This study comprises an investigation of the timing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and the role therein, of investment banks, in taking firms public. Most prior studies of IPOs and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) investigate timing with respect to firm-specific or economy-wide conditions. Also, the vast majority of prior studies have apparently ignored the role of market timing often ascribed to underwriters by practitioners. The analysis in this study elucidates the matter of the long-run post-issue performance of IPOs documented in the literature. Evidence is provided here about the timing of IPO firms relative to market conditions before and after their offerings. It is shown that firms are, on average, more likely to go public when the market valuation of comparable stocks in the same industry is at its peak relative to the entire market. No evidence is found of a pattern of IPO firms timing their offerings with respect to market-wide conditions. Further, this study shows that IPO timing is a function of the reputation of investment banks who have expertise in the financial market. It is found that the more reputable investment banks possess a greater proficiency than their lesser known counterparts, in taking companies public when the market valuation of comparable stocks in the same industry is high. These results are found to be invariant with regard to several statistical tests and alternative explanations. / Ph. D.