This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential states arise and their nature. After examining the desiderata for naturalistic explanations, I argue that theories which ascribe nonconceptual content to experiences are the most plausible versions of representationalism. Further, causal covariation and teleological theories yield distinctive and interesting representationalist positions, hence, they become the focus of this study. To assess representationalism, I investigate whether all differences in phenomenal character can be correlated with differences in content. I claim that a useful distinction can be drawn between implicit and explicit content, which allows one to best describe the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. I then argue that ambiguous figures show that two experiences can have the same content but different phenomenal character. I explicate the Inverted Earth hypothesis and claim that to identify content and phenomenal character, representationalists either have to condone the possibility of philosophical zombies, or hold that people lack authoritative first-person knowledge of their current experiences. Both these positions are unpalatable. Finally, I argue that representationalists cannot ascribe contents to experiences of novel colours to account for their phenomenal character. I also question, in light of dissociation phenomena, whether there is one distinctive relationship that all experiences bear to the cognitive system. I conclude that phenomenal character cannot be identical with the type of content under investigation, and that naturalistic representationalist theories cannot fully explain conscious experience.

There has been a recent flurry of activity in consciousness research. Although an operational definition of consciousness has not yet been developed, philosophy has come to identify a set of features and aspects that are thought to be associated with the various elements of consciousness. On the other hand, there have been several recent attempts to develop computational models of consciousness that are claimed to capture or illustrate one or more aspects of consciousness. As a plausible substitute to evaluating how well the current computational models model consciousness, this study examines how the current computational models fare in modeling those aspects and features of consciousness identified by philosophy. Following a detailed and critical review of the literature of philosophy of consciousness, this study constructs a composite and eclectic list of features and aspects that would be expected in any successful model of consciousness. The study then evaluates, from the viewpoint of that list, some of the current self-claimed computational models of consciousness, specifically CLARION, IDA, ACT-R and model proposed in the Cleeremans&#039 / review and study. The computational models studied are evaluated with respect to each identified aspect and feature of consciousness.

This dissertation concerns the location and nature of phenomenal qualities. Arguably, these qualities naively seem to belong to perceived external objects. However, we also seem to experience phenomenal qualities in hallucinations, and in hallucinations we do not perceive any external objects. I present and argue for a theory of the phenomenal qualities, "brain theory", which claims that all phenomenal qualities we experience are physical properties instantiated in the brain, regardless of whether they are experienced in veridical perceptions or in hallucinations. I begin by more carefully identifying the phenomenal qualities, discussing how they are related to "qualia" and "phenomenal character". Then I present brain theory, and investigate its implications for the perceptual relations we stand in to external objects, noting that it is mostly neutral. I also compare brain theory to a similar theory of perception advocated by Bertrand Russell. Next, I provide an overview over the competing theories of phenomenal qualities, and relate them to theories of perception, such as representationalism, qualia theory, sense data theory and disjunctivism. The majority of my argumentation for brain theory focuses on arguing that the phenomenal qualities are instantiated in the brain, rather than on arguing that they are physical properties. Instead, I largely assume physicalism. However, even independently of the physicalism assumption, I show that we have reason to believe that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations, and that qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects, such as our brains or sense data. In the first step towards this conclusion I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations face serious problems. In the next step I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects face serious problems. Finally, an important part of the argumentation is my replies to objections against brain theory, including common sense objections and the "observation objection". From these conclusions, together with the physicalism assumption, I infer that we have reason to believe that brain theory is true about hallucinations. On this basis, I then argue, through a generalizing argument, that the same is the case for veridical perceptions.

Jan Wallentin. Vägar till samadhi : en granskning av Robert K. C. Formans begrepp ”Pure Consciousness Event” (Roads to Samadhi : An Examination of Robert K. C. Forman’s Concept of ”Pure Consciousness Event”). Umeå University: Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious studies. Bachelor thesis. June 2021.Is Robert K. C. Forman’s concept of ”pure consciousness event” an example of a universal,mystical core experience? Is it possible to establish the neural correlates of this proposedexperience, and to induce it experimentally? These are the main questions of this study,which is a literature review drawing on recent scientific research from three fields: religious studies, philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience.The major findings are:The concept of ”pure consciousness event” (PCE) does seem like a tenable way ofgetting around the constructivist critique regarding universal, mystical core experiences.However, Forman’s original definition of PCE seems too strict. Forman defines PCE as ”a wakeful though contentless (non-intentional) consciousness”, but in the conventional wisdom of contemporary philosophy it is deemed impossible to be conscious without beingconscious about something. A conceivable solution would be to replace the term ”PCE” withThomas Metzinger’s less strict term ”Minimal Phenomenal Experience” (MPE), whichallows for some, though minimal, mental content during these kind of experiences.Regarding neural correlates, several recent studies suggest that a high level of activityin the brain’s default mode network (DMN) is correlated with a heightened sense of self-awareness. A low level of activity in the DMN is, vice versa, correlated with a sense of self-forgetting, as in the flow-experience. However, the activity-level of the DMN does not seem to fully explain the proposed existence of pure consciousness events, even in a less strict definition of this term.Methods used to induce experiences reminiscent of PCE include the white dreams ofTibetan dream yoga (yoga nidrā), states of deep meditation, and the intake of psychoactive substances, like psilocybin, DMT and LSD.Keyterms: Robert K. C. Forman, pure consciousness event, mysticism, samadhi, philosophy of consciousness,Thomas Metzinger, minimal phenomenal experience, drug induced ego dissolution.

Submitted by Nara Lays Domingues Viana Oliveira (naradv) on 2015-08-29T14:56:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 clorio.pdf: 1569404 bytes, checksum: 1d447767db6e54e17d83dc952781b7af (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-08-29T14:56:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 clorio.pdf: 1569404 bytes, checksum: 1d447767db6e54e17d83dc952781b7af (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Nenhuma / A História proporciona, em certa medida, um relato da sociedade na qual se está envolvido no presente. É naquela que está a possibilidade de respostas a certas inquietações, sem que tais respostas transbordem da sua condição de respostas para a de soluções. Mas olhar a História é, com efeito, olhar a tessitura e os vários “textos” que a formam. Os vários “eventos” devem ser considerados nesse contexto. No correr da História, no tempo e no espaço do Ocidente, ela sempre foi vista como uma sucessão de etapas, etapas vistas como mudanças que, por sua vez, decorriam de escolhas e supressões. O posterior, se não moralmente, ideologicamente superior ao anterior. Para essa narrativa ser possível, mister uma estrutura conceitual filosófica que representasse e justificasse os valores envolvidos nas escolhas: a Filosofia. A partir da filosofia grega, constitui-se um esteio justificador que permeou todas as demais instituições, especialmente o Estado e o Direito. Efetivamente as escolha são feitas; o que predomina, porém, jamais se demite da sua experiência anterior, pois não há rigorosamente nada de originário. O evento, seja o Estado, seja o Direito, sempre está vinculado ao contexto. Um contexto de ações, atitudes, de cultura, em um sentido amplo, envolvendo todos os comportamentos, modos de pensar e agir do homem; envolvendo o ethos; isso é o originário. Na dinamização da cultura é que se pode observar o valor das ações. O valor atribuído a elas é o critério usado para se proceder às escolhas e configura, portanto, o núcleo ético-mítico no espaço e no tempo da civilização ocidental. Se desde sempre se está em um mundo de escolhas, desde sempre se está num mundo prático. A Filosofia no entanto, transformada em metafísica, esconde essa questão originária da escolha, ao cindir a razão e subordinando a razão prática à razão teórica, na medida em que esta fornece os elementos estruturais necessários (transcendentes) para a formulação dos juízos. Cindir a razão é uma escolha, vinculada a um modo de agir, a uma atitude, a um ethos. Isso está repercutido na forma como a História é considerada (etapas sucessivas e superiores) e na fundamentação filosófica do Estado e do Direito. O exemplo da Modernidade é eloquente, pois, a pretexto de superar o Medievo, recupera materiais da Antiguidade clássica, sem dar-se conta, no entanto, que o Medievo sequer rompera com a Antiguidade. Assim, é possível olhar a História não na linearidade da sucessão de fases e períodos, mas como um desdobramento cultural em espaço definido. Esse ponto de vista permite identificar nas manifestações políticas (Estado) e jurídicas (Direito) a natureza das escolhas a partir da fundamentação filosófica. Estado e Direito, em que pese serem conquistas (no sentido positivo) da civilização ocidental, conservam a originariedade do ethos civilizatório. O desvelamento é possível a partir da filosofia hermenêutica ou da hermenêutica filosófica. Retirar o véu encobridor das relações, não apenas revela os tantos problemas sociais, deixa implícita uma contradição: mantém-se um discurso que substitui a realidade (o uno) pela aparência (a igualdade entre o uno e outro) e a verdade, com efeito, é entregue à retórica, ao argumento. A hermenêutica filosófica não é normativa, mas apenas por meio dela é que se pode dizer que desde sempre se está na razão prática, desde sempre se faz escolhas, na História e na Linguagem. / History provides, to a certain extent, a report of the society in which it is involved at the present. It is in that which is the possibility of responses to certain concerns, without which such answers exceeds its condition of answers to solutions. But looking at History is, in fact, look at the structure and the various "texts" that forms it. The various "events" should be considered in this context. In the course of History, time and space in the West, it has always been seen as a succession of steps, steps seen as changes which, in its turn, resulted from choices and omissions.The latter, if not morally, ideologically superior to the former. To be possible this narrative, it is necessary a philosophical conceptual framework that could represent and justify the values involved in the choices: Philosophy. From the Greek philosophy, is a mainstay justifier that permeated all the other institutions, especially the State and the Law. Effectively the choices are made; what predominates, however, never resigns from his previous experience, because there is absolutely nothing of originating. The event, being it the State, being it the Law, is always linked to the context. A context of actions, attitudes, culture, in a wide sense involving all behaviors, ways of thinking and acting of the human being, involving the ethos, that is original. In fostering the culture that it is possible to observe the value of the actions. The value assigned to them is the criteria used to make the choices and configures, therefore the ethical and mythical nucleus in both space and time of Western civilization. If since always one is in a world of choices, since always is in a practical world. Philosophy, however, turned into metaphysics, hides this original question of choice, splitting the reason and subordinating practical reason to theoretical reason, in so far as that it provides the necessary structural elements (transcendent) for the formulation of judgments. Split the reason is a choice, linked to a way of acting, to an attitude, to an ethos. This is reflected in the way history is considered (successive and superior stages) and the philosophical foundation of the State and Law. The example of Modernity is eloquent, thus the pretext of overcoming the Medieval period, recovers materials of classical antiquity, without realizing, however, that the Medieval period even broken with the antiquity. Thus, it is possible to look at History not in the linearity of the succession of phases and periods, but as a cultural unfolding in definite space. This point of view allows the identification of the political demonstrations (state) and legal (law) the nature of the choices from the philosophical foundation. State and Law, although being conquests (in the positive sense) of Western civilization, retain the originating of ethos civilization. The unveiling is possible from the hermeneutic philosophy or of philosophical hermeneutics. Remove the veil that covers the relationship, not only reveals the many social problems, but it is implicit a contradiction: it remains a discourse that replaces the reality (the sole one) by the appearance (equality between the one and another) and the truth, indeed, is given to rhetoric, to the argument.The philosophical hermeneutics is not normative, but only through it is possible to say that since one is always in practical reason, one always makes choices, in the History and Language.