This dissertation examines representations of authorship and subjecthood in the Romantic period as products of market position and publishing mode. In doing so, it views the traditional concept of Romantic individualism commonly associated with the solitary poet as a strategy developed to help the author navigate a complex writer’s market. Rather than focusing upon individualism as the defining authorial model for this period, however, my project presents it as one example of a diverse range of representational strategies employed by different authors operating from different positions within the market. To this end, this study compares the authorial model of the independent poet with authors engaged in a variety of other modes of publishing, including hack essayists, serialized poets, periodical editors, and celebrity authors. By examining authors operating across different publishing modes, I demonstrate that each one’s concept of public identity is shaped principally by his or her particular market position, as defined by working relationships with peers, involvement in the particulars of publishing, exchanges with the critical press, and engagement with readers. These authors include William Wordsworth, Lord Byron, Letitia Elizabeth Landon, Charles Lamb, and Francis Jeffrey. By juxtaposing their different models of authorship, this study seeks to bridge the longstanding discourse regarding the social isolation of the Romantic poet with more contemporary streams of scholarship into the material realities of the nineteenth-century publishing industry. Drawing upon the social philosophy of the Frankfurt School and Eric Gans’ theory of Generative Anthropology, I examine how different strategies of representation were developed to preserve personal meaning and sustain public attention. By comparing responses to the rise of the writer’s market and the ubiquity of print culture, this dissertation argues that Romantic period authors demonstrate a distinctly modern understanding of public identity as a product of mediation in mass media culture.

Panpsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are basic phenomenal subjects, is motivated by a commitment to explaining human subjects of experience, as well as by a rejection of the possibility that phenomenal properties are arbitrarily necessitated – human subjects of experience are thought to only be possible if prefigured by more basic phenomenal subjecthood. In this paper I will consider autopoietic enactivism as an alternative to panpsychism when it comes to explaining human subjects of experience on the basis of subjective precursors. Both of the theories theorise possible subjective precursors but panpsychism (which will be referred to as panphenomenal monism) is mostly based on speculative, unobservable, fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Autopoietic enactivism does not require that there is fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Instead it describes emergent individuals with subjective behaviour at the biological level. This involves a form of bodily subjecthood that may be pre-phenomenal. If autopoietic enactivism involves describing phenomenal subjecthood as possible on the basis of bodily subjecthood, it is not describing an arbitrary but an intelligible necessitation, because phenomenal subjecthood, then, is understandable on the basis of some other subjecthood. However, that other subjecthood is not fundamental. Since autopoietic enactivism does not require fundamental phenomenal subjecthood it is compatible with the NFM (The No Fundamental Mentality Constraint) which means that it is seamlessly compatible with a form of physicalism that panpsychism is not compatible with. The fundamental question that panpsychists start out with is The Hard Problem of Consciousness, a version of the problem of experience that may contain an unnecessarily wide, or even insurmountable, gap between two types of mutually exclusive properties – phenomenal and physical properties. Autopoietic enactivism has a corresponding problem that is tied to a common denominator between phenomenal and physical properties, namely biological life. The enactivist's Body-Body Problem involves an explanatory gap between the living body and the lived body. Since the phenomenal and the physical are united in (at least some) biological life, life is a relevant starting point for investigation regarding the problem of consciousness. I will argue that autopoietic enactivism offers a way of understanding the intelligible necessitation of the known subjects of experience on the basis of emergent, and not necessarily fundamental, subjective precursors. Moreover, I will briefly show how autopoietic enactivism also is compatible with panprotopsychism, a view closely related to panpsychism. My argument in favor of autopoietic enactivism, and against the need for fundamental phenomenal subjecthood, may lead undecided pan(proto)psychists to choose panprotopsychism over panpsychism.

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Although the efforts of multiple scholars contribute to a growing sociological conception of ADHD, I seek to fill a gap in the literature on ADHD by scrutinizing the various meanings that society attaches to the diagnostic construct of ADHD and commencing a more critical engagement with the manner in which ADHD unfolds in the lives of diagnosees - one which is premised on the actual experiences of the individual subject. Thus, I explore the sociological meaning of ADHD diagnosis through two related questions. First, what discourses shape the meaning of ADHD as a categorical marker or subject identity? Second, what are the consequences of identifying as an ADHD subject? To identify discourse on ADHD, I conduct a content analysis on 40 articles of the popular press on ADHD. To explore the consequences of identifying as an ADHD subject, I conduct a series of five interviews with young women students who associate themselves to ADHD. This mixed methods study finds strong contention surrounding ADHD diagnosis and treatment in the public sphere and individual negotiations of meaning that work around or else avoid negative subject identities in the private sphere of ADHD diagnosis.

Phenomenal consciousness presents a recalcitrant problem for the scientific conception of the world and the physicalist thesis that claims that everything that exists (including whatever is involved in any mental phenomena) is physical and physically explainable. Thus, on this view, every truth is a physical truth. By Putnam-Kripkean considerations and for several other reasons, I defend the claim that any version of such a physicalist thesis must be a necessary thesis, which ultimately means that contingent physicalism is not tenable. Against this thesis, philosophers have put forward several anti-physicalist arguments including the knowledge argument, the conceivability/modal argument, the explanatory gap argument, and the property dualism argument. All these arguments rest on the assumption of an epistemic/explanatory gap, which I call the &ldquo / phenomenal-physical gap,&rdquo / between the phenomenal and the physical. I claim that the phenomenal-physical gap (the PP-gap) is unbridgeable, from which it can be concluded that a priori physicalism is not tenable. The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS), which is a specific strategy within a posteriori necessary physicalism, aims at offering an explanation in physical terms of why we have such an unbridgeable gap by differentiating between phenomenal and physical concepts in a fundamental way. Nevertheless, proponents of PCS&mdash / the most promising version of a posteriori necessary physicalism&mdash / face a severe problem that I call &ldquo / the problem of phenomenal subjecthood&rdquo / in explaining in physical terms why we have the PP-gap. The phenomenon of &ldquo / experiencing&rdquo / consists of three substantially existing elements: the phenomenal subject (the experiencer), the experiential item (what is experienced by the subject), and the phenomenal s-v-o relation (the experiential relation) between the first two. I argue for the substantial existence of phenomenal subjects based on an argument I provide, the reality of some mental phenomena such as phenomenal unity and continuity, and the mental facts concerning phenomenal peculiarity, phenomenal agency, and the sense of phenomenal I-ness, the reality of all of which one cannot deny. Since PCS accounts are mostly qualia-centered accounts that ignore the reality of phenomenal subjects and the phenomenal s-v-o relation, they cannot account for the PP-gap in physical terms without first offering substantial theories of phenomenal subjecthood. But once they grant the substantiality of phenomenal subjects, they face severe difficulties in establishing their accounts of the nature of phenomenal concept, and thus the PP-gap in physical terms.

In 1921, the Canadian government confiscated over 400 pieces of Kwakwaka’wakw potlatch regalia and placed it in three large museums. In 1967 the Kwakwaka'wakw initiated a long process of repatriation resulting in the majority of the collection returning to two Kwakwaka’wakw cultural centres over the last four decades. Through the theoretical framework of object biography and using the museum register as a tool to reconstruct the lives of the potlatch regalia, this thesis explores the multiple paths, diversions and oscillations between objecthood and subjecthood that the collection has undergone. This thesis constructs an exhibition history for the regalia, examines processes of institutional forgetting, and adds multiple layers of meaning to the collection's biography by attending to the post-repatriation life of the objects. By revisiting this pivotal Canadian case, diversions are emphasized as important moments in the creation of subjecthood and objecthood for museum objects.

In 1921, the Canadian government confiscated over 400 pieces of Kwakwaka’wakw potlatch regalia and placed it in three large museums. In 1967 the Kwakwaka'wakw initiated a long process of repatriation resulting in the majority of the collection returning to two Kwakwaka’wakw cultural centres over the last four decades. Through the theoretical framework of object biography and using the museum register as a tool to reconstruct the lives of the potlatch regalia, this thesis explores the multiple paths, diversions and oscillations between objecthood and subjecthood that the collection has undergone. This thesis constructs an exhibition history for the regalia, examines processes of institutional forgetting, and adds multiple layers of meaning to the collection's biography by attending to the post-repatriation life of the objects. By revisiting this pivotal Canadian case, diversions are emphasized as important moments in the creation of subjecthood and objecthood for museum objects.

The transnationalisation of economic relations and the emergence of supranational sites of policy-making and governance have been of concern both to 'affected publics' subject to the remote decisionmaking that such developments entail (and who have mobilised extensively to demonstrate their opposition to these bodies), and scholars keen to locate the possibilities for a democratic politics in the context of the state's subsequent diminishment (O'Brien et al., 2000; Scholte, 2001; Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004; Rittberger et al., 2008). One such group of scholars are public sphere theorists, who, taking up an ongoing concern with the conditions for, and criteria of, effective democratic participation in politically authoritative policy debates, and responding to these new dynamics, have begun to define a new research agenda in search of 'transnational public spheres' (Habermas, 1989; Fraser, 1991; Fraser 2007). That is, they have begun to look to the transnational for sites in which those affected by the exercise (or, indeed, absence) of political authority at this level strive to engage that authority in policy debate. In this thesis, I argue for the existence of one such transnational public sphere, which, being both provoked and constituted by the transnational peasant and small farmers social movement La Via Campesina, promises to be institutionally realised by the recently reformed United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS). Identifying and exploring key dynamics relevant to the CFS's aspirations for political centrality, inclusivity, and policy debate, moreover, I lay bare the challenges that confront the attainment of this promise.

The transnationalisation of economic relations and the emergence of supranational sites of policy-making and governance have been of concern both to ¿affected publics¿ subject to the remote decisionmaking that such developments entail (and who have mobilised extensively to demonstrate their opposition to these bodies), and scholars keen to locate the possibilities for a democratic politics in the context of the state¿s subsequent diminishment (O¿Brien et al., 2000; Scholte, 2001; Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004; Rittberger et al., 2008). One such group of scholars are public sphere theorists, who, taking up an ongoing concern with the conditions for, and criteria of, effective democratic participation in politically authoritative policy debates, and responding to these new dynamics, have begun to define a new research agenda in search of ¿transnational public spheres¿ (Habermas, 1989; Fraser, 1991; Fraser 2007). That is, they have begun to look to the transnational for sites in which those affected by the exercise (or, indeed, absence) of political authority at this level strive to engage that authority in policy debate. In this thesis, I argue for the existence of one such transnational public sphere, which, being both provoked and constituted by the transnational peasant and small farmers social movement La Via Campesina, promises to be institutionally realised by the recently reformed United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS). Identifying and exploring key dynamics relevant to the CFS¿s aspirations for political centrality, inclusivity, and policy debate, moreover, I lay bare the challenges that confront the attainment of this promise.