In his recent book, Moral Minds, Marc Hauser claims that humans are genetically endowed with a moral faculty operating in much the same way as our linguistic faculty, and that this faculty delimits normative moral systems. Further, he states that this work represents the beginning of what will become a science of morality. These claims contrast sharply with the conception of human nature presupposed by many of the dominant Western moral theories. For the most part, these conceptions of human nature are not flattering: they suggest that our natural instincts, in large part, or in whole, are not conducive to living a moral life. Given these presuppositions, such theories typically call for setting aside our natural instincts when determining the basis upon which normative moral theory should be established. This thesis seeks to show that there is a middle ground between these two views. On my account, recent scientific learning about innate traits impacting our behaviour towards others can be employed to construct a conception of human nature that is at odds with that used by a number of the dominant Western moral theories. As the impact of such innate traits is constrained by our analytic intellect, however, I argue that views such as Hauser’s overstate the implications for normative moral theory.

In this study I first examined whether the cognitive processes (hot versus cold cognition) underlying judgments to traditional moral situations are universal to situations that are morally neutral, and whether individual differences in cognitive ability moderate these judgments. Second, I tested whether it was possible to modify the impact of hot versus cold processing systems on judgment deliberation by shifting the focus of attention during the decision-making process. I conclude that moral judgment is not simply the product of cognitive ability and is not sufficiently motivated by hot cognitive experiences alone. The role of cognitive abilities on moral valuation requires further examination.

In his recent book, Moral Minds, Marc Hauser claims that humans are genetically endowed with a moral faculty operating in much the same way as our linguistic faculty, and that this faculty delimits normative moral systems. Further, he states that this work represents the beginning of what will become a science of morality. These claims contrast sharply with the conception of human nature presupposed by many of the dominant Western moral theories. For the most part, these conceptions of human nature are not flattering: they suggest that our natural instincts, in large part, or in whole, are not conducive to living a moral life. Given these presuppositions, such theories typically call for setting aside our natural instincts when determining the basis upon which normative moral theory should be established. This thesis seeks to show that there is a middle ground between these two views. On my account, recent scientific learning about innate traits impacting our behaviour towards others can be employed to construct a conception of human nature that is at odds with that used by a number of the dominant Western moral theories. As the impact of such innate traits is constrained by our analytic intellect, however, I argue that views such as Hauser’s overstate the implications for normative moral theory.

In the field of Jane Austen study, some critics regard her novels as a preaching of Christianity while some others consider her works as secular novels. In regards of the author¡¦s religious background, it is essential to re-examine her novels in order to formulate the influence of religion in both her life and her works and to settle certain debates on her belief. This present thesis will center on three of Austen¡¦s novels: Pride and Prejudice, Mansfield Park and Emma, with exploring her surviving correspondence in mention of her opinion on Christians, to probe into her religious principles and to provide a neutral viewpoint to scrutinize the relation between literature and religion in the novels. The introductory chapter gives an overall look on Jane Austen¡¦s religious and historical background. The following three chapters aim to discuss several elements of Christianity in her novels respectively. Chapter One exemplifies the practice of Christian charity in Austen¡¦s novels as well as in her daily life. It also elaborates on certain ¡§good principles¡¨ that were well-known by the Regency congregation and that were practiced by the authoress. Chapter Two discusses how Austen reflects the biblical teaching in her novels without using direct quotes and how she presents her concern of the potential crisis with ambiguous values. The final chapter deals with the problems facing by the Regency clergy and how Austen projects her ideal clergy through a hero¡¦s mouth. Most importantly, this thesis conjectures the reasons of Austen¡¦s evasiveness on religion in hope to gain a new insight into her fictional world.

This essay begins with the assumption that a liberal political morality is grounded upon two core ideals one, that the freedom to shape one's own life in accordance with one's reasonable beliefs about the good is constitutive of the ideal human life; and two, that the state ought to be in the business of securing this life-shaping freedom for its citizens. I argue that the endorsement of these ideals has perfectionist implications for a political morality. My central claim is that if the liberal state is committed to securing its citizens' life-shaping freedom, then it must actively and intentionally promote a definitive ideal of human flourishing. Accordingly, a liberal political morality is perfectionist insofar as it promotes an ideal of human flourishing; it is liberal insofar as that ideal is a distinctively liberal one. My argument proceeds in four stages. In Chapter II, I argue that a liberal political morality cannot remain neutral in the way that many liberals claim it must be. The consequence of this is that a liberal morality must be grounded upon a non-neutral moral ideal. In Chapter III, I argue that this non-neutral ideal must take citizens' positive liberty or what I am calling their life-shaping capabilities €”seriously if it is to achieve its end of securing its citizens' life-shaping freedom. In Chapter IV, I present a theoretical framework intended to support the perfectionist element of my account. To do this, I propose a capabilities approach to well-being, which enables us to determine which capabilities are necessary for life-shaping freedom. In Chapter V, I address the inevitable worry that the state's enforcement of perfectionist political principles is likely to unjustifiably infringe upon its citizens'€™ freedom. To alleviate this concern, I argue that any paternalistic interference justified by a capabilities approach actually enhances citizens' long-term freedom by preventing them from permanently forfeiting the necessary conditions of their freedom. Once this obstacle has been overcome, we will be free to embrace the perfectionist implications of our commitment to life-shaping freedom.

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Can Philosophers make a genuine and substantive contribution to the theory and practice of moral education? Contrast the following two answers. According to one approach, analytic moral philosophy is concerned with constructing moral theories. As such, moral education is a secondary concern of the moral theorist and a moral theory will, at most, only have implications for moral education. Call this the strict theoretical approach. An alternative account holds that moral education is a central topic of moral philosophy. As such, moral theorists who ignore questions of moral education are offering incomplete theories. Call this the educative approach. In this dissertation, I argue that moral philosophers need to take the educative approach more seriously. In part one, I argue that the educative approach is well grounded in the western tradition of moral philosophy (particularly in the eudaimonist tradition of ethics). In part two, I show how recent work in virtue theory can make a genuine and substantive contribution to the interdisciplinary field of moral education.

This work is an analysis of moral concepts in the philosophy of music education. Philosophy is understood in a broad sense as scholarly writing in music education that implicitly or explicitly involves discussions of right action, appropriate human interaction, or moral authority in music education. The works of six music education scholars (Bennett Reimer, David Elliott, Estelle Jorgensen, Thomas Regelski, Clifford Madsen, and Patrician Shehan Campbell) were analyzed by applying Lakoff and Johnson's theories of Conceptual Metaphor and Family Metaphor. Results of the analysis indicate that a range of moral authorities and moral systems are used and that they reflect the conceptual metaphors of Strict, Nurturant, and Permissive Parent Families. Possible applications and implications of this analysis for the practice of music education are explored.

This dissertation examines the ways in which elementary school teachers view their job as political. I asked teachers to reflect on how they construct their identity, inside and outside the classroom; their relationship with the community, inside and outside the educational institution; and what behavior they consider political.Teachers' identity is constructed through personal ideology and through societal influences such as historical context and popular culture. Radical pedagogy and feminist theory are the ideological lenses by which I measured the attitudes of teachers.Using grounded theory I found that elementary school teachers characterize their actions as moral rather than political, what they called "doing the right thing." This research is important for looking at ways that political involvement on the part of teachers can be reframed as moral behavior. It includes implications for the relationship of elementary school teachers' pedagogy and a democratic society.

The current program of research investigated factors that influence students’ perceptions of everyday moral violations, as well as their own inclinations to engage in immoral behaviours. In Experiment 1, I demonstrated that participants’ evaluations of a hypothetical student who contemplated plagiarizing an assignment depended on both the choice that was ultimately made and the length of time spent deliberating about it (cf., Tetlock et al., 2000). Specifically, when participants were informed that the student ultimately elected to refrain from cheating, the length of time that this individual spent considering the decision had no impact on their subsequent behavioural or character evaluations. However, when participants were informed that the student had succumbed to the temptation to cheat, they evaluated the individual more harshly if the decision to cheat had been made after a period of deliberation than if the decision had been made blithely, without any forethought. Experiment 2 extended this program of research by showing that stable and transient variations in construal level interact to influence participants’ perceptions of students who engage in acts of plagiarism. Specifically, participants with low levels of personal agency evaluated a hypothetical student who had plagiarized an assignment relatively charitably, regardless of how they were prompted to construe the situation. Furthermore, these participants felt a greater affinity for the student after being induced to construe the student’s actions in low-level terms. On the other hand, participants with high levels of personal agency who were induced to construe the student’s actions in high-level terms were less positive in their evaluations, and also felt less of an affinity for the student. Experiment 3 assessed the extent to which stable and transient variations in construal level interact to predict actual cheating behaviour during an evaluative task. The results of this investigation revealed that priming participants with low levels of personal agency to adopt high-level construals lessened the incidence of cheating among members of this group. In sum, the results associated with the current program of research suggest that transient shifts in construal level interact with stable levels of personal agency to influence students’ perceptions of peers who engage in academic dishonesty. Furthermore, they provide evidence that these two factors play a role in the extent to which students behave dishonestly in evaluative settings themselves. Potential applications that could be derived from the current findings and possible avenues for future research are discussed. / Thesis (Ph.D, Psychology) -- Queen's University, 2010-01-12 12:56:11.965