My hypothesis is that social contract theory does not satisfactorily explain why we owe a serious concern or respect to profoundly mentally disabled individuals (PMD). This is a problem for social contract theories if we assume, like I do in this dissertation, that the PMD possess a robust moral status (RMS). My dissertation will explore the main strategies deployed by contractarian and contractualist theorists to bring the PMD within the purview of the social contract, in order to clarify why some aspects of their claims are promising but why they nonetheless fail to fully explain the robust moral status of the PMD. I notably find that they leave morally important dimensions of human relations out of the contractual frame, which means that they exclude the PMD from the scope of justice and morality when they claim that this contractual frame offers the only valid explanation to be a subject of justice and a moral patient. I do not conclude that this requires us to reject social contract theory altogether, nor do I count it as a reason to question whether the PMD have a robust moral status. In my concluding chapter, I will rather suggest a theoretical frame that has the potential of incorporating both contractual and non-contractual relations within the spheres of morality and justice, because both kinds of relation vehicle important intuitions about what is of value in human life. This dissertation will contribute to orientate future research on the moral and political grounds for the rights of profoundly mentally disabled people, as well as question or curtail the breadth of certain key assumptions of social contract theories.

While the United Kingdom has a general commitment to religious freedom, there is currently very little written on what this commitment ought to mean for religious organizations. This thesis contributes to religious freedom literature by considering when United Kingdom law ought to apply to religious organizations. It answers this question by exploring certain potential conflicts between United Kingdom law and religious organizations paying particular attention to those that are under-examined and where the possibility of differential treatment is strongest. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part One consists of Chapter One and sets out the doctrinal and theoretical foundations of religious freedom. Here the thesis accepts that autonomy is the liberal normative justification for religious freedom. Part Two consists of Chapters Two to Chapter Seven and examines the interaction between United Kingdom law and religious organizations in six contexts: employment; the provision of goods and services; membership admission; internal discipline, internal property disputes; and family matters. Each chapter in Part Two is divided into two parts. The first part considers the legal doctrine that applies to religious organizations in that context. It then considers whether that approach can be justified in light of the commitment to religious freedom and autonomy identified in Part One. Part Three consists of the final chapter, Chapter Eight. This chapter uses the conclusions from the preceding doctrinal chapters to suggest a general approach for determining when law should apply to religious organizations. The thesis concludes that a contextual approach, that considers the often competing interests involved, is the best way of determining when law should apply to religious organizations. Such consideration ought to pay special attention to the importance of the particular activity to ensuring that the option of a religious way of life is available.

This thesis explores the intersection of freedom of expression (as protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter)) and copyright in Canada. In this thesis, I argue that both lower Canadian courts and the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) should reconsider their approaches to this intersection. Lower Canadian courts have consistently rejected arguments that provisions of Canada's Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression. The SCC, on the other hand, has consistently interpreted provisions of the Copyright Act in such a manner as to result in expanded protection for the expression interests of non-copyright owning parties. It has done so not by relying explicitly on the Charter right to freedom of expression, but through a process of statutory interpretation. I argue that both approaches merit reconsideration. Specifically, I argue that the approaches adopted by lower Canadian courts to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright are based on now-invalidated approaches to both copyright and to freedom of expression, and are thus themselves invalid; that to the extent to which the SCC's approach to this intersection assumes that the Charter right to freedom of expression can be protected, in the context of copyright, through statutory interpretation alone, that it fails to adequately protect the Charter right to freedom of expression; that other leading national courts from which the SCC has previously sought assistance have explicitly engaged with this intersection, and that the SCC should follow suit; and that the SCC's own copyright and freedom of expression jurisprudence suggests that provisions of the Copyright Act may unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression. These four arguments, taken together, suggest that the time is ripe for reconsideration of this intersection.

Submitted by Maria Aparecida (cidazen@gmail.com) on 2017-04-26T14:41:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Denisson Gonçalves.pdf: 2137540 bytes, checksum: 6d45b85c224614c1d0ac06f3d7d37728 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-26T14:41:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Denisson Gonçalves.pdf: 2137540 bytes, checksum: 6d45b85c224614c1d0ac06f3d7d37728 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-09 / Nowadays, the deficiency is a multidimensional thematic, approached by the most various areas of the Science, from the spheres of health, like medicine, to Social Sciences, such as Law and Politics. However, this plurivision is something recent, so that until the middle of the 21st century a purely biomedical perspective of the phenomenon of disability prevailed in a hegemonic way, considering it as pathology. The social model of disability emerges as an innovative paradigm, defining disability as the livingness in bodies with impairments in environments with barriers. In these terms, it becomes part of human diversity, not a stigma. In spite of this interpretative revolution, the deficiency is still governed by common standards, by charitable attitudes or even relegated to social invisibility. The Brazilian Law contains a vast number of protective norms for people with disabilities, however, they need enforcement. This misfortune is due in part to the lack of studies on this topic from a legal perspective. Furthermore, even within the sociology of health, the social model is still poorly diffused. Therefore, the objective of this work is to analyze the social model of disability from a Law perspective, showing "if" and "how" the internal legal system is adopting such archetype. The methodology used was the analysis of the content of national and international decisions and legislations, as well as the bibliographic review about the disability. The results found in this study show that the Brazilian State has a mechanism to enforce the rights of people with functional diversity, though, obstacles, such as invisibility, prejudice and socioinstitutional disengagement represent environmental barriers that generate and promote the exclusion of the disabled. / Hodiernamente, a deficiência é uma temática multidimensional, podendo ser abordada pelas mais variadas áreas da Ciência, desde as esferas da saúde, como a medicina, até as Ciências Sociais, como o Direito e Política. Entretanto, esta plurivisão é algo recente, de maneira que até meados do século XXI prevalecia de modo hegemônico uma perspectiva puramente biomédica do fenômeno da deficiência, considerando-a como uma patologia. O modelo social da deficiência surge como um paradigma inovador, definindo deficiência como a vivência em corpos com impedimentos em ambientes com barreiras. Neste sentido, ela se torna parte da diversidade humana e não um estigma. Apesar dessa revolução interpretativa, a deficiência ainda é governada pelos ditames do senso comum, por posturas caritativas ou mesmo relegada à invisibilidade social. O Direito brasileiro contém um amplo rol de normas protetivas das pessoas com deficiência, que contudo, carecem de densificação. Essa mazela deve-se em parte a carência de estudos sobre a temática pela ótica jurídica. Ademais, mesmo no âmbito da sociologia da saúde, o modelo social ainda é pouco difundido. Portanto, o objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o modelo social da deficiência pela perspectiva do Direito, demonstrando “se” e “como” o ordenamento jurídico interno está adotando tal arquétipo. A metodologia utilizada foi a análise de conteúdo de decisões e legislações nacionais e internacionais, bem como a revisão bibliográfica sobre a deficiência. Os resultados encontrados demonstram que o Estado brasileiro dispõe de mecanismo de efetivação dos direitos das pessoas com diversidade funcional, todavia, óbices, como a invisibilidade, preconceito e descomprometimento socioinstitucional representam barreiras ambientais que geram e promovem a exclusão dos deficientes.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 212-232).

Diss. Uppsala : Uppsala universitet, 2005.

Univ., Diss.--München, 1999.

Thesis (LL.M.)--The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, 2007. / Title from PDF t.p. (LLMC Digital, viewed on Mar. 22, 2010). "April 2007". Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University, 2002. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 292-307).

Habilitationsschrift--Zürich. / Bibliography: p. v-vi.