The thesis studies the relations of Communist China's foreign policy and its military offensives in the battlefield in Korean Peninsula in late 1950 and early 1951, an important topic that has yet received little academic attention. As original research, this thesis cites extensively from newly declassified Soviet and Chinese archives, as well as American and UN sources. This paper finds that an adventurism dominated the thinking and decision-making of Communist leaders in Beijing and Moscow, who seriously underestimated the military capabilities and diplomatic leverages of the US-led West. The origin of this adventurism, this paper argues, lays in the CCP's civil war experience with their Nationalist adversaries, which featured a preference of mobile warfare over positional warfare, and an opportunist attitude on cease-fire. This adventurism ended only when Communist front line came to the verge of collapse in June 1951.

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La République Populaire de Chine a été établie le 1er Octobre 1949, cela met fin au régime de Chiang Kaï-shek en Chine continentale. À ce moment-là, le gouvernement français commence à négocier officiellement pour reconnaître la République populaire de Chine. Vivant dans deux camps hostiles, pourquoi la France est-elle prête à reconnaître le régime de Mao Tse-tung en 1949 ? Le 27 janvier 1964, la Chine populaire et la France ont publié simultanément un communiqué diplomatique à Pékin et à Paris. La France est devenue le premier pays occidental majeur à établir des relations diplomatiques au niveau des ambassadeurs avec la République populaire de Chine en 1964. Que se passe-t-il au cours de ces 15 ans? Pendant cette période, les États-Unis jouent un rôle très important à la Guerre de l’Indochine, la Guerre de Corée, la Conférence de Genève, la question de Taïwan et la représentation des peuples chinois à l’ONU, et influence la politique européenne avec le plan Marshall. Après son retour en 1958, De Gaulle a la volonté de sauvegarder la souveraineté nationale, les intérêts nationaux et l’indépendance, et s’engage sur une route de décolonisation. À partir de 1962, la politique extérieure française devient plus active en Chine, et les deux pays commencent à négocier sur l’établissement des relations diplomatique après être parvenus à un consensus sur Taïwan, Algérie et États-Unis. L’établissement des relations diplomatiques sino-françaises n’est pas accidentelle, cela répond aux besoins politiques et diplomatiques et aussi à la tendance inévitable du développement historique dans la Guerre Froide. / The People’s Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949, which ended the regime of Chiang Kaï-shek in Chinese mainland. At that time, the French government began to negotiate officially la recoginization of the People's Republic of China. Living in two hostile camps, why France had the plan to recognize the regime of Mao Tse-tung in 1949? On January 27, 1964, People’s Republic of China and France simultaneously issued a diplomatic announcement in Beijing and Paris. France became the first major western country to establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with the People’s Republic of China in 1964. Why France waited 15 years for recognizing PRC? What had happened during this 15 years? During this period, the United States played a very important role in the Indochina War, the Korean War, the Geneva Conference, the Taiwan question and the representation of China in the United Nations with launching the policy Marshall Plan. After the return of De Gaulle in 1958, he resolved to safeguard national sovereignty, national interests, and embarked on a road to decolonization. From 1962, French foreign policy became more active in China, and the two countries began to negotiate on the establishment of diplomatic relations after reaching a consensus on Taiwan, Algeria and the United States. The establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations is not accidental, which responds to political and diplomatic needs, and to the inevitable trend of historical development in the Cold War.