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In the literature on reflection in teaching, authors frequently lament the lack of clarity in understandings of this concept, despite its wide acceptance as a phenomenon beneficial to teaching and learning. This dissertation reports a study of this literature that attempts to clarify the meaning of reflection and to establish a methodology for examining such a complex concept. Three analyses, each intended to explore the literature on reflection from a different perspective, comprise the study. The first is an analysis of the literature on reflection in three professional communities---continuing professional development, higher education and teacher education---to establish general themes in this literature. The second analysis examines definitions of reflection from the three communities, focusing in particular on processes and rationales of reflection. The third analysis explores a variety of critiques of reflection to determine predominant epistemologies and recurring themes in the literature. The merging of the results of the three analyses leads to a framework for understanding reflection. This integrative framework highlights the importance of underlying epistemologies as the bases for different understandings of reflection and shows the intricate interrelationships among four major themes in the literature: the processes involved in reflection, the rationales behind it, the context in which it occurs, and its connection to action. The framework also points to the link between the self and the reflective context, the possibilities of reflection in-, on-, for-, and as-action, the unclear connection between the cognitive and affective processes and the movement from internal to external rationales. The study contributes both conceptually and methodologically by making sense of the range of ways reflection has been understood and by providing a possible model for exploring a complex concept. It provides a consistent language for discussing reflection, demonstrates the complexities of the concept and the interrelationships of the themes contained in the literature, allows for the situating of individual works within the literature, increases understanding of the connection of reflection and action, and helps to position the concept of reflection within broader theories of cognition and social practice.

This paper examines and compares the different ways in which Charles Taylor and Richard Rorty critique the representationalism and foundationalism characteristic of modern epistemology (Chapter One), then considers how their critiques affect their respective understandings of morality (Chapter Two) and of the role of religious belief in modern secular societies (Chapter Three). Rorty's and Taylor's epistemological debate is presented as an example of the differences between, on the one hand, 'anti-ontological' or pragmatic post-foundational philosophies (such as Rorty's) and, on the other, 'weak ontological', contact realist alternatives (such as Taylor's). The paper concludes with a defense of Taylor's position over Rorty's, and, in doing so, makes a case for the rejection of strictly naturalist accounts of the moral and religious life in favor of a (weak ontological) picture of the human person as necessarily oriented in relation to transcendent goods of other trans-human realities.

The subject of this thesis is the relationship of the psychology and epistemology of the philosopher Epictetus (c.55-135 A.D.) to the Stoic tradition to which he belonged. Epictetus' psychology is characterised by the subsuming of psychological functions and development under the single term prohairesis, and his epistemology under a corresponding term 'use of impressions' (chrêsis phantasiôn); the two terms being used largely interchangeably. The status of the prohairesis as a faculty is investigated and it is concluded that it is the principal over-arching faculty of the governing-principle of the soul (hêgemonikon), and thus occupies a similar position to that occupied by Reason (logos) in the Stoic tradition. Prohairesis is used to define the 'end' and 'good' for man in Epictetus' teaching, displacing 'wisdom' and 'virtue' with 'prohairesis as it ought to be'. Epictetus thus seeks to reflect the concerns of the 'person making progress' by making the end an extreme point on a continuum of mental and moral states on which he already occupies a place. The self-contemplating ability of prohairesis allows it to be used to define the human self as a single unified consciousness, and also distinguish it from 'external' things outwith our power. The redefining of all things external to the mind as outwith our power is Epictetus' most significant innovation. Epistemology is closely linked to psychology. The 'use of impressions' involves using 'preconceptions' (prolêpseis) and 'rules' (kanones) to test incoming impressions. The aim is not to allow any false judgement to be installed permanently in the prohairesis and thus hinder moral progress. The substitution of the term judgement (dogma) for 'cognition' (katalêpsis) allows Epictetus to draw attention to the need to replace poor judgements with better ones. The thesis concludes that Epictetus introduces a number of innovations to Stoicism and also develops established doctrines to reflect his emphasis on the 'inner life' and on the moral development of ordinary people.

In chapter one, I describe the different conceptions of self that Murdoch and Nussbaum have, and I show how these affect their depictions of human good. And I relate how each one defends the internal logic of her claims against the critique of moral relativism. I examine Iris Murdoch's conception of reality and consciousness in the distinctive way that she fuses them to a transcendent morality. / In chapter two, I turn to Murdoch's description of the journey from illusion to reality and the role of love or eros in this journey. I examine the many points of intersection between her description of the escape from selfishness and Wendy Farley's (1996) theory of how we acknowledge the other through a type of attention that she calls eros for the other . / In Chapter three, I discuss the problem that evil poses for Murdoch's moral philosophy, and how Murdoch and Farley interpret the experience of the void as yearning for relation. In the conclusion of this thesis, I present Murdoch's views on form as the consolation of human yearning. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 330-347). / Microfiche. / xviii, 347 leaves, bound ill. 29 cm

The introduction deals with the state of philosophy and science at the time McKinney constructed his theory. It introduces McKinney, his books and their public reception to the reader. Chapter One closely follows the development of McKinney's arguments as he expounded them in his first philosophical work, “The Challenge of Reason”. Chapter Two outlines the challenge McKinney had convincing his audience that his theory was noteworthy. Chapter Three reflects the problems of the modern view of knowledge as described in Chapter One and examines its historical development commencing with Socrates. Chapter Four discusses the 'tension of temperaments', a fundamental aspect of McKinney's theory where individual differences have an important part to play in the initiating of original consciousness. Chapter Five asks the question: What is reason? Here I examine the concept of reason from many angles, especially those that infer reason is a Universal. Chapter Six focuses on modern science. Chapter Seven discusses the three phases of human evolution as McKinney describes them in “The Challenge of Reason”. Chapter Eight explores the topic of pain. Chapter Nine is related to aggression and follows on logically from the discussion of pain covered in the previous chapter. Chapter Ten is about amateur philosophy and deals with the attitude of philosophers and scientists towards knowledge. Chapter Eleven deals with the problem of language. Chapter Twelve deals with the modern crisis of feeling and thought. It attempts to observe how McKinney's theory might extend to the everyday world. Chapter Thirteen is my last word on the subject of McKinney's philosophy. It is a brief personal expression of what I think McKinney is attempting to say. I have included an appendix, which expresses McKinney's ideas, mostly using his own words. / Thesis (PhD)--University of South Australia, 2005.

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Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1984. / Bibliography: leaves 94-96.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University, 1999. / Includes "critical interpretations of the work of G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as some ... detailed critical discussions of recent responses to scepticism by Hilary Putnam and Michael Williams"--Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 184-188). Also available via World Wide Web.