière précise des rapports phénoménologiques et des descriptions des états à la première personne. Ainsi, nous avons conçu un paradigme nouveau basé sur présentation de sondage d'expérience aux méditants afin de mieux comprendre les mesures dynamiques de l'EEG (Electroencéphalographie) pendant la méditation. Nos résultats suggèrent que la pratique experte de méditation est associée à une fréquence atténuée de la pensée spontanée et que l'entraînement à la méditation réduit par la suite la susceptibilité de l'esprit à errer, menant à des périodes d'absorption méditative rapportées comme étant plus longues. Les augmentations de l'activité thêta (4-7 Hz) sur les régions thêta frontales médianes ainsi que l'activité alpha (9-12 Hz), principalement focalisée sur le cortex somatosensoriel, semblent être des marqueurs d'états méditatifs soutenus par rapport au vagabondage mental. Sur la base de la robustesse de l'activité thêta de la ligne médiane frontale chez les méditants avancés, ainsi qu'une multitude de résultats démontrant que l'activité thêta frontale serait le pilier du contrôle cognitif via l'intégration et l'échange d'informations de longue portée, nous avons développé un protocole de neurofeedback méthodologiquement nouveau et exhaustif dans le but d'entraîner l'activité thêta (3.5-6.5 Hz) de la ligne médiane frontale Fz, en donnant comme instruction à nos sujets de s'engager dans des techniques de respiration et de relaxation similaires à la méditation. Nous avons constaté que les sujets qui ont reçu le vrai neurofeedback ont été capables de moduler significativement leur activité thêta Fz (3-7 Hz) à travers huit séances de neurofeedback par rapport aux sujets contrôles qui ont reçu un feedback apparié. Nous avons également observé des modulations significatives dans les bandes de fréquences alpha (9-11 Hz) et bêta (13-20 Hz) chez les sujets qui ont reçu l'entraînement réel de neurofeedback, ainsi que des améliorations sur plusieurs mesures des fonctions exécutives. Nos résultats réduisent davantage l'écart explicatif en reliant caractéristique neurophysiologique et données à la nature phénoménologique de notre experience. / The work presented in this thesis aims to extend our scientific understanding of the subtle relationships between our phenomenological experience of specific states of consciousness, and the corresponding and potentially causal effects on neural activity. In our first experiment, we focused on a phenomenon referred to as spontaneous thought or mind wandering. Our vastly complex inner landscape is an essential aspect of our conscious experience, with research suggesting that people are engaged in some form of inner dialogue unrelated to their surroundings 50% of waking hours. These ongoing trains of thought have been consistently linked to reports of negative affect, even when the specific content is positive. Interestingly, the cornerstones of most meditation and contemplative practices are; a) training the continuous and flexible monitoring of mind wandering and sensory experience, b) the cultivation of sustained attention, and c) enhanced metacognitive awareness. Given that we are generally unaware of mind wandering when it occurs, meditation practitioners may provide more accurate first person phenomenological reports and descriptions of these temporally fluctuating states given their respective training. Thus, we designed a novel paradigm based on experience sampling probe presentations to gain insight into the dynamic measures of mental activity and EEG during meditation. Our findings suggest that meditation expertise is associated with an attenuated frequency of mind wandering, and that meditation training reduces the susceptibility of the mind to wander subsequently leading to longer periods of reported meditative absorption. Increases in theta activity (4-7 Hz) over frontal midline regions of the cortex, and alpha activity (9-12 Hz) primarily focused over the somatosensory cortex, appear to be markers of sustained meditative states when compared to mind wandering. Based on the robustness of the frontal midline theta in advanced meditators, alongside a multitude of findings demonstrating that frontal theta may serve as the backbone for cognitive control via long range information integration in neural networks throughout the brain, we then developed a methodologically novel and exhaustive neurofeedback protocol with the aim of training frontal midline theta (3.5-6.5 Hz at electrode site Fz) by means of instructing our subjects to engage in focused breathing and other techniques similar to meditation. After eight training sessions, we found that subjects who received real neurofeedback were able to significantly modulate and increase theta activity (3-7 Hz) over frontal regions, whereas subject's receiving age and gender matched sham (pseudo) feedback were not. We additionally observed significant modulations in both the alpha (9-11 Hz) and beta bands (13-20 Hz) in subjects who received real neurofeedback training. Together, these findings provide evidence that we can successfully connect neurophysiological features and data to the phenomenological nature of our subjective experience.

The present paper critically examines the epistemic status of first-person accounts and first-person methods in Francisco Varela’s research program neurophenomenology, which integrates a phenomenological perspective in cognitive science. The paper also questions Varela’s description of neurophenomenology as an ontological recategorization of nature and a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

The Bonny Method of Guided Imagery and Music (GIM) is an individual form of music psychotherapy known for facilitating profound and embodied music and imagery experiences. GIM theorists have argued that the use of music and imagery can facilitate a mind-body interaction, leading to powerful experiences that affect all facets of a person's being. But this interaction has not been directly examined in GIM, despite the need to understand its nature and risks. This gap in research is due to the inherent limitations of the two major paradigms used in this field: quantitative research cannot account for unique individual responses to phenomena, while qualitative research is not predictive in the same way as quantitative, positivistic research. This study used a new research approach, neurophenomenology, in order to link participants' descriptions of qualitative music and imagery experiences with electroencephalographic (EEG) data, providing context for the brain data while also illuminating the neurological effect of imagery experiences. The music and imagery session used a guided imagery script which focused on six different kinds of imagery experiences (Affect, Body, Interaction, Kinesthetic, Memories, Visual) and was pre-recorded over two different classical musical pieces selected from the GIM literature. Four participants each underwent individual music and imagery sessions using the pre-recorded script and music while having simultaneous EEG data collected. Afterward, participants viewed a video of their sessions with the researcher and described their imagery experiences during a phenomenological interview. The contents of the transcribed interviews were coded into phenomenological categories concerning the congruence of image with guiding cue, imagery modality, stability of imagery, awareness of guiding and music, and awareness of altered state of consciousness (ASC). Meanwhile, consultants performed coherence analyses on the EEG data, examining relationships between major regions of the brain according to both guiding condition and frequency ranges of brain waves. The researcher integrated the phenomenological and EEG data for each participant, and then across cases to determine patterns of subjective experience and brain response. Each participant demonstrated distinctive styles of reported imagery experience with brain responses, ranging from minimal emotional involvement with alertness, to drowsy, disjointed body sensory imagery, to drowsy, disconnected emotional imagery, to a deeper exploration of consciousness with a consistent ASC. Cross-case comparisons of the integrated data showed that 1) the ASC involves both physical relaxation and ongoing focus on the imagery experience; 2) imagery generates brain activity in the same regions that would process information from similar real-life experiences; 3) beta and gamma frequencies played a significant role in how participants maintained an ASC and made meaning out of the imagery. Implications of these and other conclusions from the separate examination of EEG and phenomenological data are discussed. / Music Therapy

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

This dissertation models the relationship between symptoms of heart rhythm fluctuations and cardiac measurements in order to better identify the probabilities of either a primarily organic or psychosomatic cause, and to better understand cognition of the internal body. The medical system needs to distinguish patients with actual cardiac problems from those who are misperceiving benign heart rhythms due to psychosomatic conditions. Cognitive neuroscience needs models showing how the brain processes sensations of palpitations. Psychologists and philosophers want data and analyses that address longstanding controversies about the validity of introspective methods. I therefore undertake a series of measurements to model how well patient descriptions of heartbeat fluctuations correspond to cardiac arrhythmias. First, I employ a formula for Bayesian inference and an initial probability for disease. The presence of particular phrases in symptom reports is shown to modify the probability that a patient has a clinically significant heart rhythm disorder. A second measure of body knowledge accuracy uses a corpus of one hundred symptom reports to estimate the positive predictive value for arrhythmias contained in language about palpitations. This produces a metric representing average predictivity for cardiac arrhythmias in a population. A third effort investigates the percentage of patients with palpitations report actually diagnosed with arrhythmias by examining data from a series of studies. The major finding suggests that phenomenological reports about heartbeats are as or are more predictive of clinically significant arrhythmias than non-introspection-based data sources. This calculation can help clinicians who must diagnose an organic or psychosomatic etiology. Secondly, examining a corpus of reports for how well they predict the presence of cardiac rhythm disorders yielded a mean positive predictive value of 0.491. Thirdly, I reviewed studies of palpitations reporters, half of which showed between 15% and 26% of patients had significant or serious arrhythmias. In addition, evidence is presented that psychosomatic-based palpitation reports are likely due to cognitive filtering and processing of cardiac afferents by brainstem, thalamic, and cortical neurons. A framework is proposed to model these results, integrating neurophysiological, cognitive, and clinical levels of explanation. Strategies for developing therapies for patients suffering from identifiably psychosomatic-based palpitations are outlined. / text

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Bc. Rostislav Ježek Diploma thesis - Husserl and neurofenomenology: Epoché, interview, practice Abstract The theme of this work is conception of practical usage of epoché in phenomenology, where epoché is carried out by philosopher in his lone meditation, and in the project of neurophenomenology, where epoché is to be found in the situation of interview. The aim of this work is, on the base of reflexion of the general practical framework of epoché, to put a question of the nature of epoché in phenomenology and of possibilities of its usage in neurophenomenology. These question will be anwered during the elaboration of progressive carrying out of epoché of experience of the one, who carries it out. We will see its natural affinity with the common attitude and with neurophenomenological epoché, which otherwise may seem naiv. Then, we will try to show, that Husserl's late theory of transcendental idealismus may be grasped as a conception of the influence, which the epoché exerts upon the experience of the one, who carries it out. At the end, we will try to show, that neurophenomenological research and research of neurophenomenology give phenomenology an oportunity to think deeper about its own methods. We will show, that the conception of dependence of the situation of the practical carrying out of epoché can...