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The overall thesis of this dissertation may be summed up as the position that Mawlāna Rūmī and Nāgārjuna both eschew any and all epistemological positions (beliefs) so as to abandon any and all ontological positionality (being). To this end, my argument is arranged into two chapters dealing respectively with these two authors. In the chapter on Rūmī, following a review of the relevant Western and Persian literature (§2.2.), and prior to diving in to Mawlānā’s disavowal of any and all self-positionedness, I firstly focus on nationalist positions through an examination of some of the ways in which various exclusivist nationalist interests have competed, and continue to compete, to appropriate Mawlānā for ends quite anathematic to his own ecumenical/multivalent approach (§2.3.1.). I thus attempt to demonstrate that, far from giving voice to any specifically Persian or Iranian nationalist identity, Rūmī and his poetry have been appropriated by not only Iranian but also Afghan and Turkish nationalist discourses as means to assert their own ideological agendas. I then take a closer look at Mawlānā’s own conceptualization of identity (§2.3.2.). Drawing on selected passages from the Masnavī, I attempt to demonstrate that Jalāl al-Dīn’s notion of identity, particularly of the nationally-constituted kind, remains steadfastly untied to sectarian affiliations, and thereby undermines the appropriative nationalist efforts adumbrated theretofore. In succeeding sections, I develop the bulk of my argument by examining the means whereby Mawlānā Rūmī develops his own mode of discursive instability so as to reject positionality of any kind. Following a survey (§2.4.1.) and critique (§2.4.2.) of existing theoretical elaborations of apophasis as inadequate to Rūmī’s case , I specifically study the multiple authorial identities enacted by Rūmī in his eponymous Masnavī to negate his own affirmations, and thence even those negations, in multifolded dynamism, and thereby convey the paradoxical truth of self-subsistence in self-annihilation (baqāʾ andar fanāʾ) by which to disavow any self’s, and any belief’s, bids at self-assertion through self-definition. Rather than speaking through kataphatic avowal, logical demonstration, or doctrinal proclamation, Mawlānā adopts apophatic discursive strategies – whereby he speaks through negation (§2.5.1.) , negation of negation (§2.5.2.) and, ultimately, the negation of all binary affirmations and negations in multifolded dynamism (§2.5.3.) – so as to deny the ego the definitive affirmation it seeks. By thus elaborating a fully fleshed-out investigation of the dynamic interplay of personified presence and authorial absence at work in the Masnavī, I develop an original understanding of this mystic’s highly charged and profoundly ambiguous relationship to his own subjectivity, and thereby to any subjectively affirmed doxastic position. We will thus see that Mawlānā eschews even his own belief system as, ultimately, inadequate in the face of what I call the constitutively polylectic nature of reality (§2.6.). In so doing, I provide a Sufi perspective on the issue of identity that both challenges prevailing intellectual presuppositions and opens the way for a further appreciation of Rūmī’s unique contribution to Persian literature. As such, it is my hope that the ultimate conclusions of this chapter provide an alternative approach to the scholarly study of mystic poetics, while shedding light upon the various masks of identity itself. My concern in the chapter on Nāgārjuna is with his efforts to express ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) in the conventional garb of language (vyavahāra-satya or saṃvṛti-satya). I focus on Nāgārjuna’s use of the catuṣkoṭi or tetralemma in his major work, the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā) to make a number of inter-related propositions. Put briefly, I interpret the Nāgārjunian catuṣkoṭi to constitute an exhaustive and tetrāletheic āssertion aimed at “the abandonment of all views” (sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya) I understand to be the distinctively Nāgārjunian means of attaining nirvāṇa, and thus the over-arching aim of Nāgārjuna’s philosophical enterprise as a whole. Following a methodologically oriented introductory section (§3.1.), I describe the tetralemma as neutrally as possible (§3.2.1.), and thence go on to delineate three prevailing means whereby (predominantly Western) scholars have sought to ‘rescue’ Nagarjuna from the evident illogicality that the tetralemma entails (§3.2.2). Apart from contextualizing my position within the existing body of scholarship on Nāgārjuna’s thought, my subsequent criticisms (§3.2.3.) of these logicalist attempts at interpreting the catuṣkoṭi adequately clear the ground for my own reading. In avowing the irreducibly soteriological ends of Nāgārjuna’s thought as a whole, this, my own reading, is more closely aligned to some interpretations proposed by Chinese-language exegetes. I thus go on to provide a summary of these latter (§3.3). Following this, I detail my reading proper, according to which, firstly, the tetralemma is to be taken in tetraletheic (as opposed to dialetheic) terms (§3.4.). In the final sections of this chapter, I introduce this tetraletheic reading of the tetralemma in support of my main point regarding the abandonment of all views or ‘view of no view’. The fact that Nāgārjuna begins and ends his major work with calls for the cessation and abandonment of all views, coupled with the fact that time and again throughout the MK he uses the catuṣkoṭi to survey and reject all possible positions on a given topic, leads me to conclude that this wholescale cessation or abandonment must in fact be Nāgārjuna’s aim as the author of the MK. I argue for this interpretation on the basis of a close reading of Nāgārjuna’s text, in support of which I survey the MK and Nāgārjuna’s other philosophical works for evidence bolstering my reading (§3.5.). Cherry picking a few verses here and there in support of my interpretation while ignoring the formal structure of the literary text of the MK as a whole, however, would be all too facile a method. As such, I then argue (§3.6.) that the text as a structured whole is oriented towards just such abandonment of all conceptuality, and the concomitant transcendence of all notions of selfhood. In the course of my exposition, I have occasion to engage with several debates very much alive in contemporary scholarship on Nāgārjuna, and as such to make what I hope is something of an original contribution to them by proposing a reading that is both textually justified and philosophically interesting.

This thesis investigates Plato's analogy between virtue and crafts, a comparison made extensively in the early dialogues. I first detail the model of technical knowledge that Plato uses as a paradigm of knowledge. An application of this model shows the inadequacies in some claims to know or to teach virtue. Applying the model to the Socratic dictum, 'Virtue is knowledge' enables us to understand what such knowledge is about. Such knowledge is identified as 'self-knowledge' and is the product of philosophy. Philosophy is thus revealed as the craft of virtue, directed at the good of individuals. One problematic aspect of the analogy between virtue and crafts is the possibility of misuse. Virtue conceived as self-knowledge enables Plato to explain both why such a craft cannot be misused and why it alone can be the basis for benefiting others.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- Unviersity of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury, 1999. / Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 275-287).

Thesis (M.Phil.) - University of St Andrews, June 2008.

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Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The question of what it means to say one knows something, or has knowledge of something, triggered an epistemological study after the nature of knowledge and its acquisition. There are many different ways in which one can go about acquiring knowledge, manydifferent frameworks that one can use to search after truth. Because most real systems about which one could desire knowledge (organic, social, economic etc.) are non-linear, an understanding of non-linear systems is important for the process of acquiring knowledge. Knowledge exhibits the characteristics of a dynamic, adaptive system, and as such could be approached via a dynamic theory of adaptive systems. Therefore, chaos theory and complexity theory are two theoretical (non-linear) frameworks that can facilitate the knowledge acquisition process. As a modernist instrument for acquiring knowledge, chaos theory provides one with deterministic rules that make mathematical understanding of non-linear phenomenaa bit easier, but it is limited in that it can only provide one with certain knowledge up until the (system's) next bifurcation (i.e. when chaos sets in). After this, it is near impossible to predict what a chaotic system will do. Complexity theory, as a postmodern tool for knowledge acquisition, gives one insight into the dynamic, self-organising nature of the non-linear systems around one. By analysing the global stability complex systems produce during punctuated equilibrium, one can learn much about how these systems adapt, evolve and survive. Complexity and chaos, therefore, together can provide one with a useful framework for understanding the nature and workings of non-linear systems. However, it should be remembered that every observer of knowledge does so out of his/her own personal framework of beliefs, circumstances and history, and that knowledge therefore can never be 100 percent objective. Knowledge and truth can never be entirely relative either, however, for this would mean that all knowledge (and thereby all opposing claims and statements) is equally correct or true. This is clearly not possible. What is possible, though, is the fulfilling and successful pursuit of knowledge for the sake of the journey of learning and understandi ng. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die vraag na wat dit eintlik beteken om te sê mens weet iets, of dra kennis van iets, het na 'n epistemologiese soeke na die wese van kennis en die verwerwing daarvan toe gelei. Daar is baie maniere waarop mens kennis kan verwerf, baie verskillende raamwerke wat mens kan gebruik om te soek na waarheid. Omdat die meeste wesenlike stelsels waarvan mens kennis sou wou verkry (organies, sosiaal, ekonomies ens.) nie-lineêr is, is 'n verstaan van nie-lineêre stelsels belangrik vir die kennisverwerwingsproses. Kennis vertoon die eienskappe van I n dinamiese, aanpassende stelsel, en kan dus via 'n dinamiese teorie van aanpassendestelsels benader word. Daarom is chaosteorie en kompleksiteitsteorie twee teoretiese (nie-lineêre) raamwerke wat die proses van kennisverwerwing kan vergemaklik. As I n modernistiese instrument vir kennisverwerwing, verskaf chaosteorie deterministiese reëls wat die wiskundige verstaan van nie-lineêre verskynsels bietjie vergemaklik, maar dit is beperk deurdat dit net sekere kennis tot op die (stelsel se) volgende splitsing (d.w.s. waar chaos begin) verskaf. Hierna, word dit naasonmoontlik om te voorspel wat I n chaotiese stelsel gaandoen. Kompleksiteitsteorie, as I n postmodernistiese gereedskap vir kennisverwerwing, gee mens insig in die dinamiese, selforganiserende aard van die nie-lineêre stelsels om mens. Deur die globale stabiliteit wat komplekse stelsels gedurende onderbreekte ewewig ("punctuated equi/ibrium"}toon te analiseer, kan mens baie leer van hoe hierdie stelsels aanpas, ontwikkel en oorleef. Kompleksiteit en chaos, saam, kan mens dus van a nuttige raamwerk vir die verstaan van die wese en werkinge van nie-lineêre stelsels, voorsien. Daar moet egter onthou word dat elke waarnemer van kennis dit doen uit sy/haar persoonlike raamwerk van oortuiginge, omstandighede en geskiedenis, en dat kennis dus nooit 100 persent objektief kan wees nie. Kennis en waarheid kan egter ook nooit heeltemaal relatief wees nie, want dit sou beteken dat alle kennis (en hiermee ook alle teenstrydige aansprake en stellings) gelyk korrek of waar is. Hierdie is duidelik onmoontlik. Wat wel moontlik is, is die vervullende en suksesvolle strewe na kennis ter wille van die reis van leer en verstaan.