This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential states arise and their nature. After examining the desiderata for naturalistic explanations, I argue that theories which ascribe nonconceptual content to experiences are the most plausible versions of representationalism. Further, causal covariation and teleological theories yield distinctive and interesting representationalist positions, hence, they become the focus of this study. To assess representationalism, I investigate whether all differences in phenomenal character can be correlated with differences in content. I claim that a useful distinction can be drawn between implicit and explicit content, which allows one to best describe the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. I then argue that ambiguous figures show that two experiences can have the same content but different phenomenal character. I explicate the Inverted Earth hypothesis and claim that to identify content and phenomenal character, representationalists either have to condone the possibility of philosophical zombies, or hold that people lack authoritative first-person knowledge of their current experiences. Both these positions are unpalatable. Finally, I argue that representationalists cannot ascribe contents to experiences of novel colours to account for their phenomenal character. I also question, in light of dissociation phenomena, whether there is one distinctive relationship that all experiences bear to the cognitive system. I conclude that phenomenal character cannot be identical with the type of content under investigation, and that naturalistic representationalist theories cannot fully explain conscious experience.

Within the Philosophy of Mind two features of our mental life have been acknowledged as the most perplexing - consciousness, the phenomenal "what it is likeness" of our mental states, and intentionality, the aboutness or directedness of our mental states. As such, it has become commonplace to develop theories about these phenomena which seek to explain them naturalistically, that is, without resort to magic or miracles. Traditionally this has been done by analyzing consciousness and intentionality apart from one another. However, in more recent years the tide has turned. In contemporary theories these phenomena are typically analyzed in terms of the other. This results in two competing views: Representationalism, which seeks to ground consciousness in intentionality, and Phenomenalism, which seeks to ground intentionality in consciousness. David Chalmers has proposed an alternative view to these which takes consciousness and intentionality as essentially interdependent, neither more fundamental than the other. This thesis explores the motivations for Representationalism and Phenomenalism, outlines their extraneous commitments, and analyzes their merits - as well as assessing whether Chalmers' view is a defensible middle ground. This involves an analysis of the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism, phenomenal consciousness, intentionality, and the nature of mental content. I argue that the view which Chalmers advocates is the best supported. Yet, I argue, it could benefit by adopting a thoroughgoing externalism of mental content.

Depersonalization-Derealization Disorder (DDD) is a dissociative syndrome characterized by a sense of disconnectedness from one’s own self and the world around. People suffering from the condition report feeling like external observers, cut off from their own bodies, emotions and thoughts; their surroundings are perceived as unreal. The present thesis analyses DDD by sustaining the view that its phenomenology can be understood through Metzinger’s notion of phenomenal transparency. This idea is not entirely new: recent contributions (Ciaunica et al., 2020; Ciaunica et al., 2021; Seth et al., 2012) have framed the dramatic experiences of depersonalization and derealization as instances of highly opaque mental states. However, more detailed discussions of phenomenal transparency are sparse. My contribution wishes to partially fill in this gap. To elucidate the concept of transparency, I will first highlight the distinction between the classical representationalist notion of transparency and the metzingerian, phenomenal account of it. I will then argue that phenomenal transparency adequately describes the associated depersonalized phenomenology. Finally, I will attempt to present and dissipate ambiguities contained in the concept and address potential criticism regarding the redundancy of transparency as an explanatory tool for dissociative phenomena. / Depersonalisations- och Derealisationssyndrom (DDD) är ett dissociativt syndrom som kännetecknas av en känsla av att vara frånkopplad från ens eget jag och omvärlden. Människor som lider av tillståndet rapporterar att de känner sig som externa observatörer, avskurna från sina egna kroppar, känslor och tankar; deras omgivning upplevs som overklig. Denna avhandling analyserar DDD genom att stödja uppfattningen att dess fenomenologi kan förstås genom Metzingers föreställning om fenomenal transparens. Denna idé är inte helt ny: senaste bidrag (Ciaunica et al., 2020; Ciaunica et al., 2021; Seth et al., 2012) har ramat in de dramatiska upplevelserna av depersonalisering och derealisering som förekomster av mycket ogenomskinliga mentala tillstånd. Mer detaljerade diskussioner om fenomenal transparens är dock sparsamma. Mitt bidrag vill delvis fylla denna lucka. För att belysa begreppet transparens kommer jag först att lyfta fram distinktionen mellan den klassiska representationalistiska föreställningen om transparens och den metzingerska, fenomenala redogörelsen för den. Jag kommer då att hävda att fenomenal transparens på ett adekvat sätt beskriver den associerade depersonaliserade fenomenologin. Slutligen kommer jag att försöka presentera och skingra oklarheter som finns i konceptet och ta upp potentiell kritik angående transparensens redundans som ett förklarande verktyg för dissociativa fenomen.

No description available.

The purpose of this work is to investigate how processes of inference are reflected in the grammar of the natural language. I consider a range of phenomena which call for a representational theory of mind and thought. These constructions display a certain regularity in their truth conditions, but the regularity does not extend to closure under arbitrary logical entailment. I develop a logic that allows me to speak formally about classes of inferences. This logic is then applied to analysis of indirect speech, belief reports, evidentials (with special attention to Bulgarian) and clarity assertions. / text

[pt] Este trabalho se debruça sobre o fenômeno do plágio, prática que, amplamente facilitada pelo advento da Internet, desperta hoje forte interesse, não raro apreensão. Oscilando histórica e contemporaneamente entre as posições de crime desprezível e recurso constitutivo da escritura, tal prática suscita interrogações quanto a seus próprios limites e critérios de identidade. A presente dissertação situa o debate sobre o plágio em um outro, mais amplo, acerca da natureza da significação lingüística, tendo em vista especialmente a proliferação contemporânea de visões que se contrapõem à tradição imanentista. Nosso objetivo aqui é mostrar de que maneira um determinado entendimento do sentido na linguagem - a saber, a perspectiva anti-imanentista de L. Wittgenstein - fornece rico instrumental para se repensar a questão dos limites do plágio textual. Para tanto, identificam-se na concepção de linguagem do autor elementos importantes para o tema em debate, com destaque para a sua discussão em torno da noção de critério. Exploram-se as implicações de se adotar tal perspectiva em relação ao objeto de estudo aqui investigado, demonstrando-se que a renúncia à tese tradicional de que os sentidos habitam a letra de forma fixa e imanente não leva necessariamente a conclusões céticas quanto aos limites e à identidade do plágio. / [en] This work addresses the phenomenon of plagiarism, an activity that, made easier with the appearance of the Internet, is today the object of increasing interest, and often concern. Oscillating between the positions of despicable crime and constitutive element in the act of writing, plagiarism provokes questions about its own limits and identity criteria. This study examines the issue of plagiarism against the backdrop of the wider debate on the nature of linguistic meaning, with special attention to the contemporary spread of views opposed to the immanentist tradition. The specific goal here is to show how a certain understanding of language and meaning, namely the anti-immanentist view of L. Wittgenstein, provides a rich means to rethinking the questions concerning the boundaries of plagiarism. Relevant elements for this discussion are identified in Wittgenstein s thought, with an emphasis on his reflections on the notion of criteria. The implications of his perspective to the subject under exam are explored, and it is demonstrated that renouncing the traditional thesis that meaning inhabits the words in a fixed and immanent manner does not necessarily lead to skeptical conclusions regarding the limits and the identity of plagiarism.

Learning, as embodied familiarization, is described as an embodied, non-representational, and non-mechanistic experience. Within this theoretical framework, a qualitative study is presented that offers a deeper understanding of the learner's encounter with unfamiliarity -- a key lived experience of embodied familiarization. Assertions related to encounters with unfamiliarity are made through a multiple case study analysis and a deeper understanding of the assertions is offered by way of a narrative-oriented framework. From this perspective, agentive, concernful, dispositional and meaningful aspects of learning are discernible.

No description available.

選言主義在這個論文當中是指在知覺哲學當中的一個特定的理論。它最核心的主張是我們應該拒斥真實知覺與不真實知覺之間所分享的共同性，目的是為了防止懷疑論的攻擊。本篇論文的目的就是為了辯護這種立場的一個版本。 在我討論選言主義之前，我會在第一章先勾勒知覺哲學的議題的大概。在第二章，我會批評三種不同的表徵主義作為解釋知覺經驗的現象特質的理論。在第三章，我會討論麥克•馬丁的選言主義。由於他的立場過於極端，他的理論反對所以共同性在真實知覺與不真實知覺之間，並且蘊含在幻覺情況下，我們是無法知覺到任何的現象特質的。在最後一章，我會說明並且辯護我的立場。我的立場是宣稱知覺經驗具有表徵內容，用來說明現象特質，並且堅守選言主義的立場，解釋真實經驗與不真實經驗的現象特質不是訴諸相同的說明。我的主張看似不太融貫，因為知覺經驗的現象特質若是可以由表徵內容全部解釋，那為什麼還需要外在世界的對象呢。我會在本篇論文中說明為什麼我的主張是融貫的。 / Disjunctivism, in this thesis, refers to a specific position in philosophy of perception. The kernel of disjunctivism is that we should reject certain commonalities between veridical perception and non-veridical perception in order to preserve the relation between our perceptual experience and the world. The aim of this thesis is to defend one version of this position. Before I discuss the disjunctivism, I articulate the problem of perception in Chapter I and criticize three versions of intentionalism in Chapter II. Then, in Chapter III, I reject Mike Martin’s extreme position of disjunctivism. I defend my only theory in the last chapter that consists in the disjunctivists’ main concern that perception is in a relation to the external world (in order to resist the skeptics) and the intentionalists’ insight that the phenomenal character of experience is wholly explained by the intentionality of experience. My thesis prima facie sounds not coherent. It is because if the phenomenal character of experience can be wholly explained by the intentionality, it is not necessary to take the external objects into account. I will articulate why and how my thesis is coherent in this essay.

[pt] Esta dissertação analisa metáforas para linguagem encontradas no Curso de Lingüística Geral, de Ferdinand de Saussure. Tomando por base aspectos da Teoria Cognitiva da Metáfora e a leitura clássica de Roy Harris para o Curso, a análise demonstra a presença de uma tensão entre duas visões concorrentes de linguagem e significado, a saber, uma perspectiva representacionista, hegemônica na história do pensamento lingüístico, e uma concepção oposta, próxima à que se encontra nas Investigações Filosóficas, de L. Wittgenstein. / [en] This study analyses metaphors for language in Saussures Course in General Linguistics. The analysis is based on the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor, and on Roy Harriss classical reading of the Course. The presence of a tension between two divergent views on language and meaning is demonstrated, where a traditional representationalist perspective is shown to coexist with an opposing view, similar to the one found in L. Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations.